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Problem Statement  
A literature study will be conducted to determine what is known about the phenomenon of 
fume events in aircraft. The attention on this phenomenon will be clarified among a group of 
flight crew and a sample of people on Gløshaugen campus. 
Main Contents:  
1. Perform a literature study; use scientific sources to find out what is known about fume 
events and following possible health impacts. 
2. Describe the technical background of fume events.  
3. Give an overview of the severity and frequency of such fume events, given through media 
coverage and other sources.  
4. Conduct a survey among a selected group of flight crew and a sample of people on 
Gløshaugen campus to clarify if they acknowledge the extent of these events. 
5. Discuss the importance of the phenomenon’s nature and its extent of attention indicated in 
the results from the surveys.  
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Abstract 
The inlet for ventilation air to the cabin and cockpit is placed in the aircraft engines. The air 
supply is known as bleed air, which is used on most commercial aircraft. During leakage due 
to malfunctions in the engines, such as ineffective or damaged seals, the air may be 
contaminated with constituents like organophosphates and other hazardous chemicals from jet 
engine oils or hydraulic fluids. This phenomenon is described as a fume event. Media 
attention regarding the air-quality in aircraft cabins has the latest years increased. Flight crew 
and passengers have reported symptoms and negative health effects assumed to be associated 
with exposure to contaminated bleed air. The aim of the study was to find out what is known 
about the nature of fume events, and its attention among flight crew and a sample of people 
on Gløshaugen campus. In addition, it was desirable to clarify the severity and estimate the 
frequency of such events. A literature study was conducted to examine the technical 
background and characteristics of a bleed air system, the phenomenon of fume events, and 
possible health impacts following these events. Surveys were distributed to a selected group 
of flight crew and a sample of people on Gløshaugen campus, to clarify if they acknowledge 
the extent of fume events. An overview of possible fume events between January 2007 and 
December 2014 was compiled by the use of different databases and news articles.  
The response rate of the survey among pilots and cabin crew was 21 %. The results from the 
survey showed that 70.5 % of the 624 respondents were familiar with fume events, while 43.6 
% considered air contamination a problem in the aircraft industry. The response rate of the 
survey among people on Gløshaugen campus was 94.3 %. Of the 100 respondents, 85 % had 
not heard about such events, while 6 % had noticed an unusual smell or smoke in the cabin. 
There were found 701 possible fume events, which resulted in an estimated frequency of 0.24 
events per day. Researchers have attempted to find whether there exists any connection 
between reported health effects and fume events. Fume events have not been manifested by 
measurements or sampling of contaminated air during an event, but it is assumed that aircraft 
occupants can be exposed to a “chemical cocktail” of contaminants. Some of these chemicals 
are known to cause symptoms and adverse health effects. 
The general knowledge about fume events among flight crew is considered relatively good. 
Although the number of respondents in the survey among people on Gløshaugen campus is 
low, the results indicate that academics have less knowledge and attention about fume events 
than flight crew. Compared to other results from previous studies, the estimated frequency of 
such events is low. However, oil leakage episodes are known to be underreported due to 
variations in thresholds by flight crew to report an event, as well as subjective assessment of 
the air-quality. Further research is necessary to clarify whether the reported negative health 
effects can be explained by fume events. The air-quality in aircraft needs to be measured by 
the use of incident samplers. These should be placed in all aircraft to continuously measure 
the concentrations of contaminants entering the cabin and cockpit during a fume event. If the 
general population acquire better knowledge about fume events, the aircraft industry may be 
willing to implement mitigating measures to prevent such events, given that they are proven 
to cause the reported health impacts. 
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Sammendrag 
Inntaket for ventilasjonsluften til kabin og cockpit er plassert i flymotoren. Lufttilførselen er 
kjent som “bleed air”, og brukes i de fleste kommersielle fly. Ved lekkasje i motoren, 
eksempelvis som følge av ineffektive eller ødelagte pakninger, kan luften bli forurenset med 
organofosfater eller andre farlige kjemikalier som finnes i motorolje og hydraulisk væske. 
Fenomenet med forurensning av luften i fly kalles fume event, eller forurensningshendelser. 
Luftkvalitet i fly har de siste årene fått økt oppmerksomhet i media. Flybesetningen og 
passasjerer har rapportert symptomer og negative helseeffekter som er antatt å ha en 
forbindelse med eksponering for forurenset bleed air. Målet med oppgaven var å undersøke 
hva som er kjent om fume events, samt klargjøre grad av oppmerksomhet fenomenet har blant 
flybesetning og et utvalg personer på Gløshaugen campus. I tillegg var det ønskelig å 
klargjøre alvorlighetsgraden og beregne hyppigheten av slike hendelser. Det ble utført en 
litteraturstudie for å undersøke den tekniske bakgrunnen og funksjonen til et bleed air-system, 
fenomenet fume events, og mulige helseeffekter som følge av slike hendelser. 
Spørreundersøkelser ble distribuert til et utvalgt piloter og kabinansatte, samt et utvalg 
personer ved Gløshaugen campus, for å avklare om de er kjent med fenomenet fume events. 
Ved bruk av ulike databaser og nyhetsartikler ble det utarbeidet en oversikt over mulige fume 
events fra januar 2007 til 2014. 
Svarprosenten i spørreundersøkelsen blant piloter og kabinansatte var 21 %. Resultatene fra 
undersøkelsen viste at 70,5 % av 624 respondenter var kjent med fume events, mens 43,6 % 
anså luftforurensning som et problem i flyindustrien. Svarprosenten i undersøkelsen blant 
personer på Gløshaugen var 94,3 %. 85 % av de 100 som svarte, hadde ikke hørt om slike 
hendelser, mens 6 % hadde lagt merke til uvanlig lukt eller røyk i kabinen. Det ble funnet 701 
mulige fume events, noe som resulterte i en beregnet frekvens på 0,24 hendelser per dag. 
Forskere har tidligere forsøkt å finne ut om det eksisterer en sammenheng mellom rapporterte 
helseeffekter og fume events. Forurensningshendelser har ikke blitt bekreftet ved målinger 
eller prøvetaking av forurenset luft under en slik hendelse, men det er antatt at flybesetning og 
passasjerer kan bli utsatt for en “kjemisk cocktail” av forurensninger. Noen av disse 
kjemikaliene er kjent å forårsake symptomer og negative helseeffekter ved eksponering. 
Den generelle kunnskapen om fume events blant flybesetningen anses å være relativt god. 
Selv om antallet respondenter i undersøkelsen blant personer på Gløshaugen campus er lav, 
tyder resultatene på at oppmerksomheten og kunnskapen om fume events er mindre blant 
akademikere enn blant flybesetning. Sammenlignet med resultater fra tidligere undersøkelser, 
er den beregnede frekvensen av slike hendelser lav. Forurensningshendelser er imidlertid 
antatt å være underrapportert, siden flybesetning har forskjellige grenser for når hendelser må 
rapporteres, samt at luftkvaliteten blir vurdert subjektivt. Det er nødvendig med ytterligere 
forskning på området for å avklare hvorvidt de rapporterte negative helseeffekter kan 
forklares av fume events. Luftkvaliteten i fly bør måles ved bruk av prøvetakere, som bør 
plasseres i alle fly for kontinuerlig måling av konsentrasjoner av forurensning i kabin og 
cockpit under fume events. Hvis den generelle befolkningen får økt kunnskap om slike 
hendelser, samt at den antatte helserisikoen blir påvist, kan det fremtvinge eller gi incentiv for 
flyindustrien til å iverksette tiltak for å hindre slike hendelser.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Commercial aviation grew rapidly after World War II, and as a result of globalization, the 
utilization has had a large increase worldwide. Millions of people use them daily as a mode of 
transport. Reports of episodes where passengers, crew and pilots became ill after or during 
flights, have led to a growing concern about what may be the cause. Suspicions have been 
directed towards the breathing air inside the aircraft and possible contamination of chemicals 
from the oils and fluids used in the engine. As a result of this, increased attention has the 
latest years been given to the quality of aircraft cabin air, and especially the phenomenon of 
fume
1
 events.  
Several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Global Cabin Air Quality 
Executive (GCAQE), the Aerotoxic Association, and the Occupational Health Research 
Consortium in Aviation (OHRCA), have been established to investigate the phenomenon. In 
1953, the Aeromedical Association was the first (known) to express their concerns about risks 
of contamination from hydraulic fluids and lubricants, and the negative health effects 
associated with these (Rizzolo, 1954, Winder and Balouet, 2001). The first found report of 
suspected intoxication from contamination of the breathing air in an aircraft was written by 
Montgomery et al. (1977) (Winder and Balouet, 2001).  
According to Michaelis (2010, p 286), sources of air supply contamination are recognised to 
include hydraulic fluids, jet engine oils, de-icing fluids, fuel, exhaust fumes, ozone, pesticides, 
solvents and anti-corrosion spray, among others. On most commercial aircraft, the inlet for 
ventilation air to the cockpit and cabin is placed in the aircraft engines. The air supply is 
known as bleed air, and during leakage due to malfunctions in the engines, such as ineffective 
or damaged seals, it may be contaminated with engine oil containing organophosphates and 
other chemicals (Balouet et al., 1999). Bleed air is neither filtered nor monitored, so if it gets 
contaminated when it passes through the engines, the air inhaled by aircraft occupants will be 
contaminated without any alarms going off (Michaelis, 2010, p 47,52, Solbu et al., 2011, 
GCAQE, 2014). Fume events may be noticed by an unusual smell of engine or oil, wet dog, 
smelly socks or visual smoke (Michaelis, 2003, Schindler et al., 2012). The terms for this 
phenomenon are “fume event”, “contaminated air event”, “contamination event”, “oil leakage 
episode”, and “fume incident”, which are used interchangeably.  
If compounds from the oils are inhaled, many different symptoms may occur. Neurological 
symptoms are mainly thought to be caused by isomers of tricresyl phosphate (TCP), which are 
organophosphate compounds used in the jet engine lubricants as anti-wear additives (Singh 
and Sharma, 2000, Abou-Donia, 2003, Winder and Michaelis, 2005). TCP is the most studied 
chemical from the reviewed literature in this context. A generic term to describe the 
associated health effects caused by exposure to fume events is “aerotoxic syndrome” (Balouet 
et al., 1999).
                                                 
1
 “Fume” can be defined as an aerosol of solid particles, which may be formed by chemical processes or thermal 
mechanisms.  
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The pilot profession has long been, and still is dominated by males, while most females work 
as cabin crew (Pawlowski, 2011, FAA, n.d-a, Goyer, n.d). There are currently about 130 000 
airline pilots worldwide and approximately 4 000 of them are females, but these numbers are 
constantly changing (ISWAP, 2015). The exact number of pilots in Norway is not known, but 
is estimated to be about 2 500 (DN, 2013). In Norway, the maximum permitted working hours 
per year are 2 000, and the shifts are irregular dependent on the flight destination (Lovdata, 
2005).  
Contamination of air in the aircraft cabin and cockpit has been a topic of interest in the media 
the last few decades, where several aircraft crew and passengers have stood out and described 
symptoms possibly caused by the contaminants. The Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet has 
published several articles about the topic, among others one article about an aircraft with 73 
passengers flying between Stockholm and Malmö on the 12th of November 1999. The aircraft 
was about to crash as a result of the pilot and co-pilot feeling dizzy and incapacitated 
(Hansen, 2003). A case that has been brought up in the media in 2015 is the death of a pilot 
named Richard Westgate, who suffered serious health problems for years before he died in 
December 2012. The pilot claimed he had been poisoned by contaminated air in the cockpit. 
Newspapers wrote that examination of the pilot showed he had been exposed to toxic fumes 
on board (Hansen, 2015).  
Prior to 1962, the ventilation system used bleedless technology, where fresh air was drawn in 
through inlets at the wing roots rather than through the engines. After 1962, bleed air was 
used on all commercial flights until 2009, when the Boeing company manufactured Boeing 
787 with bleedless ventilation systems (GCAQE, 2014, p 4). 
Previous studies have attempted to find an estimate of the frequency of fume events, but due 
to the lack of an industry standard regulatory system for reporting, and the fact that there are 
different criteria of reporting such events in different airlines, no well-known frequency exist 
to date. The great variation in how such events are characterized and followed up between 
different airlines makes it challenging to assess the severity of the phenomenon. Based on the 
above, one can first ask whether the current knowledge about fume events is limited among 
the people that potentially are exposed the associated health risks, such as passengers and 
flight crew. No previous studies to find out whether they acknowledge such events have been 
done. It is assumed that the general public have insufficient knowledge about this issue, based 
on that it is not a topic that is discussed among “everyone”. Secondly, one can ask if the 
phenomenon and its causes are sufficiently described by available literature. It is believed that 
increased knowledge about the phenomenon would allow aircraft occupants, especially flight 
crew, to recognize and report fume events objectively when they occur, in addition to, 
potentially, demand change by implementation of preventive or mitigating measures. 
Similarly, if the frequency of fume events was properly quantified, and found to be high, the 
industry and the regulators may be more inclined to develop such measures. 
This assignment is part of the course TIØ4925 - Safety, Health and Environment, Master’s 
Thesis, incorporated in the Master’s degree of Safety, Health and Environment, at the 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). A literature study will be 
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conducted to determine what is known about the phenomenon of fume events in aircraft. The 
attention among flight crew and people on Gløshaugen campus regarding this phenomenon 
will be clarified by the use of surveys. Additionally, an overview of the frequency and 
severity of registered fume events will be presented. Information will be collected through 
scientific sources, media and other sources, all of which are specified, in addition to 
participation on GCAQE’s annual meeting in London in February 2015.  
1.1 History 
In a handbook published in 1953, the Aeromedical Association expressed their concerns about 
the toxicity risks of cabin air contamination by hydraulics and lubricants (Rizzolo, 1954). 
Winder and Balouet (2001) and Ross (2008) reviewed an article by Montgomery et al. (1977) 
about a 34 year old military navigator, who experienced acute intoxication following 
inhalation of vaporized synthetic lubricating oil from a contaminated air supply. This was the 
first paper found regarding ill health followed by exposure to contaminated air. Since then, a 
number of papers have been published, with descriptions of both acute and chronic symptoms 
from reported exposure to contaminated air. The appearing neurological symptoms are mainly 
thought to be caused by isomers of the organophosphate tricresyl phosphate (TCP), which are 
used as additives in jet engine lubricants (Singh and Sharma, 2000, Abou-Donia, 2003, 
Winder and Michaelis, 2005). 
1.1.1 The History of Tricresyl Phosphate 
According to Winder and Balouet (2002b), organophosphorus compounds have, at least since 
1899, been known to be toxic to humans. During earlier treatment of tuberculosis with 
phosphocreosole, there were reports of neurotoxicity. In the 1930s, there was an outbreak 
called “Ginger Jake Paralysis” which affected between 20 000-50 000 people in the United 
States (Schopfer et al., 2010, Ehrich and Jortner, 2002, Craig and Barth, 1999, Baron, 1981). 
The paralysis was caused by tricresyl phosphate which was an adulterant in a medicinal 
alcohol extract of ginger called “Jamaica Ginger”. The extract was a convenient way of 
consuming alcohol during the Prohibition, as it contained about 70 % alcohol (Parascandola, 
1995). Craig and Barth (1999) proposed that approximately 3.3 grams of TCP had been added 
per fluid ounce of extract (1 fluid ounce=0.02957 l). The subsequent symptoms would 
typically be numbness in the legs, followed by weakness and ultimately paralysis. In many 
cases the nervous system suffered damage, where patients got permanent disabilities 
(Parascandola, 1995). According to Schopfer et al. (2010), TCP has infamously been 
associated with this particular incident. Later on, there have been a number of reports 
regarding outbreak of TCP poisoning, with the latest reported in 1995 in China. It has 
generally been accepted that the ortho-cresyl phosphate isomers are the neurotoxic component 
of TCP (Winder and Balouet, 2002b). The chemistry of TCP will be described in chapter 
 1.10.2. 
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1.1.2 Tricresyl Phosphate in the Aircraft Industry 
Winder and Balouet (2002b) claim that most commercial use of TCP has ceased, despite that 
it is a commercially useful material. Earlier applications, among many, include TCP as a 
plasticizer, lubricant, hydraulic fluid, paint additive, oil additive and dust suppressant. TCP 
has flame retardant properties and is still used as an anti-wear additive in jet engine oil to 
enhance load bearing properties, and to improve tolerance for increasing the speed of rotating 
and sliding motion. “Torpedo oil” was a TCP product used during World War II, which with 
its content of about 25-40 % ortho-cresyl isomers (isomers of TCP) was highly toxic. To 
minimize the potential of neurotoxicity, the manufacturers reduced the content of ortho-cresyl 
isomers in the oils. By the 1950s, the content of ortho-cresyl isomers was reduced to about 3 
% in commercially available TCP, and during the 1980s and 1990s the level was further 
decreased. 
Since 1962 until 2009, the bleed air technology was the only applicable design of aircraft. 
Bleed air enters the cabin from jet engines. The jet engine operates by compressing outside 
air, before it enters the combustion chamber. Some of the compressed air is extracted (bled 
off) and used as ventilation air in the cabin and cockpit. In some earlier aircraft, like Douglas 
DC-8 and Boeing 707, this technology was not used. Instead, the outside air was drawn into 
the cabin by the use of turbo compressors or blowers. These were located on the outside of the 
fuselage, allowing air to enter into the aircraft during flight; the air was called “ram air”. 
Contamination of ram air was only possible when the outside air was contaminated from 
external sources, whereas bleed air may also be contaminated by internal sources such as 
components in the engine oil during leakage. The argument for choosing bleed air rather than 
ram air was mainly grounded in that a bleed air system was more economical, since the ram 
air system was heavy and not very fuel-efficient (GCAQE, 2014, van Netten, 2005). 
1.1.3  Increased Attention on Oil Containing Organophosphates  
A number of events since the 1980s in international aircraft industry led in 2002 to the 
Norwegian Oil Workers’ Trade Unions’ (OFS, now SAFE) demand of a full review of the 
occupational health, by a survey of health among people who had been exposed to turbine and 
hydraulic oils containing organophosphorus compounds (Bjørseth and Paulsen, 2003). In the 
spring of 2003, the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet published an extensive series of articles 
about “Giftoljesaken”. The articles were related to serious incidents and health effects, where 
organophosphates in hydraulic and turbine oils were suspected to be the cause. This was a 
result of OFSs earlier suspicions regarding a connection between the previously mentioned 
substances, and cases that included neurological damage. In the early 90s, there were a 
number of cases where workers on a Norwegian offshore platform showed symptoms of 
multiple sclerosis. Since the turbines offshore have many resemblances with jet engines on 
aircraft, parallels were drawn between the health effects among offshore workers and aircraft 
occupants and -technicians (STAMI, 2011). 
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1.2 Regulations and Standards  
Different guidelines and legislation exist in the aircraft industry to ensure that the aircraft are 
operated in a safe and airworthy manner. The only organization with regulatory authority to 
establish standards for the aircraft cabin environment is the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) (National Research Council, 2002, Tao et al., 2011). The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) was founded in 1944, and works with various global aviation 
organizations to develop international Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). In 
2013, the number of member states was 191, where Norway was among the Council member 
states (ICAO, n.d). Guidelines based on ICAO and nationally adopted regulations are mainly 
related to the aircraft function. A key element in the safety of aviation internationally is 
airworthiness of an aircraft.  Standards to describe airworthiness of transport category aircraft 
are established by ICAO, and are explained in detail in part 25 of the U.S. Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FARs). The standards define the requirements for an aircraft to be “fit for flight” 
or “airworthy”. The areas covered in the standards are, among others, aircraft design, power 
plants, aircraft performance and -equipment, and aircraft ventilation requirements (Michaelis, 
2010, p 31, U.S. Government, 2015).  
ICAO developed several protocols that member countries are obliged to pursue through their 
own legislation, set down by each national aviation regulator. In Norway this is the Civil 
Aviation Authority (Luftfartstilsynet). The established set of guidelines is based on FARs or 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specifications (CS) (Michaelis, 
2010, p 31, EASA, 2014). When countries follow established set of guidelines, they avoid 
spending considerable time making their own. 
The first aviation regulation on fumes and carbon monoxide (CO) in cabin or cockpit was 
founded in 1937 by the FAR, and required that “a suitable ventilation system shall be 
provided which will preclude the presence of fuel fumes and dangerous traces of carbon 
monoxide” (Murawski, 2009, Michaelis, 2010, p 32). The FAR Ventilation Regulation 25.831 
from 1964 stated that “...the ventilation system must be designed to provide a sufficient 
amount of uncontaminated air to enable the crewmembers to perform their duties without 
undue discomfort or fatigue and to provide reasonable passenger comfort”.  
From Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes CS-25.831, it is stated that “crew and 
passenger compartment air must be free from harmful or hazardous concentrations of gases 
and vapours”  (EASA, 2007, p 1-D-31). Further, “there must be provisions made to ensure 
that the conditions prescribed (...) are met after reasonably probable failures or 
malfunctioning of the ventilating, heating, pressurisation or other systems and equipment” 
(EASA, 2007, p 1-D-32).  
By government regulation the cabin pressure cannot be less than the equivalent of outside air 
pressure at approximately 8 000 ft. (2 400 m) (National Research Council, 2002). The 
regulations present clear boundaries for contents of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide (CO2) 
and ozone (O3) in the cabin air, but it has been claimed that they fail to incorporate the levels 
of other contaminants. This may be due to the intention that there are not supposed to be any 
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other contaminants present (Michaelis, 2010, p 35). The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) establishes permissible occupational exposure limits (PELs), which 
is intended for workplaces populated by healthy, working adults. Hence, they are not 
applicable in aircraft, where people of all ages and with different medical conditions reside 
(Tao et al., 2011). 
Considerations about health and comfort for the passengers are limited, apart from some 
health issues like medical first aid provisions, and some regulations for pressure and 
ventilation (Michaelis, 2010, p 31). There are certification requirements for some of the cabin 
environmental factors, but the existing standards for the specific environment of the cabin are 
not addressed in detail. When taking the risk of possible exposure to contaminated air by 
passengers and crew into account, it has been argued that the regulations have to be improved 
(Michaelis, 2010, Dechlow and Nurcombe, 2005). The environment in an aircraft is different 
from the one at sea level, which requires an artificial indoor climate. As a consequence, there 
should be standards especially for the flight environment. Even though it is over 50 years 
since the bleed air system was taken into use, few regulations to either prevent or monitor 
exposure to contaminants in the cabin and cockpit ventilation air exist to date (Dechlow and 
Nurcombe, 2005, Ministry of Business, 2013, Murawski, 2009). Currently, it does not exist 
any airworthiness standards about the filtration system to regulate the level of filtration 
removal efficiency required on board aircraft (Michaelis and Loraine, 2005). 
1.2.1 Guidelines to Exposure Standards   
Different workplace exposure standards (WES) are applied to measure the quality of cabin 
air. Examples of some of them are time-weighted average (WES-TWA) and short-term 
exposure limits (WES-STEL). The first standard represents an 8-hours working day and a 40-
hours working week, and the assigned value should not be exceeded throughout the working 
period. WES-STEL is a 15-minute exposure standard, and hence applies to any 15 min period 
of the working day (Ministry of Business, 2013). Limit of detection (LOD) is a term used to 
describe the smallest concentration of a substance that can be reliably measured by an 
analytical procedure (Lawson, 1994). Countries use different terms for exposure standards.  
1.3 Technical Background of Fume Events 
1.3.1  Commercial Jet Engines 
To move an aircraft through the air, thrust is generated by a propulsion system; the engine. 
The turbofan engine was first used in 1960, and is still used in most commercial aircraft and 
military fighters today. This engine has a propeller-like device inside the engine assembly, 
and is a combination of a propeller-driven aircraft and a pure turbojet. The engines are usually 
mounted under the wings, the tail or on the sides of the fuselage rear on the aircraft (IEEE, 
2013, Smith and Mindell, 2000, p 107). Airbus and Boeing, two well-known aircraft 
manufacturers, are used in commercial flights worldwide (Boeing, n.d., Airbus, n.d.). 
In order of market share, the turbofan engine market is dominated by General Electric 
Aviation, Rolls Royce plc and Pratt & Whitney, according to the companies’ web pages. 
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1.3.2 Turbofan Engine 
Turbofan engines are the most modern variant of the basic gas turbine engine (also called jet 
turbine engine). As with other gas turbines, it contains a core engine that is surrounded by a 
fan at the front and a turbine at the rear (Figure 1). The core compressor and core turbine are 
composed of many blades, which are connected to an additional shaft. The “turbo” in turbofan 
refers to a gas turbine engine which takes mechanical energy from combustion. The “fan” is a 
ducted fan that draws air into the engine. The bypass stream is compressed, which lead to 75-
80 % of the engines thrust by accelerating air rearwards. Turbofan engines can be divided into 
two categories; low-bypass turbofans (low ratio), which use more jet thrust relative to fan 
thrust, and high-bypass turbofans (high ratio), which conversely use more fan thrust than jet 
thrust (NASA, 2014h, p 107, Rolls Royce, 2015b, Smith and Mindell, 2000).  
 
Figure 1: Schematic cross sectional view of a jet engine. Air is compressed by the fan blades as it 
enters the engine. The air is mixed with fuel before it enters the burner/combustion section. The hot 
exhaust gases provide forward thrust and turn the turbines that drive the compressor fan blades 
(NASA, 2014c). 
1.3.3 Subsonic Inlet 
All turbine engines have an inlet placed upstream of the compressor (Figure 2). The main 
function of the inlet is to bring a suitable mass flow into the engine and reduce the speed of 
flow to a level suitable for mechanical compressor operation. This is dependent on different 
flight speeds and altitudes (Greatrix, 2012, p 163). For aircraft with speed much less than the 
speed of sound, the aircraft is said to be subsonic. Typical speed for subsonic aircraft is less 
than 250 mph (NASA, 2014g). 
 
Figure 2: Schematic cross sectional view of an engine inlet. The incoming air enters through the 
engine inlet (NASA, 2014d). 
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1.3.4 Compressor 
The primary purpose of the compressor is to increase the pressure of the incoming air before 
it enters the combustor (Figure 3). The total engine performance is highly dependent on the 
compressor performance. Alternating stages of rotating blades (rotors) and static vanes 
(stators) make up the compressor. The rotors are connected to the central shaft and rotate at 
high speed, while stators, on the other hand, are fixed and do not rotate. The compressor is 
attached to a shaft connected to the power turbine. Modern large turbojet- and turbofan 
engines usually use multi staged axial compressors due to the high amount of compression 
such engines require. The multiple stages increase the pressure and temperature of the air step 
by step as it flows through them. If a lesser amount of combustion is needed, the simpler 
single stage centrifugal compressor is applied. Air that flows through a centrifugal processor 
is turned perpendicular to the axis, and as a result of this, a system of multiple centrifugal 
stages would be inefficient because it would require air to be routed back to the axis at each 
stage (NASA, 2014b, Rolls Royce, 2015a, Greatrix, 2012, p 181).  
 
Figure 3: Schematic cross sectional view of the compressor section of a jet engine. The compressor 
increases the pressure of the incoming air before it enters the combustor (NASA, 2014b). 
1.3.5 Burner/Combustion Chamber  
Some of the incoming air passes through the fan and continues into the core compressor and 
further into the burner. The burner in turbofan engines is situated between the compressor and 
the power turbine, as shown in Figure 4 (NASA, 2014a). The combustion chamber can 
simplified be described as the place where fuel and air are mixed and burned to convert the 
chemical energy of the fuel into thermal energy. The term for this chemical process is 
combustion and it is continuous once the engine has started. The fuel is combusted at 
temperatures of over 2 000 °C within the combustion chamber, which means that the jet fuel 
to be used should have good overall combustion properties. Appearance of soot or smoke is 
evidence of unburnt fuel in the exhaust (Greatrix, 2012, p 190, Rolls Royce, 2015c, Palocz-
Andresen, 2013, p 153). When a hydrogen-carbon-based fuel (like gasoline) burns, the 
exhaust includes hydrogen, oxygen and carbon dioxide. Film cooling is commonly applied for 
inner liner surface cooling, using bled-off compressor air (NASA, 2014a).  
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Figure 4: Schematic cross sectional view of where combustion takes place in a jet engine. In the 
burner, air is heated by the injection, vaporization, and subsequent burning of the jet fuel (NASA, 
2014a). 
A burner usually has an outer casing, and an inner liner, which generally is perforated to 
enhance mixing of the fuel and air. There are three main types of combustors, and all of them 
are found in modern gas turbines, as shown in Figure 5 (NASA, 2014a). 
 
Figure 5: Illustration of the three main types of combustors. 1) Annular combustor with the liner 
(orange) inside the outer casing (red). Many modern burners have an annular design.  2) Can or tubular 
design. Each can have both a liner and a casing, and the cans are arranged around the central shaft. 3) 
Can annular design is a compromise between the two designs described above; the casing is annular 
and the liner is can-shaped (NASA, 2014a).  
The turbine is composed the same way as the compressor, with rows of air foil cascades 
called rotors and stators (Figure 6). Mechanical energy from hot gasses in the combustion 
chamber is extracted by the turbine. Since the turbine extracts energy from the flow, the 
pressure decreases across the turbine (Torenbeek and Wittenberg, 2009, p 220). Turbine 
blades experience flow temperatures of about 540 °C, and as the combustor walls, they must 
be made of materials that can tolerate heat or be actively cooled (NASA, 2014f). 
 
Figure 6: Schematic cross sectional view of a turbine. The turbine extracts energy from the air flow, 
and in that way the pressure decreases across the turbine. It is composed the same way as the 
compressor (NASA, 2014f). 
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1.3.6 Nozzle 
A nozzle is a specially shaped tube through which hot gasses from the turbine flow (Figure 7) 
(NASA, 2014e). After the final stage of the turbine, the remaining hot gas expands at high 
velocity through the engine exhaust nozzle, providing 20-25 % of the engine thrust (Rolls 
Royce, n.d). 
 
Figure 7: Schematic cross sectional view of a nozzle. The hot gasses flow through a nozzle, which is a 
specially shaped tube. The nozzles come in different shapes and sizes, depending on the aircraft 
utilization (NASA, 2014e). 
1.4 Fume Events in Aircraft Cabins 
Aircraft occupants may be exposed to many different air contaminants in the aircraft cabin, 
including carbon monoxide (CO) from engine exhaust, O3 from outside air, and organic 
compounds of biological origins. The latter are generated by emissions from materials in the 
cabin and the human body, as infectious agents, irritants and allergens. Incidents that result in 
the intake of potential contaminants from jet engine oils and hydraulic fluids can be described 
as fume events. These events occur if unintended release of engine oils, hydraulic fluids, de-
icing fluids, and combustion products pass through the environmental control system (ECS) 
and into the cabin (National Research Council, 2002).  
Leakage of jet engine oil, hydraulic oils, and de-icing fluids may lead to exposure of 
contaminants from the bleed air in the aircraft cabin. The oils are known to contain different 
neurotoxins, carcinogens, irritants and other toxic agents (WHO, n.d). Contamination by 
aircraft fluids can be due to smoke from engine fire, leaks of combusted or pyrolyzed 
materials, or seal failures, among others (Balouet et al., 1999). In case of seal leakage in the 
compressor stage of the jet engine oil system, the oil enters the bleed air stream, gets 
aerosolized, compressed, and heated to a high degree, before it enters air condition packs, and 
finally ends up in the cabin and cockpit (Hocking, 2005, p 200). Contamination may also be 
due to wear and aging of materials, ground operations at gate or on tarmac (as airport 
surrounding, de-icing procedures, pack burnout procedures or recirculation), design flaws (as 
fluids accumulating at the APU-inlet, rear engines ingesting hydraulic leaks, or thrust reverser 
hydraulic lines), or residual contamination from lack of cleaning after contamination events 
(Balouet et al., 1999).  
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Solbu et al. (2011) developed a simple automatic air incident sampler with the purpose to 
assess concentrations of organophosphates (OPs) from jet engine oils and hydraulic fluids in 
aircraft when fume events occur. The sampler was supposed to collect samples during sudden 
and unexpected incidents with potential of exposure to semi-volatile organophosphates and 
possible volatile decomposition products. Ten incident samplers were placed in ten different 
aircraft within a one year period, but were never taken into use, since such incidents did not 
occur during the period. To date, there are no long-term samplers in use to measure aircraft air 
quality in the aircraft industry.  
1.4.1 Organizations That Register Fume Events  
The American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates and monitors all aspects of 
civil aviation in the United States. The agency falls under United States Department of 
Transportation (FAA, n.d-a). The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an 
independent Federal agency charged by the Congress. It investigates every civil aviation 
accident in the U.S. and issues accident reports following the investigation. The reports are 
available online (National Transportation Safety Board, n.d). 
The European Coordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS) 
is a database that the National and European transport entities use in their work to collect, 
share and analyse their safety information in order to improve public transport safety. The 
incidents are, according to the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet, reported according to four 
levels of seriousness; aviation accidents, serious incidents, aviation incidents and operational 
malfunctions (the reporting levels in ECCAIRS could not be confirmed, due to denied 
access). Some cases of gas or oil smell on board aircraft are probably not looked upon as 
serious incidents, and may be reported as “operational malfunctions”. These events are to be 
reported to the Authority, but are not recorded in any databases. Hence, there may be 
underreporting of these types of incidents.  
In Norway, incident reporting is divided into incidents, aviation accidents and serious aviation 
accidents, according to the current regulations for reporting, BSL A 1-3 (Lovdata, 2007, 
Ingebrigtsen, 2014). During 2015, a new legislation for the regulation of reporting will take 
effect, the Regulation (EU) No 376/2014. All new reporting systems should be compatible 
with the reporting system in ECCAIRS (European Parliament, 2014, Ingebrigtsen, 2014). 
Several organizations are concerned with fume events in aircraft cabins, the ones mentioned 
in this thesis is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: List of organizations with concerns about fume events in aircraft. The information in the table 
is found in the organizations respective web pages. 
Name of the 
organization 
What they do 
Aerotoxic 
Association 
Incidents including fume events are continuously updated. The organization 
concentrates on aerotoxic syndrome. 
European Aviation 
Safety Agency 
(EASA) 
The centrepiece of the European Union’s aviation safety system comprises 
of the Agency, the European Commission and the National Aviation 
Authorities (NAAs). 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
(FAA) 
The American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates and 
monitors all aspects of civil aviation in the United States. 
Global Cabin Air 
Quality Executive 
(GCAQE) 
An international organization with primary purpose of affecting necessary 
changes in the aircraft industry to prevent exposure to oil and hydraulic 
fluid. Represents air crew (pilots, cabin crew and engineers), offshore 
workers and consumers. 
 
International Civil 
Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) 
 
Works with the Convention on International Civil Aviation Member States 
and global aviation organizations to develop international Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) that the States refer to when developing 
their legally-enforceable national civil aviation regulations. 
Norwegian Civil 
Aviation Authority 
(Luftfartstilsynet) 
Independent administrative body with regulatory responsibilities for the 
Norwegian Civil Aviation. 
Occupational Health 
Research Consortium 
in Aviation 
(OHRCA) 
The Occupational Health Research Consortium in Aviation (OHRCA) 
received some of the funds from FAA to carry out research on air quality 
incidents and health effects on airline crew members. 
  
1.4.2  Frequency of Fume Events 
Murawski (2011) states that neither the individual airlines nor the general aircraft industry 
have a well described frequency, cause and characteristic of fume events. Some researchers 
have attempted to find an estimate of the frequency of such incidents. Air contamination 
events, or fume events, are assumed to be underreported (Murawski, 2011, Murawski and 
Supplee, 2008, Michaelis, 2010, van Netten, 2005). There are only a few studies regarding 
frequency of fume events that exist to date, some of which follow below.   
van Netten (2005) identified air contamination events to occur in 1-3.8 per 1 000 flights, and 
found that the frequency depends on the type of aircraft and its maintenance. It is claimed that 
underreporting occurs, and that the cause appears to be, among others, subjective assessment 
of the air quality within the aircraft. The flight crew may consider the temporary smell when 
engines start as “normal”,  and since they are somewhat used to it, they do in some cases not 
find it necessary to report. It is also claimed that there is an intimidating factor due to 
underreporting, in which pilots are afraid to lose their job if they report symptoms after 
noticing smell or smoke in the cockpit, since they are dependent on their medical certificate to 
continue their career. Hence, a pilot do not want to complain about his health following 
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exposure to the co-pilot, because it would target his health status if the co-pilot does not 
notice any symptoms (Murawski, 2011, van Netten, 2005).   
Murawski and Supplee (2008) did a study where data about fume events was collected in the 
U.S. between January 2006 and June 2007. The reports that were used included the specific 
words “fume”, “haze”, “mist”, “odour”, “smell”, or “smoke”. 350 out of 470 incidents were 
reported by the airlines to the Federal Aviation Authorization and put into their database, 
while others were reported by flight attendants to the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA). 
Some of the incidents were also found in media articles. Most of the incidents, 319 (68 %), 
occurred while in-flight, of which the majority was specified to climb (42 %) or cruise (26 
%).  57 % of incidents that occurred while en route returned or diverted to the nearest airport, 
whereas the incidents that occurred when the aircraft was on ground rejected take-off and 
were either delayed or cancelled. Several of the reports did not include any cause of the 
incidents. This was assumed to be due to the time required to find a plausible cause, and that 
the airlines do not want to provide information about the cause of an event with absence of 
exposure data. It was furthermore assumed to be because there are no monitors to assist in 
identifying fume events, and that sense of smell by the flight crew is unreliable. They may 
sense the smell as electric, even though the cause is oil leakage. The results of the study 
indicated an average of 0.86 events per day in the U.S., by the noted time period. 
Murawski (2011) conducted a case study in 2009-2010, where a total of 87 fume events of 
one major U.S. airline were identified. The results showed that the crew reported unusual 
smell on 83 of the 87 flights. The smell was noticed prior to take-off on 44 (50.6 %) of the 
flights, and 20 (45.5 %) of these were either delayed or cancelled. 34 of the events (39.1 %) 
occurred while the aircraft was airborne. Oil was confirmed to contaminate the air supply on 
41 of the 87 flights, and one or more crewmember reported symptoms in all of the 87 fume 
events. In 35 (40.2 %) out of the 87 flights the smell was characterized as “dirty socks or 
smelly feet”. The smell was mainly present prior to take-off in 44 flights (50.6 %), which 
shows different results than the study conducted by Murawski and Supplee (2008). It was 
recommended that airlines should train pilots and cabin crew to recognize when they may be 
exposed to fumes (Murawski, 2011).  
Michaelis (2010) conducted a review of reported fume events in the UK to determine the 
frequency of such events. The databases used included the Civil Aviation Authority of the 
United Kingdom (CAA), the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB), and the Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). A total of 1 050 events were found between 1985 and mid-
2006. It was claimed that less than 4 % of all fume events are assumed to be reported, and that 
reasons for this are, among other factors, that regularly smell is seen as normal, flight crew 
assume that their symptoms can be explained due to something else than exposure to fumes. 
In addition, fumes are only seen as health and comfort issues.   
The UK Committee on Toxicity (COT) reported that events occur in 1 % of flights. This value 
is based on information from 3 airlines in the UK. Based on engineers’ verification of smoke, 
it occurs in 0.05 % of flights in the UK, noting that the frequency may vary by engine type, 
maintenance practices and the type of aircraft where incidents occur (COT., 2007). 
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The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reported in 2010 more than 900 smoke or 
fume events of all kinds, including but not limited to, hydraulic fluid and oil in the air (FAA., 
2011, Furlong, 2011).  
Shehadi et al. (2015) conducted a case study where the frequency of fume events was 
estimated by examining incident databases from the FAA, NASA and other sources from 
2007 to 2012 for flights that either originated or terminated in the U.S. Incidents where 
smoke, oil smell, fumes or any symptoms that could relate to fume events had been noticed, 
was included. The results showed an average incident rate of 0.2 per 1 000 flights in the U.S. 
Occurrence of incidents were found to be spread widely across all major aircraft 
manufacturers and models. 
1.4.3  Fume Events Reported in the Media   
Following are some accidents assumed to have a connection with contaminated air in aircraft. 
The events are only a small part of all registered incidents, but are mentioned here due to their 
severity, and media attention. 
“Pilots Knocked Out by Nerve Gas” (1999) 
Dagbladet began to take an interest on the topic of toxic fumes on board aircrafts and 
published in 2003 an article regarding this. The incident happened on the last of three flights 
between Stockholm and Malmö in 1999. The aircraft was from the BAe 146 series. Both the 
pilot and co-pilot were struck by severe dizziness and nausea, and even though they put on 
oxygen masks, the captain continued to have symptoms. The cabin crew had on the two 
earlier flights noticed that something was wrong with the cabin air (Hansen, 2003).  
The Swedish Accident Investigation Board compiled a report about the same incident. It 
emerged that some of the cabin crew had experienced the feeling of fainting, pressure in the 
head, nasal itching and ear pain on the first and second flight, while the pilots did not notice 
anything abnormal. Subsequent to the incident on the third flight, the airline performed a 
trouble-shooting of the aircraft. This revealed an external leak in one of the engines, which led 
technicians to test the bleed air- and air-condition system. These revealed no indication to 
which chemical substances could have caused the symptoms, and no technical fault could 
explain the incident. The board concluded that the pilots probably were affected by polluted 
cabin air (Lundström and Elinder, 2001). 
“Norwegian Airline Captain Permanently Injured” (2000) 
In 2000 there was an incident on a flight from Gardermoen, Oslo, to Charles DeGaulle, Paris. 
The aircraft was from the Boeing 737 series. The co-pilot noticed an acrid smell in the cockpit 
after about five minutes at cruising level, and both pilots started to feel unwell. The smell was 
recurrent, and the captain decided to return to Gardermoen, but finally made an emergency 
landing at Torp airport. The pilot experienced symptoms such as confusion and dizziness 
(Hansen, 2006).  
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According to a report by the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board from this event, the 
cargo compartment was inspected, but the source of the smell was not detected, neither at the 
moment of the happening or after further investigation. Subsequent to the incident, the pilot 
had reduced general state and was granted sick leave. After a period, he was declared 
incapable as pilot for medical reasons and was given “loss of license” (HSL., 2002).  
“Dead BA Pilots Victims of Toxic Cabin Fumes” (2013) 
There were suspicions about the relationship between exposure to toxic oil fumes on aircraft 
and the death of a 43 year old pilot, Richard Westgate. Prior to his death in 2012 he suffered 
persistent headache, chronic fatigue, mood swings and loss of confidence. The same article 
also mentions Karen Lysakowska, a 43 years old female pilot who died only days before 
Westgate. As with Westgate, she believed that she had been exposed to toxic fumes (Jeory, 
2013). Ante-mortem in vivo blood had been collected prior to Westgate’s death, due to his 
suspicions about toxic fumes being the cause of his ill health. There was also conducted tests 
post-mortem. Scientific researchers concluded that injury to the nervous system was 
consistent with organophosphate-induced neurotoxicity (Abou-Donia et al., 2014).  
“Passengers and Crew May Have Been Exposed to Toxic Fumes” (2014) 
In a more recent case, from 2014, the passengers in a Boeing 737-800 heading to Brüssel 
from Oslo were evacuated on the runway, after the crew noticed smoke in the cabin. A 
spokesman from STAMI claimed it was a typical “smoke-in-cabin incident”, while a 
spokesman from SAFE claimed that it “looked like a fume incident”. The airlines head of 
information claimed that the smell was similar to the one used during training, and that it is 
not toxic or harmful. Increased concentrations of organophosphates were found in the cabin 
following the incident (Hansen, 2014). No investigation report of the incident is published.  
“Plane Carrying 185 Passengers Forced to Make Emergency Landing After 
Nine Crew Fall Ill due to Noxious Fumes” (2014) 
It was declared emergency on an A330 Airbus flying from Venice to Philadelphia, when 
cabin crew started to feel nauseous and dizzy two hours into the flight. According to the Irish 
Aviation Authority, the aircraft turned around and diverted, and the aircraft was evacuated on 
the airport. None of the pilots or passengers reported feeling ill, whereas nine cabin crew 
members were taken to a hospital for examination. The incident was investigated by both the 
U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Irish Air Accident Investigation 
Unit (AAIU) (Boyle, 2014). There is no  investigation report published of the incident.  
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1.5 Environmental Control System 
Aircraft are equipped with an environmental control system (ECS) to deal with the extreme 
conditions at cruising altitude. The main functions of the ECS are to provide pressurized air 
and thermal comfort for the passengers and cabin crew, and air supply without harmful 
contaminants. Passengers and crew are able to breathe due to the pressurized environment in 
cabin in flight (Dechlow and Nurcombe, 2005, Michaelis, 2010, p 47). 
The ECS has some primary functions regarding air conditioning. These include heat 
exchangers, compressor, water extraction and turbine, and the air distribution, -recirculation 
and -pressurization, including associated fans, valves and ducts. The bleed air system delivers 
hot air from the engines, Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) or external sources to the ECS, and a 
trim system let off some of this hot air before it passes through the air conditioning unit. The 
air is led to a distribution duct for temperature control reasons. One of the challenges with the 
ventilation system is that requirements of both crew and passengers must be fulfilled within 
the same cabin conditions (Dechlow and Nurcombe, 2005).  
1.5.1 How Air Enters the Cabin 
The airflow from outside enters into the engine and either goes around the core of the engine 
(“fan air”), or to the core where it is compressed. The compressed air enters the combustion 
section of the engine, where jet fuel is added. The majority of the air entering the core of the 
engine passes on to the combustion section, but some of the compressed air, typically 2-8 %, 
is bleed air. This can be taken from specific stages of the compressor section in the engine, 
depending on the design by the engine manufacturer. The location of the bleed air ports on the 
engine is dependent on the pressure or temperature required for a particular task or stage of 
flight (Michaelis, 2010, p 47, Smith, 1991).   
Usually, engines are designed with a low and a high stage pressure bleed air take-off point in 
the compression section. At high power settings, the bleed air will normally be taken from the 
lower pressure take-off point. When the pressure at low pressure point decreases beneath a 
predetermined level, the bleed air returns back to the high pressure take-off point. The bleed 
air is taken from the compressor section, before the compressed air enters the combustion 
section (Hunt et al., 1995). 
The bleed air from the compression section keeps high temperatures, from 350-600 °C, at 
high compression stage, and between 100-300 °C in the low stage compressor. Thus, when air 
containing various substances passes through the engine, such as when leakage of oil within 
an engine occurs, there is always a risk of combustion which may cause by-products to end up 
in the cabin air (Spittle, 2003). The air that enters through the engines is not distributed evenly 
throughout the aircraft.  
The cockpit receives outside air continuously, which means that the air is 100 % new outside 
air. In the cabin, however, the air is 60/40 % recycled air, which means that the cabin receives 
about 10-fold less bleed air. At this ratio, the air from outside will refill the air space in the 
cabin every three to five minutes. As a consequence, pilots situated in the cockpit would be 
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exposed to components from oils and hydraulic fluids to a higher degree during fume events, 
than people in the cabin (van Netten, 2005, de Boer et al., 2014, Michaelis, 2010, p 55). The 
air drawn in from the engines passes through air-conditioning packs, which is an air cycle 
refrigeration system that cools the hot air before it enters different locations of the cabin or 
cockpit (SKYbrary, n.d.). By the use of heat exchangers, a combined turbine and compressor 
machine (an air cycle machine), valves for temperature and flow control. The unfiltered 
outside air enters a mixing chamber (called the “mix manifold”) after being cooled by the air-
conditioning packs, and is mixed with an equal amount of recirculated air before it enters the 
cabin from the overhead outlets (Figure 8) (Michaelis and Loraine, 2005). The recirculation 
system is equipped with High Efficiency Particulate Air filters (HEPA), which removes dust 
and other small particles like viruses and bacteria from the recirculated air. HEPA filters do 
not remove gases and vapours due to their small molecular sizes (Hunt et al., 1995, Bull and 
Roux, 2010).  New filtering system is being developed, and a new system based on nano-
photocatalytic oxidation has been introduced. By the use of this type of filter, it was claimed 
that bacteria and viruses would be killed, in addition to clear the VOCs in the cabin (Tao et 
al., 2011). 
The bleed air can also flow through an APU, but this is mostly used on the ground or in some 
cases during take-off and landing. The APU is used to provide air to the air conditioning 
packs, and to start the engine or electrical power from a relatively small self-contained engine. 
It is located at the rear on most commercial aircraft. The on-board APU, a small gas turbine 
(turboshaft) engine, can be valved to deliver high-pressure air to an engine’s starter turbine 
(Greatrix, 2012, p 194, Michaelis, 2010, p 52). 
 
Figure 8: Schematic overview of the ventilation system on an aircraft. Outside air passes through the 
engine and is heated as a result of pressure changes. The air continues to the air conditioning unit to 
get a suitable temperature. From the air condition unit it enters the air mixing unit. Here, the bleed air 
is mixed with filtered and recirculated air from the cabin. The mixed air finally enters the cabin and 
then either passes back to the air mixing unit, or is discharged to the atmosphere (Pall, 2014, Michaelis 
and Loraine, 2005). 
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1.5.2 Emergency Oxygen Masks 
The emergency oxygen system is designed to store or generate a supply of oxygen. It 
regulates, dilutes and distributes oxygen to aircraft occupants. Depending on type and role of 
the aircraft, the oxygen system may be used during normal operations, to provide 
supplemental oxygen for specific situations or to provide emergency oxygen in case of events 
with smoke, fire, fumes or loss of pressure. National regulations for provision and use of 
supplemental or emergency oxygen systems are based on the guidance provided in Annex 6 
of the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) (SKYbrary, 2014). SARPs’ 
Annex 6, part II reference 2.2.3.8, states that the pilot in command have to ensure that 
breathing oxygen is available to crew members and passengers in sufficient quantities. This is 
valid for all flights at altitudes where lack of oxygen may change the crew members’ abilities 
to work or harmfully affect the passengers. Reference 2.4.6.1 states that aeroplanes intended 
to be operated at high altitudes shall be equipped with oxygen storage and suppliers capable 
of storing and dispensing the oxygen supplies required in reference 2.2.3.8 (ICAO, 2010).  
The drop-down oxygen masks on an aircraft provide recirculated cabin air, which may 
contain oil contaminants in case of leakage. Pilots and flight attendants have access to 100 % 
pure oxygen from portable bottles. When the pressure in the cabin becomes too low, pilots 
and cabin crew have access to about 15 minutes of pure air from their oxygen bottles. This is 
the estimated time needed to lower the altitude and increase the pressure inside the aircraft 
(Nassauer, 2009). The oxygen masks used by the passengers can be used in at least 10 
minutes in case of low pressure. This air is not 100 % pure oxygen as it is mixed with the air 
in the cabin (Loraine, 2008). 
1.6 Environmental Factors 
Some environmental factors have to be taken into account when considering the airworthiness 
of an aircraft, and specifically the aircraft indoor quality. Reported negative health effects 
may be explained by other factors than fume events, such as a pressurised environment, 
temperature, humidity and biological factors, or a combination of these factors and fume 
events. 
1.6.1 Pressure at Cruising Altitude 
The lowered pressure outside an aircraft is hostile to human life at cruise levels of modern 
aircraft. 11 000-12 200 m above sea level is the typical cruising altitude, and in the cabin, this 
height is equivalent to the outside air pressure at 1 800-2 400 m above sea level (called the 
cabin altitude). Oxygen (O2) levels remain constant at 20.9 % at increasing altitude, which 
means that the proportion of oxygen in air remains unchanged. To keep both cabin crew and 
passengers healthy, a certain amount oxygen saturation of the blood is required, depending on 
the oxygen partial pressure of the cabin air (Dechlow and Nurcombe, 2005). Since the 
atmospheric pressure decreases at increasing altitude above sea level, the partial pressure of 
oxygen decreases (Figure 9).  
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Healthy passengers usually tolerate the effects of reduced cabin air pressure, but those with 
certain medical conditions, such as heart- and lung diseases, and blood disorders, may not 
tolerate an environment of reduced pressure (Winder and Balouet, 2002a, WHO, n.d).  
 
Figure 9: Change in atmospheric pressure with altitude. 
1.6.2 Effects of Low Pressure  
The sensitivity to toxic contaminants is changed with lowered oxygen concentrations. 
Hypoxia is a condition with low absorption rate of oxygen from the lung alveoli into the 
bloodstream. When cruising at high altitude, people have higher respiratory rates and 
increased inhalation due to the hypoxic environment (reduced oxygen environment) at 
cruising level (Ross et al., 2006). Reduced air pressure may cause crew members and 
passengers to not obtain enough oxygen for their physiological requirements. As a 
consequence, increased respiratory rates may cause a higher susceptibility in case of exposure 
to toxicants (Winder and Balouet, 2002a).   
Since the aircraft is pressurized to the equivalent between 6 000 and 8 000 ft., symptoms of 
hypoxia that may act adversely with exposure to chemical exposures, may occur. An example 
of a compound leading to hypoxia is the odourless and colourless gas carbon monoxide (CO), 
which has 50 % higher toxicity at 8 000 ft. (2 438 m above sea level) than at sea level 
(Winder and Balouet, 2002b). When contaminants entering the bleed air supply system are 
thermally decomposed, CO may be generated. It may also be produced as a by-product of 
incomplete combustion. The concentration of CO depends on the air flow, the quantity of the 
contaminant, the temperature of the bleed air, as well as surfaces in contact with the 
contaminant (Michaelis, 2010, p 111). When CO is inhaled, it combines with haemoglobins 
(Hb) in blood to form carboxyhaemoglobin (COHb). COHb have a much higher affinity to Hb 
than oxygen, which causes a lack of oxygen for the cells in the body (Boyle, 2006).  
Hyperventilation is claimed to be a common condition in the pressurized aircraft environment, 
especially when flight attendants are confronted with an unusual event or emergency in the 
aircraft. The symptoms after being exposed to fumes in the cabin are reported to be the same 
as those seen during hyperventilation. Hence, it is concluded that some cases of fume events 
can be explained by hyperventilation (Bagshaw, 2014). 
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1.6.3 Temperature and Humidity in Aircraft Cabin 
Thermal comfort can be defined as a combination of air, temperature, air velocity, rate of 
velocity fluctuation and humidity, including the ratio of these parameters. To ensure that the 
ventilation air supply is correctly distributed throughout the cabin, it is important to consider 
the air flow pattern. Large commercial aircraft often use a circular flow pattern, where 
ventilation air enters at the top of the cabin and circulates as two counter-rotating advection 
rolls, before being exhausted at floor level (Dechlow and Nurcombe, 2005). For every 1 000 
ft. (305 m) of increase in altitude in the troposphere
2
, temperature reduces with a constant of 
about -2 °C to -3.5 °C. The aircraft uses the environmental control system to keep the 
temperature at a constant when temperature outside decreases (FAA, n.d-b, p 22).  
For human comfort and aircraft safety, the humidity is controlled. High humidity in the cabin 
air may lead to passenger discomfort, especially in addition to high temperature. In addition, it 
may lead to condensation, dripping, and freezing of moisture on the inside of the aircraft 
shell, and eventually corrosion. Biological growth can also be a result of condensation. As the 
humidity at cruising altitudes is usually very low, respiration and evaporation from the skin of 
occupants are the main sources of humidity in the cabin air (National Research Council, 2002, 
p 52). 
1.6.4 Biological Factors 
Other factors likely to cause negative health effects in people are biological agents. Agents 
from plants, microorganisms and animals have been found on aircraft. Biological airborne 
particles are termed bioaerosols, and can be found in the outdoor air near the ground, or in the 
outside air of the aircraft. Biological material, especially fungal spores and pollen grains are 
contained in outdoor air up to an altitude of about 4920 ft. (1 500 m). The amount and mixture 
of different bioaerosols depend on the location of the aircraft, as well as the ambient 
conditions. These enter through open doors and the ventilation system. The primary source of 
airborne bacteria is humans. The cabin passengers and the furnishing have been concluded to 
cause the presence of airborne microorganisms such as cultivable bacteria and fungi. Most of 
these microorganisms are found on the human skin, and rarely cause any infections (National 
Research Council, 2002, WHO, 1998). 
  
                                                 
2
 The lowest layer of the atmosphere, where most civilian aviation cruise. 
  1.0 INTRODUCTION 
21 
 
1.7 Jet Engine Oil System 
The regulations for international aviation demand that each engine is equipped with an 
independent oil system that under all conditions should be capable of providing continuous oil 
flow to the engine (Exxon Mobil, 2014b). 
1.7.1 Engine Seals   
Seals are installed in the jet engines to prevent oil leakage from the engine bearing chambers. 
The seals control the cooling airflow and prevent entrance of the mainstream gas into the 
turbine disc cavities. Various type of seals have been designed to only allow air and not 
engine oil through the compressor stage of the engines (Michaelis, 2010, p 52). 
The jet engine oil system stores, carries, cools, and distributes oil that is needed for 
lubricating and cooling of components in the engines. Oil sumps are a part of the oil circuit, 
and to prevent oil leakage and pollution of the bleed air, the oil must remain inside the oil 
circuit at all times (Figure 10). A front sump is located in the compressor section, a mid sump 
is placed after the burner, before the turbine, while an aft sump is located in the turbine 
section (Exxon Mobil, 2014b). 
The sumps are sealed by labyrinth or carbon seals, and the bearings and gears enclosed inside 
the sumps require lubrication. The pressure inside the sumps must be lower than outside to 
prevent oil leaking into and contaminating the cabin air. From the core engine compressors, 
the pressurizing air is bled off and injected between two labyrinth seals into the dry cavity in 
the bearing sump before it flows across the oil seals. An oil mist is created when air mixes 
with part of the oil inside the sump cavity. The ventilation air that carries droplets has to be 
discharged overboard through a rotating air/oil separator (Exxon Mobil, 2014c).  
 
Figure 10: Schematic view of a jet engine oil system. The oil sumps are located along the main shaft 
line and surrounded by a dry cavity. The core engine compressors bleed off pressurized air, and the air 
is injected between two labyrinth seals into the dry cavity before it flows across the oil seals (Exxon 
Mobil, 2014c). 
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1.8 Jet Engine Oils, Hydraulic Fluids and De-Icing Fluids 
Jet engine oils and hydraulic fluids are used in jet aircraft operations, where the former are 
developed specifically for aviation gas turbine engines. Their main functions are to lubricate 
and cool engine bearings. The jet engine oils used in the aircraft industry are needed to 
operate over huge temperature differences, from -40 °C for cold starting, and up to more than 
250 °C. During many different aircraft operations, lubricants in the jet engine oils will 
undergo extreme heat (Exxon Mobil, 2014g).  
Hydraulic fluids are the medium by which energy is transferred in hydraulic machinery. The 
fluids transmit energy in fluid-filled, pressurized systems, from the generating sector (the 
hydraulic pumps) to the motor sector (the hydraulic motors, actuating cylinders, or turbines). 
Valves control the quantity, pressure and direction of flow of the fluid. There exist two types 
of hydraulic principles; hydrokinetic and hydrostatic drives, where the latter are being used in 
aviation. The pressure in a fluid is distributed evenly in all directions in the hydrostatic drives. 
A certain volume of hydraulic fluid is displaced by the pump per stroke against the pressure in 
the system (Ramesh et al., 2013, Möller and Young, 2000).  
Hydraulic fluids also have other functions than energy transfer; to lower friction between 
moving sliding parts and reduce wear (lubrication), to effectively remove heat in the system, 
to protect the steel or metal surfaces from corrosion, and to keep the system clean from oil 
insoluble products, such as dust or oxidation products. Hydraulic systems intended for 
aviation have to fulfil various functions, like moving flight control surfaces that help steer-, 
take-off- and land the aircraft, engage aircraft brakes and deploy- or retract landing gear. 
Hydraulic fluids used in aircraft have particular requirements, such as extremely low wear in 
pumps and valves, very good low-temperature behaviour, and very low tendency to fire 
propagation (Möller and Young, 2000, Exxon Mobil, 2014g).  
Jet engine oils and hydraulic fluids contain base stocks, which is the main ingredient of the 
oils and fluids. The main functions of the base stock are to ensure the correct viscosity 
properties, due to the low temperature fluidity requirement for cold starting, and the need to 
have a sufficient oil film even at the highest bearing temperatures (Exxon Mobil, 2014g). The 
base stocks may be very different with respect to both the performance characteristics and the 
chemical composition. In addition, different types and quantity of additives are added to the 
base stocks (STAMI, 2003). 
Additives are used in all fluids and oils to improve the lubricant performance of base stocks. 
They may be used to avoid rapid wear of engine components (anti-wear), or to improve the 
oxidative stability of ester lubricants (antioxidants) (Rudnick, 2006). These are comprised in 
less than 3 % of the formulation. The additives are commercially useful products, but have 
been recognized to cause negative neurotoxic health effects in humans after exposure. The 
commonly used anti-wear additives are triaryl phosphates (TAP), especially tricresyl 
phosphate (TCP) (Phillips et al., 2013, Winder and Balouet, 2002a). 
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1.8.1 Synthetic Jet Engine Oils 
Synthetic lubricating oils used in gas turbine engines of aircraft are made up of a base stock, 
additives and antioxidants (Bernabei et al., 2000). The reasons why synthetic oils, also called 
“designer fluids”, are used in the aircraft industry are the molecules ability to stay together, 
the resistance to oxidation at high temperatures, the ability to keep the metal surfaces clean, 
and to maintain the required lubricant film. Synthetic oils are nearly wax free and therefore 
have the possibility to flow at low temperatures, in addition to fulfil a variety of viscosity 
requirements (Michaelis, 2010, p 59).  
The base stocks in the synthetic oils are mostly based on a synthetic polyol, such as 
derivatives of erythritol, like pentaerythritol, which comprise around 95 % of the oils. 
Sometimes the oils may be based on trimethylolpropane esters (TMPE), and if tricresyl 
phosphate (TCP) and TMPE react together, it may be formed trimethylolpropane phosphate 
(TMPP), a potent neurotoxin (Wright, 1996, STAMI, 2003, Centers, 1992). This is described 
further in chapter  1.11. 
N-Phenyl-1-naphthylamine (PAN) is a liphophilic solid often used as an antioxidant in jet 
engine oils. It acts as a radical scavenger in the auto oxidation of lubricants (Michaelis, 2010, 
p 68). These aromatic amines are used in concentrations of 0.25-5 % in the synthetic oil. The 
substituted diphenylamine is also an antioxidant used in concentrations not greater than 1 % 
(Winder and Michaelis, 2005). 
The most common oils used in the commercial aircraft industry, shown in Table 2, are Mobil 
Jet engine oil  II (Exxon Mobil, 2014f), Mobil Jet engine oil  254 (Exxon Mobil, 2014d), 
Mobil Jet engine oil  387 (Exxon Mobil, 2014e), BP Turbo Oil 2380 (BP, 2015), BP Turbo 
Oil 2197 (BP, 2014a), BP Turbo Oil 2389 (BP, 2014b), Aeroshell Turbine Oil 560 (Shell, 
2013) and Turbo Nycoil 600 (Petro-Canada, 2015). Mobil Jet engine oil  II commands almost 
half (49 %) the synthetic jet engine oils market share (Winder and Balouet, 2002a).  
In the MSDS of the oils it is stated among others that “The product is not expected to produce 
adverse health effects under normal conditions of use”, “Avoid breathing of vapours, mists or 
spray”, and “Not considered to be an inhalation hazard under normal conditions of use” 
(BP, 2015, Shell, 2013, Exxon Mobil, 2014f). What “normal conditions of use” means, is not 
further described in the MSDS.  
The additives in the oils, listed as hazardous, include the chemicals found in the MSDS, 
product data sheets, on oil packaging material and in other oil company data. The base stocks 
that comprise 95 % of the jet engine oils are only described as “synthetic esters”, with no 
further details about which base stocks that can be found in the different oils. 
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Table 2: List of jet engine oils and their respective constituents. These are found in the Material Safety 
Data Sheets by the manufacturers.  
Manufacturer Name of oil Chemical name of 
constituent 
CAS No. Concentrations 
Exxon Mobil Mobil Jet engine oil  
II 
Alkylated 
diphenylamines 
68921-45-9 1- <5 % 
Tricresyl 
phosphate 
1330-78-5 1- <3 % 
N-phenyl-1-
naphthylamine 
90-30-2 
 
1 % 
 
Phenol, dimethyl-, 
phosphate (3:1) 
25155-23-1 0.025- <0.1 % 
Mobil Jet engine oil  
254 
Tricresyl 
phosphate 
1330-78-5 1-3 % 
Phenol, dimethyl-, 
phosphate (3:1) 
25155-23-1 0.1-1 % 
Mobil jet engine oil  
387 
Tricresyl 
phosphate 
1330-78-5 1-2.5 % 
BP 
 
BP Turbo Oil 2380 Tricresyl 
phosphate 
1330-78-5 
 
≥1- <3 %  
N-Phenyl-1-
naphthylamine 
(PAN) 
90-30-2 
 
≥1- <3 % 
BP Turbo Oil 2197 Tricresyl 
phosphate 
1330-78-5 
 
≥1- <2.5 % 
BP Turbo Oil 2389 Tricresyl 
phosphate 
1330-78-5 
 
≥1- 2.5 % 
Shell Aeroshell Turbine Oil 
560 
Benzenamine, N-
phenyl-, reaction 
products with 
2,4,4-
trimethylpentene 
68411-46-1 1-3 % 
Tricresyl 
phosphate 
1330-78-5 1-2 % 
Petro-Canada TurboNycoil 600 Phenol, 
isopropylated, 
phosphate(3:1)[Tri
phenyl phosphate 
> 5%] 
(Triisopropylated 
phenyl phosphate) 
68937-41-7 
 
1-5 % 
 
TurboNycoil 600 oil is developed by a French company named NYCO. It is now used by the 
U.S. Navy and by many military agencies worldwide. Additionally, it is used in many 
commercial engines and APUs. The oil does not contain TCP at any measurable quantity, 
unlike the previously mentioned oils. The TCP is replaced with isopropylated triphenyl 
phosphate (TIPP). In the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) of the oils it is stated: 
“Contains material that may cause adverse reproductive effects” (Piveteau, 2009). Thus, 
there still exists toxicity risk of using the jet engine oil (Petro-Canada, 2015). 
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1.8.2 Hydraulic Fluids 
The four main groups of hydraulic fluids are mineral oils, poly-α-olefin oils (synthetic 
hydrocarbons), alkyl or aryl phosphate ester oils, and polyol esters (Möller and Young, 2000, 
STAMI, 2003).  
The mineral oils are complex mixtures of aliphatic and aromatic hydrocarbons, which are 
made up from refined petroleum oil (Solbu, 2011). Since the 1940s, a mineral based hydraulic 
fluid named MIL-H-5606 has been one of the most widely used fluids. The fluid did provide 
excellent operational properties, but had a high degree of flammability. This was increased by 
the high pressure required for hydraulic system operation (2.07 x 10
7
 Pascals). As a result, 
hydraulic systems based on phosphate-ester-based hydraulic fluids were developed, which 
now are used by all big civil transport aircraft. When an aircraft is certified, the hydraulic 
fluids for each application point are specified on the “Type Certificate” (Shell, 2012, p 181-
182). 
The hydraulic fluids in the aircraft industry often contain phosphate esters, due to their fire 
resistant properties (Solbu, 2011). Tributyl phosphate (TBP), which is a phosphate ester, is 
often the base stock (main ingredient) in hydraulic fluids. It is a colourless and odourless 
trialkyl phosphate ester, often mixed with dibutyl phenyl phosphate (DBPP), triaryl triphenyl 
phosphate (TPP) and butyl diphenyl phosphate. About 40-60 % of all TBP utilized in the U.S. 
is used as base stock in hydraulic fluids (WHO, 1991). All of the common hydraulic fluids, 
among others, Hyjet V, Hyjet IV-A Plus, Skydrol LD4 and Skydrol 500B-4, contain TBP. 
Neopentyl polyol esters, abbreviated “polyols”, are made by a reaction between 
multifunctional alcohol and monofunctional fatty acids. Variations in these raw materials can 
have a major influence on the final physical properties of the esters. The polyol ester 
component of the base stock is made up of polyhydric alcohols, like pentaerythritol and 
sometimes trimethylolpropane (TMP/TMPE), and may be varied to change physical 
properties of the lubricants, such as the viscosity (Rudnick, 2006).  
The MSDS contains further information about the ingredients in hydraulic fluids (Exxon 
Mobil, 2013, Exxon Mobil, 2014a, Eastman, 2013a, Eastman, 2013b) . The most used 
hydraulic fluids in the aircraft industry are listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3: List of hydraulic fluids and their respective constituents. These are found in the Material 
Safety Data Sheets by the manufacturers. 
Manufacturer Name of 
hydraulic 
fluid 
Chemical name of 
constituent 
CAS No. Concentration 
Eastman/ 
Solutia 
Skydrol 500B-
4 
Dibutyl phenyl phosphate 
(base stock) 
2528-36-1 40-70 % 
 
Tributyl phosphate (base 
stock) 
126-73-8 19-20 % 
Butyl diphenyl phosphate 
(base stock) 
27752-95-6 10-30 % 
 
2-ethylhexyl 7-
oxabicyclo[4.1.0] heptane-3-
carboxylate (aliphatic 
epoxide) 
62256-00-2 <10 % 
 
 
2,6-Di-tert-butyl-p-cresol 
(additive) 
128-37-0 0.1- 1 % 
Skydrol LD4 Tributyl phosphate (base 
stock) 
126-73-8 55- 65 % 
Dibutyl phenyl phosphate 
(base stock) 
2528-36-1 20-30 % 
 
2-ethylhexyl 7-
oxabicyclo[4.1.0] heptane-3-
carboxylate (aliphatic 
epoxide) 
62256-00-2 <10 % 
 
Butyl diphenyl phosphate 
(base stock) 
2752-95-6 5- 10 % 
 
2,6-Di-tert-butyl-p-cresol 
(additive) 
128-37-0 1- 5 % 
Exxon-Mobil Hyjet V Tributyl phosphate (base 
stock) 
126-73-8 70- <80 % 
Phenol, isopropylated, 
phosphate(3:1)[Triphenyl 
phosphate > 5%] 
(Triisopropylated phenyl 
phosphate) 
68937-41-7 10- <20 % 
 
Aliphatic epoxide 62256-00-2 5-7 % 
2,6-di-tert-butyl-p-
cresol(additive) 
128-37-0 0.1- <1 % 
 
Hyjet IV-A 
Plus 
Tributyl phosphate (base 
stock) 
126-73-8 70- <80 % 
Phenol, isopropylated, 
phosphate [Triphenyl 
phosphate > 5%] 
68937-41-7 10- <20 % 
 
Aliphatic epoxide 62256−00−2 5- <10 % 
Calcium sulphonate 57855-77-3 0.1- <1 % 
2,6-di-tert-butyl-p-cresol 
(additive) 
128-37-0 0.1- <1 % 
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1.8.3 De-Icing Fluids 
The use of de-icing fluids is the most common technique to remove frozen precipitation from 
the critical surfaces of aircraft. In addition it protects the aircraft against re-freezing, and thus, 
re-contamination. The main ingredient in de-icing fluids is ethylene glycol or propylene 
glycol. Ingredients also include thickening agents, wetting agents, corrosion inhibitors and 
coloured UV-sensitive dye (Michaelis, 2010, p 69). 
1.9 Potential Toxicity Following Exposure to Jet Engine Oils and 
Hydraulic Fluids 
Toxicity can be defined as the degree to which a chemical substance (or physical agent) 
causes an adverse effect on the biological system of an organism exposed to the substance 
over a designated time period. Toxicity can be divided into two groups; acute and chronic 
toxicity. The cause of acute toxicity is a single dose or exposure, while the chronic toxicity is 
the result of long-term or numerous brief exposures (US National Library of Medicine, 2014).  
Changes in product formulations of synthetic oils, hydraulic fluids and de-icing fluids have 
been made, but still there exists concern about the potential toxicity an exposure to these 
materials may cause (Daughtrey et al., 1996, Abou-Donia, 2015). Even small amounts of 
toxic fumes, like some of the organophosphate ingredients in oils and hydraulic fluids, may 
cause serious ill health effects in humans. There exist a large number of reported health 
effects followed by exposure to contaminated cabin air (Solbu et al., 2011). The earliest case 
found in the literature was reported in 1977, where a pilot had a sudden indisposing during 
flight, with neurologic impairment and gastrointestinal distress. After one day, his clinical 
status returned to normal. The cause of his symptoms was believed to be inhalation of 
aerosolized or vaporized synthetic lubricating oil coming from the jet engine of the aircraft 
(Montgomery et al., 1977, Winder and Balouet, 2002a). 
There is missing information about the retention, absorption, metabolism or distribution of 
inhaled mist containing organophosphates. In general, the rate of absorption of an inhaled 
substance via the lung depends on the molecular size and solubility of the substance. Oil mist 
droplets larger than 5 μm tend to be trapped in upper airways and later swallowed or 
expectorated, while the smaller droplets may be carried down and detained in the lungs (Craig 
and Barth, 1999, p 291). 
According to information from a presentation by Abou-Donia (2015) during a Global Cabin 
Air Quality Executive meeting in London (2015), the chemical-induced adverse health effect 
of chemical exposure in cabin and cockpit is dependent on two factors; the long-term, 
repeated exposure and the cocktail of combined chemicals. The so-called “chemical cocktail” 
is described as a blend of components from the engine oils, hydraulic fluids, flame retardants, 
by-products after combustion, insecticides sprayed inside the aircraft, and other chemicals. 
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1.10 Components in Jet Engine Oils and Hydraulic Fluids 
1.10.1 Amines 
N-Phenyl-1-naphthylamine (PAN) 
Synonyms: phenyl-α-naphtylamine, 1-Naphthalenamine, N-Phenyl-, 1-Anilinonaphthalene, antioxidant PAN, N-
(1-Naphthyl)aniline (Figure 11) 
CAS No. 90-30-2 
 
Figure 11: Chemical structure of N-Phenyl-1-naphthylamine (Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014). 
N-Phenyl-1-naphthylamine is a liphophilic solid often used as an antioxidant in lubrication 
oils (TOXNET, 2005a). The commercial product of PAN is comprised at concentrations of 
about 1 % in lubricating oils, and has a typical purity of about 99 %. From different studies it 
is found that the antioxidant may have a carcinogenic effect, but there are made no 
conclusions regarding this. Mammalian systems readily absorb PAN, and convert it rapidly to 
metabolites (WHO, 1998). By single dosing it does not seem as particularly toxic, with LD50 
above 1 g/kg. The chemical has a mechanism of toxicity similar to that of many aromatic 
amines with meta haemoglobin production (Winder and Michaelis, 2005, Winder and 
Balouet, 2002b). 
In some studies, the chemical shows no irritation effect to skin and eyes, while in other 
studies it is shown to be a strong skin sensitizer (Boman et al., 1980, Kalimo et al., 1989, 
Winder and Balouet, 2002b). There are reports of little genotoxicity potential, while various 
forms of cancer were found among workers exposed to antirust oil containing 0.5 % PAN. 
Some studies indicate a mild carcinogenic effect, while others have reported no carcinogenic 
potential (Winder and Balouet, 2002b, Wang et al., 1984). 
Alkylated diphenylamine 
Synonyms: N-Phenylaniline, anilinobenzene, N-Phenylbenzenamine, benzenamine, N-phenyl-, N,  
N-Diphenylamine (Figure 12) 
CAS No. 122-39-4 
 
 
Figure 12: Chemical structure of alkylated diphenylamine (National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, n.d). 
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Alkylated diphenylamine antioxidants have been used for many years to suppress the 
oxidation of industrial- and engine oils. Improved oxidation resistance of base stocks has led 
to the development of longer life turbines, which often have required the use of higher levels 
of antioxidants. There have been small changes in the types of antioxidants available due to 
the cost associated with development and commercialization of new antioxidant components. 
Alkylation of diphenylamines can occur both ortho- or para to the nitrogen atom, in addition 
to possible occurrence of mono-, di-, or tri-alkylation (Gatto et al., 2007). 
The substance may be irritating to mucous membranes, eyes and skin. Incidents of 
occupational human poisoning have been reported with bladder symptoms, tachycardia
3
, 
hypertension, and eczema. Sensitization is unlikely, and has been observed only as a 
consequence of cross sensitization to p-Phenylenediamine (PPD) (National Center for 
Biotechnology Information, n.d). 
1.10.2 Organophosphates 
Butyl diphenyl phosphate (BDP) 
Synonyms: phosphoric acid, butyl diphenyl ester (Figure 13) 
CAS No. 2752-95-6 
 
Figure 13: Chemical structure of butyl diphenyl phosphate (Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014). 
Organophosphates are often highly toxic pesticides (Lewis, 2008, p 1114). Studies on BDP 
are not available. 
Dibutyl phenyl phosphate (DBPP) 
Synonyms: phosphoric acid, dibutyl phenyl ester, dibutyl phenylphosphate, Di(n-butyl) phenyl phosphate, 
CCRIS 4604 (Figure 14) 
CAS No. 2528-36-1 
 
Figure 14: Chemical structure of dibutyl phenol phosphate (Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014). 
                                                 
3
 A heart rate that exceeds the normal resting rate (also called tachyarrhythmia).  
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Formulations of dibutyl phenyl phosphate have been reported to lead to marked pain in the 
eyes, following contact. However, no reports where such contact caused actual damage to the 
eyes have been found. Irritation in the form of drying and cracking of exposed skin has been 
caused by repeated or prolonged skin contact (National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, n.d, TOXNET, 2015). 
Exposure to aerosolized dibutyl phenyl phosphate formulations or to vapours at high 
temperatures has been reported to produce nose and throat irritation, accompanied by 
coughing and wheezing. Dibutyl phenyl phosphate is not considered to be a primary irritant or 
a sensitizing agent based on patch testing of 50 human volunteers. The recommended 
maximum permissible concentration of DBPP in the working zone is suggested to be 0.1 
mg/m
3
 (National Center for Biotechnology Information, n.d, TOXNET, 2015). 
Isopropylated triphenyl phosphate (TIPP)  
Synonyms: Phenol, isopropylated, phosphate (3:1), tris(4-propan-2-ylphenyl) phosphate, tris[4-(propan-2-
yl)phenyl] phosphate (Figure 15) 
CAS No. 68937-41-7 
 
Figure 15: Chemical structure of isopropylated triphenyl phosphate (Royal Society of Chemistry, 
2014). 
The substance is poisonous by subcutaneous route, and moderately toxic by ingestion. It is 
absorbed slowly, especially by skin contact. It is not a potent inhibitor of human 
cholinesterase. When the substance is exposed to heat it is combustible, and when heated to 
decomposition, it emits toxic fumes of phosphorus-oxygen (POx) (Lewis, 2008, p 1396). 
Phenol, dimethyl-, phosphate (3:1) 
Synonyms: Tris(3,5-xylyl) phosphate, Phenol, 3,5-dimethyl-, phosphate (3:1), HSDB 3912, Trixylenyl 
phosphate mixed isomers, 3,5-Xylenol, phosphate (3:1), tris(3,5-dimethylphenyl) phosphate (Figure 16) 
CAS No. 25155-23-1  
 
Figure 16: Chemical structure of Phenol, dimethyl-, phosphate (3:1) (Royal Society of Chemistry, 
2014). 
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Phenol, dimethyl-, phosphate (3:1) is produced through the reaction between phosphorus 
oxytrochloride and xylenols. Breathing or swallowing large quantities may cause ataxia
4
. It 
may be irritating to the skin, respiratory tract, mucous membrane and eyes (CAMEO, n.d). 
The chemical may contain impurities of tri-ortho-cresyl phosphate and other ortho-cresyl-
components (National Center for Biotechnology Information, n.d). 
Hens exposed to hydraulic fluid containing phenol, dimethyl-, phosphate showed delayed 
neurotoxicity (TOXNET, 2013). From studies on roosters, there were not found any 
neuroparalytic effects when they were given phenol, dimethyl-, phosphate (3:1) orally. When 
orally given 1 g/kg/day for 40 days, the results showed low toxic effect (National Center for 
Biotechnology Information, n.d). 
OMTI, a fireproof aerosol lubricant for turbines based on phenol, dimethyl-, phosphate (3:1), 
were in another study inhaled by mice, rats and guinea pigs. The dose was 1-10 mg/m
3
, 4 
hours daily for 16 weeks, and the results showed relatively low toxicity to the lung, skin and 
peripheral nerves (National Center for Biotechnology Information, n.d). 
Tributyl phosphate (TBP)  
Synonyms: Tri-n-butyl phosphate, Butyl phosphate, Phosphoric acid tributyl ester, Tributylphosphate (Figure 
17) 
CAS No. 126-73-8 
 
Figure 17: Chemical structure of tributyl phosphate (Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014). 
Tributyl phosphate can be absorbed into the body by inhalation of its vapour, through the skin 
or by ingestion. Hence, the target organs are eyes, skin and respiratory system. Symptoms of 
exposure may include irritation to the above mentioned, in addition to headache and nausea. 
Severe irritation was produced in the skin (inducing erythema and oedema) of all rabbits 
given a single dermal dose of 500 mg TBP (Sjögren et al., 2010, p 38). It can be combusted 
under hot conditions. The phosphate is shown to have a slightly inhibitory effect on the 
activity of human plasma cholinesterase, from an in vitro protocol (National Center for 
Biotechnology Information, n.d). 
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Tricresyl phosphate (TCP) 
Synonyms: Tri-p-cresyl phosphate, Tri-p-tolyl phosphate, Tritolyl phosphate, Tris(4-methylphenyl) phosphate, 
Phosphoric acid, tris(4-methylphenyl) ester (Figure 18) 
CAS No. 1330-78-5 
 
 
Figure 18: Chemical structure of tricresyl phosphate, TCP (WHO, 1990). 
Tricersyl phosphate is used as a flame-retardant additive for extreme pressure lubricants and 
non-flammable fluid in hydraulic systems (Michaelis, 2010, p 60, Mackerer et al., 1999). It is 
colourless to bright yellow, with a slightly aromatic odour. It is a viscous organophosphate 
with low water solubility. TCP essentially consists of a mixture of ten isomers of varying 
toxicity. The isomers are divided into three main groups: meta-cresyl, para-cresyl and ortho-
cresyl. These are difficult to separate due to their approximately equal boiling point, 
respectively 202, 201.8 and 191-192 °C (De Nola et al., 2011). Isomers have the same 
molecular formula but different structural formulas, which result in different toxic properties. 
Persmissible Occupational Exposure Limit (PEL) is 100 µg/m
3
 (=0.1 mg/m
3
) as an 8 hour 
time-weighted average (TWA) (OSHA, n.d). The structural formula of TCP is C21H21O4P, as 
can be seen in Figure 18 (WHO, 1990). 
Toxicity of Different TCP-isomers 
Most synthetic jet engine oils contain TCP as an additive. The commonly used oils (Table 2) 
contain between 1-5 % TCP.  The ten isomers of the organophosphate have different level of 
toxicity depending on the ortho-, meta-, or para- location of the methyl cresyl (CH3) groups in 
the cresyl ring (Figure 19). The tri-ortho isomer has been the most studied of the ten TCP 
isomers, which is the only isomer with an exposure limit of 0.1 mg/m
3
 (PEL) (Craig and 
Barth, 1999). 
 
Figure 19: Chemical structure of the para-, meta-, and ortho-location of -CH3 on TCP (Johnson et al., 
2002). 
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The synthesis and composition of commercial TCP have changed over time. Formerly, TCP 
contained high levels of all the isomers, but now commercial TCP is manufactured by the 
reaction between phosphorous oxylchloride, and a mixture of alkyl phenols derived from coal, 
tar or petroleum, in which the majority is m-cresol (3-methylphenol) and p-cresol (4-
methylphenol). TCP only containing m- and p-cresyl isomers are considered relatively non-
toxic (Craig and Barth, 1999). 
Already in 1931, the neurotoxic potential of the ortho-cresyl isomers was recognized, with 
focus on tri-ortho-cresyl phosphate (TOCP). This is the isomeric form suspected to be the 
primary responsible component for organophosphate-induced delayed neuropathy (OPIDN). 
OPIDN are explained in chapter  1.14.2 (Craig and Barth, 1999, De Nola et al., 2008, de Boer 
et al., 2014).  
The connection between neurotoxic effects of TCP and alkyl substitution in the ortho-position 
of the aromatic ring has been known since the 1950s (De Nola et al., 2008, Henschler, 1958). 
TOCP was formerly presumed to be the only reason for TCP-toxicity. In a study carried out 
by Henschler (1958), it was suggested that TCP containing 25-30 % mono-ortho-cresyl 
phosphate residues are more toxic than pure TOCP (Craig and Barth, 1999). His studies 
ascertained that the mono-ortho-cresyl phosphate (MOCP) and di-ortho-cresyl phosphate 
(DOCP) isomers were most toxic, respectively ten and five times more than TOCP (Figure 
20) (Henschler, 1958, De Nola et al., 2011, De Nola et al., 2008). Although Henschler’s 
findings showed that MOCP was the most toxic isomer, the manufacturers have concentrated 
on reducing the content of TOCP in the oils. The isomer now only occurs as a smaller 
constituent in commercial mixtures, and is regulated to not exceed 0.2 % (Winder and 
Balouet, 2002a, Abou-Donia, 2015).  
 
Figure 20: Triangular view of the ten different TCP isomers. MOCP is considered to be ten times more 
toxic than TOCP, while DOCP is presumed to be five times more toxic than TOCP (De Nola et al., 
2008). 
The level of TCP in jet engine oils is normally 3 %, and only about 0.003-0.03 % (30-300 
ppm) of this is ortho-cresyl phosphate (Winder and Balouet, 2002b). The human exposure 
limit of TCP is based on the toxicity of the TOCP isomer, even though it is considered to be 
present as a minor impurity (De Nola et al., 2008). Thus, several of the previously reported 
poisonings may be the result from consumption of TCP with high content of asymmetric 
mono-ortho and di-ortho isomers (Craig and Barth, 1999). The total toxicity of a particular 
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composition depends on the content of each ingredient, and interactions between the various 
chemicals. On this basis, it was claimed that the presence of all ortho-cresyl-containing 
molecules should be considered in the overall toxicity of TCP (Winder and Balouet, 2002b)  
1.10.3 Other Compounds 
Calcium sulphonate 
Synonyms: calcium 2,3-dinonylnaphthalene-1-sulfonate, Naphthalenesulfonic acid, dinonyl-, calcium salt, 
86329-66-0, calcium bis(2,3-dinonylnaphthalene-1-sulfonate), Naphthalenesulfonic acid, dinonyl-, calcium salt 
(2:1), AGN-PC-02K3CO (Figure 21) 
CAS No. 57855-77-3 
 
Figure 21: Chemical structure of calcium sulphonate (ChemSpider, n.d.)  .  
Calcium sulphonate has been shown to induce sensitization in guinea pigs. It has been noted 
to be irritating to rabbits’ eyes, and acute toxicity is low for the dermal route in rabbits and the 
oral route in rats. In human volunteers no sensitization was observed in a repeated insult patch 
sensitization test (EPA, 2012). 
2,6-Di-tert-butyl-p-cresol  
Synonyms: 2,6-Di-tert-butyl-4-methylphenol, Butylated hydroxytoluene (BHT), Butylhydroxytoluene, 2,6-Di-
tert-butyl-p-cresol, Dibunol (Figure 22) 
CAS No. 128-37-0 
 
Figure 22: Chemical structure of 2,6-Di-tert-butyl-p-cresol (Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014). 
2,6-Di-tert-butyl-p-cresol is used as a readily absorbed antioxidant used in fats and oils, and 
packaging material for fat-containing foods. Results from studies on rats showed that there 
was some deposition in adipose tissue following a high dosis of (3)H-BHT ip for 35 days. 
Liver tissue and body fat showed elevated concentrations, which varied among female and 
male rats. Rats fed high doses of BHT showed increases in serum cholesterol in both sexes 
(National Center for Biotechnology Information, n.d, TOXNET, 2005b). 
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The substance is toxic by intraperitoneal and intravenous routes, and moderately toxic by 
ingestion. It is a skin and eye irritant, and questionable a carcinogen. The substance is 
combustible when exposed to heat, and may under such circumstances emit acrid smoke and 
fumes. It can react with oxidizing materials (Lewis, 2008, p 170). 
2-Ethylhexyl 7-oxabicyclo (4.1.0) heptane-3-carboxylate 
Synonyms: 7-Oxabicyclo[4.1.0]heptane-3-carboxylic acid, 2-ethylhexyl ester, 7-Oxabicyclo(4.1.0)heptane-3-
carboxylic acid, 2-ethylhexyl ester (Figure 23) 
CAS No. 62256-00-2 
 
Figure 23: Chemical structure of 2-Ethylhexyl 7 oxabicyclo (4.1.0) heptane-3-carboxylate (Royal 
Society of Chemistry, 2014). 
Aliphatic epoxides are suspected to be carcinogens, with experimental tumours of the skin, 
lung, and blood-forming tissues (Lewis, 2008, p 35).  
1.11  Products of Combustion and Pyrolysis  
The bleed air may sometimes be contaminated with combusted or pyrolyzed engine oil and 
hydraulic fluid, as mentioned earlier (Harrison et al., 2009). Maintenance, operation, and 
design failures or deficiencies give the potential of heated engine oil and hydraulic fluid to 
contaminate the cabin and cockpit air, and may thus lead to negative health effects in the 
cabin crew and passengers (Murawski, 2005). Pyrolysis of the chemicals may occur at high 
temperatures, and chemicals from heated engine oils not included in the original ingredients, 
may be created in this process (van Netten and Leung, 2001). Currently, the knowledge about 
which chemicals and combustion products that enters the ventilation systems of aircraft from 
the engines or APU is insufficient.  
In an effort to find agents that may be responsible for the symptoms experienced by pilots, 
flight crew and passengers, a number of researchers have attempted to describe the 
constituents of the oils and fluids used in aircraft engines, and their pyrolytic degradation 
products (Daughtrey et al., 1996, van Netten, 1999, van Netten, 1998). Carbon dioxide (CO2), 
carbon monoxide (CO) and fumes from oil leaks, hydraulic leaks, and water leaks are 
potential contaminants. The substances known to be emitted due to pyrolysis of commercial 
jet engine oils and hydraulic fluids are: cresyl- and the more volatile butyl-phosphate esters, 
potentially irritant acid, aldehyde and ketone volatile organic compounds (VOC) (Expert 
Panel on Aircraft Air Quality, 2009). 
There have been, and still are, concerns about the potential reaction of ingredients in some 
base stocks, such as the reaction between trimethylol phosphate (TMP) polyols and TCP 
during elevated temperatures, which may produce the potent neurotoxin trimethylolpropane 
phosphate (TMPP) (Centers, 1992, STAMI, 2003). Synthetic oils are, as mentioned, 
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sometimes based on trimethylolpropane esters (TMPE), and can be mixed with triaryl 
phosphates, like TCP, as anti-wear additives. Under extreme temperatures (350-700 °C), 
model experiments have shown that a potent neurotoxin, trimethyl propane phosphate 
(TMPP) can be formed by a reaction between TCP and trimethylolpropane esters (TMPE) 
(STAMI, 2003, Wyman et al., 1987, Kalman et al., 1985, van Netten and Leung, 2000). 
TMPP is known to cause epileptiform seizures potentially followed by death (Wyman et al., 
1993, Keefer et al., 2001).   
In a study conducted by Kalman et al. (1985), there was found production of TMPP during 
pyrolysis of synthetic aircraft engine oil. Once decomposition temperatures were reached, the 
formation of products was rapid, and some TMPP production occurred within 2 minutes. 
Wyman et al. (1987) investigated the formation of TMPP during pyrolysis of synthetic jet 
engine oils. The oils were primarily composed of a trimethylol propane (TMP) ester base 
stock. To quantify the production of the neurotoxin, rodent bioassay and GC-MS analysis 
were performed. The temperature that gave the maximum production of TMPP for sealed tube 
and open air methods of pyrolysis was respectively 500 °C and 650 °C.  
Centers (1992) did an experiment to determine the potential of TMPP formation in thermally 
degraded synthetic ester turbine lubricants. It was concluded that the neurotoxin only could be 
formed at high temperatures. In studies on mice, the neurotoxin caused convulsion followed 
by death. The LD50 was 1.0 mg/kg body weight when injected intraperitoneal
5
, and 50-100 
mg/kg when applied dermally. For some formulations, 7-10 mg or more of TMPP per 
millilitre of lubricant were found to be produced by open-to-air pyrolysis at very high 
temperatures (350-700 ºC). 
van Netten and Leung (2000) compared two commercial available jet engine lubricating oils 
and their volatile pyrolytic degradation products in a study regarding the aircraft BAe-146. 
Castrol 5000 and Exxon 2380 were the two jet engine oils compared. They were investigated 
under lab conditions at 525 °C to measure the release of CO, CO2, nitrogen dioxide (NO2), 
and hydrogencyanide (HCN), as well as volatiles, to find out if TCP and TMPP would be 
present or formed. The article does not state whether or not the TMPE are contents in the two 
oils compared initially, but it was stated that TCP and TMPE are both common constituents in 
jet engine oils. TMPP was not found in any of the experiments. Some CO2 was generated 
along with CO, which reached levels in excess of 100 ppm. HCN and NO2 were not detected. 
TCP was confirmed in the bulk oils and in the volatiles, but not in the cabin air. CO and 
volatilized components, as well as pyrolysis products, could pose a potential hazard to flight 
crews if engine oil seals fail in an aircraft. It was expected that localized condensation in the 
ventilation ducts and filters in the air condition packs was likely to be the reason why TCP 
was not found in the air (van Netten and Leung, 2000). 
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  Injection of a substance into the peritoneum (body cavity). 
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1.12 Short-and Long Term Symptoms of Exposure to Contaminated 
Air 
When it comes to route of exposure of contaminants in aircraft, it is stated that inhalation is an 
important route. A second, less significant route is exposure of uncovered skin, such as 
exposure to oil mists or vapours. A third route is ingestion, which is considered unlikely in 
this case (Winder and Michaelis, 2005).  
The acute effects of exposure to contaminated air in aircraft show a close temporal 
relationship with exposure and usually ends after the exposure ceases (Ross et al., 2006). 
Chronic health effects have been reported to last for months or years after exposure. From a 
survey sustained by Winder and Balouet (2001), the symptoms of exposure were divided by 
short- and long-term low-level symptoms or residual symptoms. These are further organized 
in subcategories, shown in Table 4. Repeated exposure over an extensive period of time may 
be a problem for frequent fliers, predisposed individuals, and when severe oil leaks enter the 
air cabin environment.  
Table 4: Overview of symptoms of exposure to contaminated air on aircraft. The table is compiled out 
of information in an article by Winder and Balouet (2001).  
Subcategory Single or short-term symptoms Long term low-level or residual 
symptoms 
Airways Irritation of eyes, nose and upper 
airways 
Irritation of eyes, nose and upper 
airways 
Cardiovascular 
symptoms 
Increased heart rate and palpitations
a)
 Chest pain 
Increased heart rate and palpitations 
Gastro-intestinal 
symptoms 
Nausea 
Vomiting 
Salivation 
Nausea 
Vomiting 
Diarrhoea 
General  Weakness and fatigue (leading to 
chronic fatigue) 
Exhaustion 
Hot flashes 
Joint pain 
Muscle weakness and pain 
Neuropsychological 
symptoms 
Memory impairment 
Headache 
Light-headedness 
Dizziness 
Confusion 
Feeling intoxicated 
Memory impairment 
Forgetfulness 
Lack of co-ordination 
Severe headaches 
Dizziness 
Sleep disorder 
Neurotoxic 
symptoms 
Blurred tunnel vision 
Nystagmus 
Disorientation 
Shaking and tremors 
Loss of balance and vertigo 
Seizures 
Loss of consciousness 
Parasthesia
b)
 
Numbness in fingers, lips, limbs 
Parasthesia 
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Respiratory 
symptoms 
Cough 
Breathing difficulties (shortness of 
breath) 
Tightness in chest 
Respiratory failure requiring oxygen 
Breathing difficulties (shortness of 
breath) 
Tightness in chest 
Respiratory failure 
Susceptibility to upper respiratory tract 
infections 
Sensitivity  Signs of immunosuppression 
Chemical sensitivity leading to 
acquired or multiple chemical 
sensitivity 
Skin symptoms  Skin itching and rashes 
Skin blisters (on uncovered skin) 
Hair loss 
a) Perceived abnormality of the heartbeat. 
b) Sensation of tingling, tickling, pricking, or burning in the skin with no apparent long-term physical 
effect. 
1.13 Aerotoxic Syndrome 
In 1999, scientists from the US, France and Australia, Professor Chris Winder, Jean 
Christophe Balouet and Dr Harry Hoffman, respectively, proposed the term “aerotoxic 
syndrome” to explain the association of symptoms observed among aircrew exposed to 
contaminated air. The Australian Senate Inquiry endorsed the term one year later (Ross et al., 
2006). According to Winder and Balouet (2000), the characteristics of this syndrome are 
related to flight crew and passengers exposed to toxic atmospheric contaminants from jet 
engine oils and hydraulic fluids during flights. Oils and hydraulic fluids can exist in 
unchanged form, be combusted or pyrolized when exposure occurs. Symptoms following 
aerotoxic syndrome have been described as chronologically development of irritancy, 
sensitivity and neurotoxicity, as headache, confusion, loss of balance, muscle weakness, 
numbness and neurobehavioral problems (de Ree et al., 2014, Abou-Donia, 2003, van Netten, 
1998). The syndrome may be reversible following brief exposures, but after a significant or 
long term exposure, a chronic syndrome may occur. Many systems in the body are affected, 
as a cause of the broad range of symptoms reported (Winder and Balouet, 2000). 
The accuracy of the term aerotoxic syndrome has been debated by, among others, Bagshaw 
(2014) and Liyasova et al. (2011). The reason for this is that the association between illness 
(areotoxic syndrome) and exposure to fumes from jet engine oil is not clearly proven and 
therefore it is disputed among experts in the field. As mentioned earlier, it was stated that the 
symptoms are identical to the symptoms resulting from hyperventilation. It was furthermore 
claimed that based on current knowledge it can be concluded that the amount of 
organophosphates which aircraft crew may be exposed to, even over long-term exposure, is 
not sufficient to cause neurotoxicity (Bagshaw, 2014). 
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1.14 Organophosphates and Health Effects Following Exposure   
Researchers have mainly focused on organophosphates (OPs) when studying the relationship 
between reported health effects and fume events. Esters, amides and thiols are derivatives of 
orthophosphoric- and thiophosphonic acid, and constitute the collective term 
organophosphates (Reichl and Ritter, 2011, p 200). The general structure of organophosphates 
is presented in Figure 24. R1 and R2 are most commonly alkoxy groups. Oxygen or sulphur is 
attached to the phosphorus with a double bond, and X is the so-called leaving group. The 
latter are most sensitive to hydrolysis, and are displaced when the OP phosphorylates 
acetylcholinesterase (AChE) (Klaasen and Watkins, 2010, p 312, Costa, 2006). Among other 
utilization areas, OP isomers have been, and still are, used as industrial chemicals, in light 
oils, as agricultural pesticides, in pharmaceuticals, as nerve agents, as fuel additives and as 
flame retardants (Abou-Donia, 2003, Baron, 1981). 
 
Figure 24: Chemical structure of organophosphate. Oxygen or sulphur is attached to the phosphorus 
with a double bond. The R-groups are most commonly alkoxy groups, and X is the leaving group 
(Klaasen and Watkins, 2010, p 312, Costa, 2006). 
Organophosphates are not stored externally or internally by organisms because of their 
biodegradability. After uptake by ingestion, inhalation or through the skin, organophosphates 
are well absorbed, and rapidly distributed to all organs and tissues. Degradation occurs 
primarily by oxidation of cytochrome P450-dependent monooxygenases of the liver, and by 
hydrolytic cleavage of ester bonds (esterase) (Reichl and Ritter, 2011, p 200). 
Organophosphates possess a high acute toxicity, and are neurotoxic to insects and warm-
blooded animals. The compounds inhibit acethylcholine esterase (AChE) in the nervous 
system. Inhibition of AChE by OPs leads to accumulation of acetylcholine at cholinergic 
synapses, followed by overstimulation of muscarinic and nicotinic cholinergic receptors 
(Figure 25). “Aging” of the enzyme-inhibitor complex occurs when there is loss of one of the 
two alkyl (R) groups. The aging leads to a very stable complex, considered to be irreversibly 
inhibited. Synthesis of a new enzyme is required to restore activity, but this process may take 
days (Reichl and Ritter, 2011, p 200, Klaasen and Watkins, 2010, p 312). The mentioned 
receptors (muscarinic and nicotinic) are localized in most organs of the body, which means 
that many body parts may be affected (Abou-Donia, 2005, Baron, 1981).  
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Figure 25: Mechanism of action of organophosphates (Reichl and Ritter, 2011, p 201). 
Exposure to organophosphorus compounds in single or short-term exposures, single large 
toxic dose, or long-term low level repeated exposure, may lead to the development of 
neurotoxicity (Winder and Michaelis, 2005). According to Abou-Donia (2003), there are three 
distinct neurotoxic actions associated with organophosphorus compounds: cholinergic 
neurotoxicity of organophosphorus compounds, organophosphorus ester-induced delayed 
neurotoxicity (OPIDN) and organophosphorus ester-induced chronic neurotoxicity (OPICN). 
Neurotoxic effects in humans have also been divided into four categories; cholinergic 
syndrome, intermediate syndrome, organophosphate-induced delayed polyneuropathy 
(OPIDP/OPIDN) and chronic organophosphate-induced neuropsychiatric disorder 
(COPIND/OPICN) (Jokanović and Kosanović, 2010). Here, the classification by Abou-Donia 
(2003) will be looked further into. Figure 26 shows an overview of different influences from 
organophosphate poisoning in humans. 
 
Figure 26: Overview of possible reactions in the body from organophosphate poisoning. Signs of 
intoxication by organophosphates may include headache, concentration difficulty, confusion, tremors, 
diarrhoea, vertigo, increased sweating, muscular twitching and various central nervous system effects 
(Klaasen and Watkins, 2010, p 312, Winder and Michaelis, 2005, Abou-Donia, 2005). 
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1.14.1 Cholinergic Neurotoxicity of Organophosphorus Compounds 
Cholinergic neurotoxicity may be caused by exposure to organophosphorus compounds. This 
occurs when the cholinergic system that includes AChE and its neurotransmitter acetylcholine 
is disrupted. The mechanism involves inhibition of AChE by organophosphorus esters when 
the serine hydroxyl group at the catalytic triad site is phosphorylated. This nerve stimulation 
(inhibition) results in a release and accumulation of acetylcholine and further overstimulation 
at some receptors in the central nervous system (CNS) and the peripheral nervous system 
(PNS), muscarinic and nicotinic receptors. The result of this is muscle contraction and gland 
secretions. Hydrolysis of AChE terminates the reaction. The acid ester (phosphoric or 
phosphonic), formed with the enzyme is very stable and gets slowly hydrolysed. 
Organophosphorus compounds undergo detoxification by binding to other enzymes that 
contain the amino acid serine. Cholinergic symptoms are dependent on dose size, frequency 
of exposure, duration of exposure, and route of exposure, as well as other factors (Abou-
Donia, 2003, Jokanović and Kosanović, 2010). 
Erytrocyte AchE and the activity of these enzymes are regarded as biomarker of toxicity of 
OP compounds. This is because clinical diagnosis of acute poisoning is relatively simple, and 
confirmation of diagnosis can be made by measurement of erythrocyte AChE or plasma 
cholinesterase (Jokanović and Kosanović, 2010). 
1.14.2 Organophosphorus Ester-Induced Delayed Neurotoxicity 
OPIDN can occur as a result of single or multiple exposures to organophosphorus esters. This 
neurodegenerative disorder is characterized by a delayed onset of prolonged ataxia and upper 
motor neuron spasticity. The earliest known incident of OPIDN was due to the use of tri-o-
cresyl phosphate-containing creosote oil, with the intention of treatment to pulmonary 
tuberculosis in France in 1899 (Abou-Donia, 2003). It was identified as the chemical 
responsible for the Ginger Jake paralysis in the 1930s, where 20 000-50 000 people suffered 
from OPIDN, as mentioned in chapter  1.1.1 (Ehrich and Jortner, 2002, Baron, 1981, Schopfer 
et al., 2010, Craig and Barth, 1999). 
Within hours of exposure to OP compounds, inhibition of a carboxylesterase called 
neuropathy target esterase (NTE) occurs in the nervous system. If the OP compound does not 
induce OPIDN, the NTE enzyme is not inhibited. To develop neuropathy, there are some 
conditions that must be present; the OP compound must inhibit NTE, the inhibition must be 
significant (≥70 % after acute administration and approximately 50 % after multiple 
exposures), and the interaction between the OP compound and NTE must be strong enough to 
reverse the inhibition. The precise relationship between NTE and OPIDN has not been 
defined, and the mechanisms that lead to OPIDN are still unknown (Ehrich and Jortner, 2002, 
Baron, 1981). 
There is a latent period between exposure and appearance of effects, typically a delay of 6 to 
14 days or more (Baron, 1981). The symptoms start as sensory loss in hands and feet, 
followed by motional difficulties and abnormal reflexes (Ehrich and Jortner, 2002, Craig and 
Barth, 1999). OPIDN has been divided into three classes, where all of them are produced by 
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organophosphorus compounds and characterized by central-peripheral distal axonopathy 
(Abou-Donia, 2003). 
Daughtrey et al. (1996) did an experiment to determine the neurotoxicity of synthetic polyol-
based lubricating oils. The oils contained either 3 % of TCP (tricresyl phosphate), 
triphenylphosphorothionate (TPPT) or butylated triphenyl phosphate (BTP). They used 
clinical, biochemical and neuropathiological endpoints in groups of 17-20 adult hens. The oils 
were administered orally at a “limit dose” of 1 g/kg, 5 days a week for 13 weeks. A group of 
positive control hens also received 7.5 mg/kg TOCP (tri-ortho-cresyl phosphate), given some 
days before the end of the experiment to observe clear organophosphorus-induced delayed 
neuropathy (OPIDN). A negative control group received saline. Six weeks after treatment, the 
neuropathy target esterase (NTE) activity in brain and spinal cord of hens dosed with the 
lubricating oils was not significantly different from the saline control. After 13 weeks, NTE 
was inhibited 23-34 % in the brains of lubricant-treated hens. Clinical assessment of walking 
ability did not show any significant differences between the negative control group and the 
hens treated with lubricant oils. There were no alterations in the neuropathology which could 
indicate OPIDN in the groups that did not receive TOCP. Significant inhibition of NTE was 
observed in the positive controls at both 6 and 13 weeks of dosing, in addition to clinical 
impairment and pathological lesions indicative of OPIDN. Although inhibition of NTE was 
observed in the hens treated with lubricating oils, the values were well below the threshold for 
effect and did not occur with the indication of OPIDN. The results indicated that synthetic 
polyol-based lubricating oils containing up to 3 % TCP, TPPT, or BTP had low neurotoxic 
potential, and it was claimed that they should not pose a hazard under realistic conditions of 
exposure.  
1.14.3 Organophosphorus Ester-Induced Chronic Neurotoxicity 
OPICN describes a nervous system disorder induced by organophosphorus compounds, which 
involves neuronal degeneration and subsequent neurological, neurobehavioral, and 
neuropsychological consequences (Rea and Patel, 2010). The neurotoxicity is distinct from 
both cholinergic and OPIDN effects. Clinical signs consist of neurological and 
neurobehavioral abnormalities and damage is present in both the peripheral- and central 
nervous system (PNS and CNS). The symptoms are primarily related to CNS injury with 
resultant neurological and neurobehavioral abnormalities. Within the brain, neuropathological 
lesions are seen in various regions, which are characterized by neuronal cell death resulting 
from early necrosis or delayed apoptosis. Because CNS injury predominates, improvement is 
slow and complete recovery is unlikely. The neurotoxicity may continue for a prolonged time, 
ranging from weeks to years after exposure. OPICN may be caused by an acute exposure that 
results in cholinergic toxicity, or by exposure to subclinical doses that does not produce acute 
poisoning (Abou-Donia, 2003). 
Studies have shown that chronic neurological and neurobehavioral illness include diffuse 
symptoms as headache, drowsiness, dizziness, mental fatigue and -confusion, depression, 
anxiety and irritability. Other symptoms described are reduced concentration, tremors, 
insomnia, impaired vigilance, generalized weakness, memory deficit, linguistic disturbances 
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and reduced information processing. In cases of chronic toxicity, respiratory, circulatory, and 
skin problems may be present as well. It should be noted that not every patient experience all 
of the symptoms (Singh and Sharma, 2000, Abou-Donia, 2003, Winder and Michaelis, 2005). 
The occurrence and severity of OPICN is influenced by factors such as environmental 
exposure to other chemicals, stress, or individual genetic differences. Stress, which also 
causes oxidative stress, may result in increased OPICN due to a decreased threshold level 
required to produce neuronal damage (Abou-Donia, 2003, Winder and Michaelis, 2005). 
According to Abou-Donia (2003), the long-term neurologic deficits reported by flight crew 
and passengers can be explained by OPICN induced by low-level inhalation of 
organophosphates present in jet engine oils and hydraulic fluids. 
1.15 Exposure and Health Effects Reported in Literature 
Michaelis (2003) conducted a survey where 600 questionnaires were sent out to pilot 
members of the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA). 106 responded the questionnaire, 
and 93 (87.7 %) of them reported that during their flying career, they had been involved in at 
least one leak event of jet engine oil or hydraulic fluids into the aircraft. Following the 
indicated exposure, a wide range of symptoms in many body systems was reported. 
Symptoms that were most frequently reported was among others, confusion, memory 
impairment, diarrhoea and nausea. Michaelis suggested by her findings that the problem of oil 
leakage into bleed air is serious, and hence it must not be treated as insignificant. She states 
that more medical and scientific research is needed to understand the short- and long-term 
health effects of exposure to contaminated air. 
Hanhela et al. (2005) did a survey of cockpit air contamination by organophosphates and 
amines in a Hawk, F-111 and Hercules C-130. The purpose of the study was to determine 
concentrations of TCP in the aircraft cockpit cabin air and determine the potential health risk 
to aircraft occupants- and engineers from exposure to the contaminated air. Concentrations of 
amine additives were also measured in the Hercules C-130. Concentrations of TCP were 
below 4 µg/m
3
, with two exceptions; where oil leakage had occurred the concentrations were 
21.7 µg/m
3 
and 49 µg/m
3
. This value is lower than the maximum permissible concentration of 
100 µg /m
3
 at the time-weighted 8-hour mean (TWA), which is based on TOCP. N-Phenyl-1-
naphthylamine and dioctyldiphenylamine concentrations were also very low (<0.06 µg/m
3
) in 
the Hercules C-130. Trialkyl phosphates were found in the F-111 and Hercules C-130 aircraft 
at concentrations of <6µg/m
3
. Thus, the concentrations were considered unlikely to cause 
negative health effects.   
De Nola et al. (2011) conducted a study on three types of military aircraft. The aircraft have a 
previous history of pilot complaints about cockpit air contamination. It was developed a 
procedure to measure TCP in aircraft cabins and cockpits. It was also examined 
concentrations of airborne TCP to assess the potential health risk to the flight crew. The 
results showed that TCP is mainly present as aerosol instead of vapour, and only four out of 
ten isomers was detected; mmm, mmp, mpp, and ppp. However, the ortho isomers were all 
under limit of detection (LOD). The total ortho isomer content of TCP have previously been 
shown to be around 0.004 % (40 mg/kg) in modern turbine oils used in the Australian 
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Defence Force (ADF) aircraft. The results in three planes generally showed low levels of TCP 
<5 µg/m
3
, and thus the expected concentration of ortho isomers is approximately 0.0002 
µg/m
3
. Whether the results are representative for commercial aircraft or not, is not known. 
Liyasova et al. (2011) did an experiment by looking at the changes of butyrylcholinesterase in 
plasma of aircraft passengers, to examine if they had been exposed to tri-ortho-cresyl 
phosphate (TOCP). The passengers did not notice any fume, smell or odours during the 
flights. It was conducted laboratory samples of the TOCP isomer, where 12 passengers were 
tested by blood tests after their flight. The results for half of them were positive (proven 
TOCP), although the levels were low, and none had toxic symptoms. Only 0.05 to 3 % of 
butyrylcholinesterase in plasma, which is one of the target enzymes of organophosphates, was 
changed. When testing of the passengers after some months, all samples were negative for the 
isomer. This was the first report where TOCP was detected in aircraft occupants. 
Schindler et al. (2012) conducted a study to examine if amounts of three metabolites of TCP 
isomers (oo-, mm-, pp-dicresyl phosphate), as well as dialkyl and diaryl phosphate 
metabolites, was found in urine of pilots and cabin crew after the occurrence of smoke or 
odour during flight. 332 urine samples were taken, and none of the samples contained TOCP 
above the limit of detection (LOD 0.5 µg/l). There were found higher metabolite levels of 
TBP, tri-(2-chloroethyl) phosphate (TCEP) and triphenyl phosphate (TPP) in cabin crews than 
in unexposed persons from the general population. The elevated metabolite levels could be 
due to traces of hydraulic fluid in cabin air, or release of flame retardants. It was stated that 
the results indicated that health problems reported by passengers and crew after air 
contamination during flight could not be due to TOCP (Schindler et al., 2012). The MOCP 
isomer was not measured in this experiment, although the isomer is proposed to be the most 
toxic one (Henschler, 1958).  
Abou-Donia et al. (2013) conducted an assay on 12 healthy control persons, and a group of 34 
flight crews who had experienced adverse health effects after possible exposure to air 
contaminants in the aircraft. The purpose was to examine whether there were changes in the 
level of autoantibodies. Findings showed significant elevations in levels of immunogloblulin 
G (IgG) class autoantibodies. IgG is generally considered to be an indication of the immune 
status to particular pathogens in an individual. The results suggest a possible development of 
neuronal injury and gliosis
6
 due to presumed exposure to cabin air contaminant containing 
organophosphates.   
de Ree et al. (2014) measured TCP on nine Boeing 737s. The background of the study was to 
increase the insight of a possible association between exposure to TCPs, via contaminated 
cabin air, and aerotoxic syndrome. The results showed that the samples of TOCP- isomers and 
other ortho isomers were below the LOD between 0.3-0.75 ng/m
3
 depending on the length of 
the flight. It was established a toxicological risk model to find a “hazard quotient” of TOCP. 
The results indicated meta- and para-isomers in low concentrations, while TOCP and other 
ortho isomers were not detected. It was concluded that the concentrations of TOCP were not 
high enough to explain aerotoxic syndrome. 
                                                 
6
 Change of glial cells in response to damage to the central nervous system. 
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To examine the relationship between previous measured results from different studies of TCP, 
de Boer et al. (2014) performed a literature study. They found that concentrations of total TCP 
in cabin air are at maximum 50-100 ng/m
3
, and thus not exceeding toxic thresholds (stated to 
be 14 mg d
-1
 in the article). These thresholds contain uncertainty and need further 
confirmation. They summarize that TCP concentrations reported in the literature are 
insufficient to explain the health effects reported by pilots. Given that analytical standards for 
MOCP are not available, the exact concentrations could not be determined. It was concluded 
that the levels may be higher than measured.
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2.0 Methods  
To do research involves selecting methods that can provide means to answer the research 
questions, knowing what and how to gather data needed, and to analyse the results and their 
quality. Methods and their application encompass different sources of error, and ethical 
aspects. These have to be considered closely to carry out the best research practice possible. 
The choice of method is a central part of the research process, because it acts as framework 
for what results are within the scope of work, and hence influences the quality of the research. 
2.1 Choice of Methods 
To gather background information and get an understanding of existing knowledge about the 
topic, a literature study was conducted. The work to find literature is time consuming and 
requires research skills, since the literature relevant for the topic is selectively chosen. It 
makes an important part of the thesis, as it gives a summary of the research that previously 
has been done. Incidents are found in databases or media articles, and these sources were used 
to estimate a frequency of possible fume events within a given period. 
To answer the research questions about how well the issue of oil leaking into the cabin air is 
known a quantitative approach was chosen, in the form of two surveys. A quantitative method 
can provide a large number of respondents, and with a high response rate the results may be 
generalized. Hence, conclusions of the results can be drawn to a larger group than the sample. 
The reason for choosing surveys to answer some of the research questions is that the data 
collection and analysis can be completed in a short period of time. Closed-ended self-
administered questions were applied, where people answered a specific set of questions. 
Qualitative research methods could have been used in addition, to get more detailed answers 
from the people who were surveyed. Since the purpose is to get an overview of how many 
people who know about fume events, the most advantageous method was found to be 
quantitative research.  
2.2 Literature Study  
To find relevant literature, several scientific search engines and books, various public web 
pages and internal presentations from participating a meeting with GCAQE in London, were 
used. Additionally, first-hand information from the supervisor and an assigned contact person 
was received. 
Search Engines 
Scientific articles were found by use of various databases in the web pages of NTNU. The 
search engines used to find articles were SCOPUS, PubMed, Web of Science, SpringerLink 
and BIBSYS. Following, some of the keywords used in different databases are described. In 
the research process, several keywords were usually added after the first search result to 
narrow down the findings.
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Given that the prior knowledge about the topic was limited, no filter, or the original filter in 
the current database was used during the searches. It is important to notice that the same 
keywords have been used in more than one search engine, and in multiple combinations with 
each other. Some examples of searches carried out are described below. 
In SCOPUS, the first keywords were “hydraulic fluid”. To narrow down the number of 
documents, the words “jet engine oil” was used. The result was then 84 articles, where all of 
the summaries were skimmed through. By another search in SCOPUS, the first keywords 
were “aerotoxic syndrome”, which resulted in only 21 articles. Some of the articles were not 
in English, and were therefore excluded. To find out about the history of tricresyl phosphate, 
the keyword “jamaica ginger” was used. This gave 27 results in SCOPUS, which were 
skimmed to consider if they had any relevance. 
In PubMed, the first keywords were “organophosphates and aircraft”, which gave 62 results. 
These were quickly skimmed. To narrow down for articles of even more relevance, the word 
“exposure” was used, which resulted in 16 documents. By another search in PubMed, the first 
keywords used were “aerotoxic syndrome”. This resulted in 14 articles, which were read 
through. 
In Web of Science, the first keyword was “aircraft”. Since this gave too many results, the 
words “bleed air” were added, which led to 81 results. After reading the titles and some of the 
summaries, the word “incident” was used, which resulted in four documents (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27: Example of a search made in the search engine Web of Science.The search was narrowed 
down from over 59 000, to only four hits. The keywords used were “aircraft, bleed air and incident”. 
The database SpringerLink was mostly used to find technical literature. The filter was set to 
“with all of the words”, and the search words were “turbofan engine”. Since this search 
resulted in 796 documents, the filter was set to “with at least one of the words”, and “where 
the title contains”, where “aircraft engine” and “turbofan” was inserted, respectively. This 
gave 24 results, where the abstracts were read.  
BIBSYS was used to find relevant books in addition to two books received from the 
supervisor. Here, the keywords “tricresyl phosphate”, and “aircraft and incidents” were used 
in two different searches. 
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Throughout the entire process, relevant articles were discovered, both through search with 
specific words, and through the reference list of articles already used. Due to limited access 
from NTNU’s web pages, Google Scholar was used when articles found in other literature 
could not be found in full text.  
Material Safety Datasheet (MSDS) 
MSDS’ of the relevant hydraulic fluids and engine oils were downloaded from web pages of 
different manufacturers. The manufacturers included are Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum, 
Shell, Solutia Inc. and Petro-Canada.  
Web Pages and Media 
Several web pages from the media, international organizations authorised by the government 
and NGOs, were applied to find popular scientific-, and other public information of relevance. 
The sites used are listed alphabetically in Table 5. Information from these pages has been 
reviewed with a critical eye, but has been included to get an understanding and a holistic 
view. In addition, web pages of various manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft engines, as well 
as airline companies, have been used for supplementary reasons. These are among others 
Boeing, General Electric Aviation, Rolls Royce and SAS. 
Table 5: List of web pages and media sites that have been used. 
Name of the organ Internet access 
Aerotoxic Association http://aerotoxic.org/about-aerotoxic-syndrome/ 
Dagbladet http://www.dagbladet.no/ 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) https://www.easa.europa.eu/ 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) http://www.faa.gov/ 
Global Cabin Air Quality Executive 
(GCAQE) 
www.gcaqe.org 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) 
http://www.icao.int/Pages/default.aspx 
Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority 
(Luftfartstilsynet) 
http://www.luftfartstilsynet.no/ 
 
Occupational Health Research Consortium 
in Aviation (OHRCA) 
http://www.ohrca.org/ 
 
Global Cabin Air Quality Executive (GCAQE) conference  
Through participating on a two-day conference with GCAQE in London, literature and new 
research results were gathered. Some of the researchers who attended the conference had done 
recent research, which provided access to unpublished literature. Cabin crew and researchers 
were willing to help and provide information if needed, and their contact information were 
received. 
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2.3 Survey Among Pilots and Cabin Crew 
The purpose of the survey was to find out if pilots and cabin crew in Norway are aware that 
the cabin air may be contaminated, which may be caused by leakage of engine oil. In addition, 
it was desirable to determine how extensive this phenomenon is, by considering how many 
pilots and cabin crew who claim to have experienced incidents of contaminated air in the 
aircraft cabin. The sample of the survey was based on this, and was hence limited to include 
pilots and cabin crew. 
Since the Norwegian trade union, Parat Luftfart, agreed to send out an electronic 
questionnaire, it was chosen to collect data from pilots and cabin crew who are members of 
the union. In this way it was assumed that the response rate would be higher than in the 
practice of interview. At the same time this would not provide any opportunity for verbal 
communication, and detailed answers would thus be excluded. Because the collection of data 
by using electronic questionnaire is subject to notification, registration was sent to Norsk 
Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste (NSD). It was made in SelectSurvey, which is the 
Faculty of Social Sciences and Technology Management’s system for online surveys at 
NTNU. After acceptance to start the collection of data, the questionnaire was made. After the 
survey was prepared, it was sent to Kyrre Svarva, a SPSS expert at NTNU, for a quality 
check. This could avoid people to misunderstand the questions, and at the same time it would 
be better to change anything in the survey based on professional feedback. It was essential to 
design a simple questionnaire, so that it would not be time-consuming for the participants, and 
to limit the work of analysing the answers. There was no opportunity to answer questions 
from the participants directly, since the questionnaire only was submitted by e-mail. Hence, 
the questions had to be understandable and carefully planned. 
In the questionnaire shown in Table 6, the respondent could only choose one answer for every 
question, except question 3, where the number of years was typed in by the respondent. 
Question No 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 9 was not optional, while question No 5 and 7 were follow-up 
questions for question No 4 and 6, respectively. The participant could not move forward in the 
questionnaire before answering all questions on the page.  
To gather as many answers as possible, and at the same time maintain the anonymity of the 
participants, the questionnaire to the pilots and cabin crew was sent out by e-mail by Parat 
Luftfart. The survey was sent out to a total of 2 952 persons (pilots and cabin crew) on the 
25
th
 of March, with deadline for responding set to the 17
th
 of April. Parat Luftfart did also 
send a reminder of the survey to the participants on the 7
th
 of April on request. In addition to 
the link to open the questionnaire, the e-mail contained information about the survey and this 
thesis, see Appendix C. The survey and information were sent to the respondents in 
Norwegian language, but have been translated for use in this thesis. 
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Table 6: Questionnaire that was sent out to 2952 pilots and cabin crew in Norway. Since the survey 
was distributed in Norwegian, the term “fume events” was replaced with a description of how the 
event may be noticed.  
Information at the beginning of the questionnaire: 
We are two students working on our Master’s degree in Health, Safety and Environment at NTNU, 
and are now writing our master’s thesis. The topic of the thesis is contamination of jet engine oil 
which may enter the air in the aircraft cabin and cockpit, commonly known as fume events. We want 
to examine whether cabin crew and pilots in Norway are aware that such contamination may occur. In 
addition, we want to find out how extensive this matter is, considering how many believes they have 
noticed/experienced incidents of contaminated air in the aircraft cabin/cockpit. 
 
The answers from the questionnaire will be treated confidentially, and it is voluntary to participate in 
the survey. All data will be anonymized. 
 
Responsible for the survey: 
Tonje Trulssen Hildre (student) 
June Krutå Jensen (student) 
Professor Kristin Svendsen (supervisor) 
No Question Answer options 
1. Age   20-30 31-40 41-50 >50 
2. Gender Male Female 
3. For how long have you been working 
as a pilot/cabin crew? 
0-9 years 10-19 years 20-29 years  >29 years 
4. Are you familiar with events where 
oil leakage has led to contamination 
in the cabin air and/or cockpit? 
Contamination in this case means 
unusual smell of engine/oil, wet dog, 
smelly socks or visual smoke. 
Yes No 
5. Where have you heard or read about 
these events? 
 
Media 
(news-
paper, 
television, 
internet) 
Co-workers Airline Others 
6. Have you ever noticed a strange 
smell/smoke in the cabin? 
Yes No Uncertain 
7. How often have you noticed 
contamination as smell/smoke in the 
cabin/cockpit (number of times)? 
1 2-5 6-10 >10 
8. Have you ever registered if someone 
else noticed a strange smell/smoke in 
the cabin/cockpit? 
Yes No 
9. Do you consider such air 
contamination a problem in the 
aircraft industry? 
Yes No I don’t know 
Thank you for participating in the survey! 
 
The participants got 23 days to answer the questionnaire. This time limit was chosen because 
of pilots and cabin crew’s unusual working hours, and because it was Easter holiday during 
the response period. After the time limit of 23 days, the data was collected and analysed by 
the use of IBM SPSS (Stastistical Package for the Social Sciences). The software was 
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recommended by the Faculty of Social Sciences and Technology Management. The variables 
were coded automatically, and data was presented by tables to get an understandable 
overview. Different questions in the survey were cross tabulated to assess whether there was 
any connection between them.   
2.4 Survey Among People on Gløshaugen Campus 
The purpose of the survey was to find out whether people on Gløshaugen campus at NTNU 
are aware that the aircraft cabin may be contaminated by engine oil. In addition, it was 
desirable to find out how extensive this subject is, by considering how many who claim they 
have experienced incidents of contaminated air in aircraft cabin. This was due to the fact that 
the largest proportion of these people probably are academics, and that this is a group of 
people who keep themselves updated on the news and hence could have heard about the 
phenomena of fume events. In advance of handing out the survey, it was assumed that 100 
respondents could give an indication of knowledge about the phenomenon among academics, 
and also how many who claimed they had experienced incidents of contaminated air in an 
aircraft cabin. 
The data was collected by the use of a self-made questionnaire in Microsoft Word (Table 7). 
The questionnaire was written in Norwegian language, but has been translated for the use in 
this thesis. The questionnaire was printed and handed out to random participants on 
Gløshaugen campus. It was chosen not to conduct an online survey, to save time. By using 
printed questionnaires, it was not necessary to inform and get permission from NSD, as it was 
not collected any information electronically. By handing out the survey personally, it was 
possible to inform about the thesis and the survey directly to the respondent, in addition to 
written information on the sheet handed out. This could give the respondents an opportunity 
to ask questions if something was unclear. At the same time, the participants answering a 
paper version of a questionnaire had to allocate time at the exact moment to answer, whereas 
at an online survey he/she could have chosen to respond at a time better suited. Since the two 
questionnaires were given to two different groups in the population, pilots/cabin crew and 
people on campus, the questions were asked differently in the surveys. 
For every question, the respondent could only choose one answer, except question No 5, 
where it was possible to answer more than one of the alternatives. Question No 1, 2, 3, 5 and 
7 was not optional, while question No 4 and 6 were follow-up questions for question No 3 and 
5, respectively. The results from the questionnaire was immediately collected and coded in 
IBM SPSS. The variables were analysed, and data were presented by tables to get an 
understandable overview. Afterwards, the results were interpreted and discussed. 
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Table 7: Questionnaire handed out to 100 participants on Gløshaugen campus. Since the survey was 
distributed in Norwegian, the term “fume events” was replaced with a description of how the event 
may be noticed.  
Information at the beginning of the questionnaire:  
We are two students taking a Master’s degree in Health, Safety and Environment at NTNU, and are 
now writing our master’s thesis. The topic is contamination of air in aircraft cabin. Contamination may 
occur if there is a leak that allows oil from the engine to enter the cabin with the ventilation air, 
commonly known as fume events. We want to find out if people on campus are aware that such 
contamination may occur. 
 
The air that enters the cabin and cockpit is initially clean air from the environment outside the aircraft. 
This air passes through the engine before it is used as ventilation air and gets inhaled by people inside 
the aircraft. Leakage may occur in the engine, which may cause the jet engine oils to be mixed with 
the ventilation air that enters the cabin. The oils used in aircraft engines contain chemical substances, 
so-called organophosphates, which under high temperature may develop into toxic compounds. 
Exposure to these compounds has been shown to have negative health effects. Air contaminated by oil 
can be detected for example by an odour of engine/oil, wet dog or smelly socks, or it may be visible as 
smoke. 
 
Please make a circle around your answers. 
1. Age 18-25 26-33 34-41 >41 
2. Gender Male Female 
3. Do you travel by 
aircraft? 
Yes 
 
If yes; please continue to question 4 
No 
 
If no; please continue to question 5 
4. How often do 
you travel by 
aircraft? 
(Roundtrip 
equals one time) 
1-5 times per 
year 
6-10  times per 
year 
11-15  times per 
year 
>16  times per year 
5. Sometimes oil 
leakage may 
occur, which 
may lead to 
smoke or a 
strange smell in 
the cabin. Have 
you ever heard 
or read about oil 
leakage 
episodes? 
Yes 
 
 
 
If yes; please continue to question 6 
No 
 
 
 
If no; please continue to question 7 
6. Where have you 
heard/read 
about such 
contamination? 
(Oil leakage 
episodes) 
News-
papers 
Tele-
vision 
Internet Others 
 
Tele-vision 
and 
internet 
News-
papers and 
internet 
7. Have you ever 
noticed a 
strange smell or 
smoke in the 
cabin? 
Yes No 
Thank you for participating in the survey! 
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The way the surveys are designed may influence the type of results that is provided. Leading 
or unclear questions are factors that can reduce the reliability and make it difficult to trust the 
answers given. To avoid low reliability of the results, the questions in the surveys were 
thoroughly designed. In addition, both of the surveys were quality checked by the supervisor.  
2.5 Sources Used to Find Frequency of Possible Fume Events  
To find events that could be categorized as “possible fume events”, organizations that record 
events or receive updates from pages that record events were used (Appendix A). The thesis 
contains an overview of how often fume events may have happened from January 2007 until 
December 2014, found from a variety of sites. The web pages used are found from both 
Michaelis’ Doctor’s degree (Michaelis, 2010, p 376-411) and by online search. The overview 
is not considered to be complete since, according to among others, Murawski and Supplee 
(2008) van Netten (2005) and Murawski (2011), few events are actually registered. It was not 
found a site where all the incidents throughout the world are registered by the responsible 
airlines or organizations. Different countries use different sites to register incidents, and at the 
same time they are assumed to be recorded by a variety of criteria. Hence, it was complicated 
to determine criteria of how relevant events could be found. A large part of the events 
occurred without including any investigation report, which means that they cannot be defined 
as fume events, even though it is a possibility.  
As mentioned, Michaelis (2010) compiled an overview of incidents in the UK from 1985- mid 
2006. It was therefore chosen to create an overview from the beginning of year 2007 and until 
the end of 2014. This overview also includes incidents that have occurred worldwide. This 
was a time consuming work, and it was therefore chosen to exclude the airlines own web 
pages, since there are many of them. As the focus in this thesis involves commercial aircraft, 
incidents on small aircraft have been excluded. The incidents have been included in the 
overview when any of the aircraft occupants noticed smell of dirty socks, unusual smell, 
smoke, haze, fumes or odour. Incidents noticed as “electrical failure” or “electrical smell” is 
not included, as these already have a presumed cause, which does not entail a fume event. 
Reports on languages included are Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and English. Appendix D 
includes a list of all the web pages considered to find possible fume events. 
The database of the National Transportation Safety Board is used as an example of how the 
incidents were found (National Transportation Safety Board, n.d). The result covered 124 
incidents when the search was limited to, “Airpane” under “Aircraft, Category” from 2007-
2014 in the search field of the aviation accident database (Appendix B). To further limit the 
results, the type of aircraft was modified to only include the commercial ones under 
“Operation” in the search field. Below “Event details” in the search field, relevant keywords 
were inserted. The keywords used to find the flight incidents where fume events had occurred 
were: “smoke”, “oil and smoke”, “oil leakage”, “oil mist”, “fume”, “fume event”, “fumes”, 
“smoke and fumes” and “smell”. The incidents were quickly read through, and the ones 
considered relevant were added to the overview. 
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2.6 Ethical Aspects  
The survey among cabin crew and pilots was in advance approved by Norsk 
Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste (NSD), and guidelines to privacy information were 
followed. The assurance of informed consensus is important, and by letting Parat send out the 
survey, the respondents were completely anonymous. All the collected data were stored and 
handled in a way to ensure that unauthorized persons did not have access to the information. 
There were no intentions of publishing information about individuals, only the overall results. 
The participants were assured complete confidentiality and anonymity and it was informed 
that the respondents’ answers would be deleted at the end of the project. It was not obtained 
any information about whether the respondents were pilots or cabin crew, and as a 
consequence, it should not be possible to identify them. Since the answers from the survey 
handed out to people on campus were not collected electronically, it was not necessary to 
notify NSD. The only sensitive information that was collected in both of the surveys was 
gender and age. 
Information about the purpose of doing the surveys and how the results would be used was 
given to all the participants. This was done so that they had the opportunity to choose whether 
they wanted to participate. It was also informed that answering the questionnaire was 
voluntary and that they at any time could choose to not continue. A problem with providing 
information was the possibility of affecting the answers to the respondents. This could result 
from a more or less conscious change of their thoughts, where the information could lead the 
participants to answer what they thought was expected, instead of the truth. At the same time, 
it would have been difficult for the respondents to answer anything if they did not know the 
background of the questions. 
A question regarding the participants experienced relevance of the topic may arise. Since 
pilots and cabin crew have aircraft as their working place, it is assumed that the relevance of 
the survey was obvious. It is conceivable that this was not as obvious to the participants at 
campus, which then could lead to completely random responses. By explaining why the study 
was conducted and how the results would be used, it was assumed that those who felt the 
study did not have any relevance, would choose not to participate.  
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3.0 Results 
The results show whether the research questions in the thesis are answered. Following is the 
results from the surveys and overview of fume events. Results from the literature study are 
given in the introduction.  
3.1 Survey Among Cabin Crew and Pilots  
The survey was sent out to a total of 2 952 cabin crew and pilots. Of the 2952 persons who 
received the survey, there was lacking information about gender and age of 23 persons, 
leaving a population of 2929. 1233 (42.1 %) of these were males and 1696 (57.9 %) were 
females. The number of persons who opened the link to the questionnaire was 736, where 112 
(15.2 %) of them did not complete the questionnaire. These were removed from the results. 
The actual number of respondents was 624, resulting in a response rate of 21 % (624/2 952). 
The respondents consisted of 317 (50.8 %) males and 307 (49.2 %) females, aged in groups 
from 20-30 years, 31-40 years, 41-50 years, and >50 years, where 31-40 years was the largest 
represented age group with 230 (34.7 %) respondents (Table 8). The question “For how long 
have you been working as a pilot/cabin crew?” has not been used in the analysis, since it gave 
the same tendencies as the age groups of the respondents; older age groups had increased 
working experience in most cases.  
Table 8: Age distribution of respondents and total population of pilots and cabin crew. 
Age distribution  No. of respondents 
(N=624) 
Total population 
(N=2929)  
20-30 years 117 (18.8 %)  595 (20.3  %) 
31-40 years 219 (35.0 %) 911 ( 31.3 %) 
41-50 years 194 (31.1 %) 922 ( 31.5 %) 
>50 94 (15.1 %) 501 (17.1  %) 
 
440 out of 624 (70.5 %) respondents are familiar with fume events, with most respondents in 
the age group 41-50 years. There is a correlation between familiarity of fume events and age. 
Older age groups have increased number of respondents who know about the phenomenon. 
There is a higher percentage of males who know about fume events than females, respectively 
81.4 % and 59.3 % (Table 9).  
Most of the respondents, 450 (72.1 %), have noticed an unusual smell/smoke in the cabin or 
cockpit. 246 (77.6 %) of the male respondents state that they have noticed an unusual 
smell/smoke in the cabin or cockpit, which is a higher percentage than females, 204 (66.4 %) 
(Table 9).  
The question “How often have you experienced contamination as smell/smoke in the 
cabin/cockpit (number of times)?” was a follow-up question to “Have you ever noticed a 
strange smell/smoke in the cabin?”. The number of respondents was 450 (72.1 %), with 246 
(77.6 %) males and 204 (66.4%) females.
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The largest number of male respondents, 96 (30.3 %), state that they have experienced such 
contamination >10 times, while the largest number of female respondents, 94 (30.6 %), state 
that they have experienced such contamination 2-5 times. The largest group that constituted 
most respondents in total, are the group who have experienced such contamination 2-5 times, 
with a total of 188 (30.1 %) respondents (Table 9).   
Of the 440 respondents who are familiar with fume events, most of the males, 162 (68.1 %),  
report to have heard about this from “Media” and most of the females, 124 (41.6 %), have 
heard about it from “Co-workers“(Table 9). Many of the respondents answered more than one 
response alternative, which is the reason why the total number of respondents exceed 440, and 
the total percentage is greater than 100 % when adding the alternatives together (Table 9). 272 
(43.6 %) of the respondents consider air contamination a problem in the aircraft industry, 
represented by 159 (50.2 %) males and 113 (36.8 %) females.  
Table 9: Cross tabulation of questions to pilots and cabin crew. The values are calculated from total 
number (N) of males, females and total respondents. 
Question Response 
alternative 
Male (N=317) Female (N=307) Total  
(N=624) 
Are you familiar with 
events where oil leakage 
has led to 
contamination in the 
cabin air and/or 
cockpit? 
Yes  258 (81.4 %)  182 (59.3 %) 440 (70.5 %) 
Have you ever noticed a 
strange smell/smoke in 
the cabin? 
Yes 246 (77.6 %) 204 (66.4 %)  450 (72.1 %) 
No 53 (16.7 %)  75 (24.4 %)  128 (20.5 %)  
Uncertain 18 (5.7 %)  28 (9.1 %)  46 (7.4 %)  
How often have you 
experienced 
contamination as 
smell/smoke in the 
cabin/cockpit? 
Never  71 (22.3 %) 103 (33.6 %) 174 (27.8 %)  
1 time 18 (5.7 %)  33 (10.7 %) 51 (8.2 %)  
2-5 times 94 (29.7 %) 94 (30.6 %) 188 (30.1 %) 
6-10 times 38 (12.0 %) 16 (5.2 %) 54 (8.7 %) 
>10 times 96 (30.3 %) 61 (19.9 %) 157 (25.2 %) 
Do you consider such 
air contamination a 
problem in the aircraft 
industry? 
Yes 159 (50.2 %)  113 (36.8 %)  272 (43.6 %) 
No 76 (24.0 %)  81 (26.4 %)  157 (25.1 %) 
I don’t know  82 (25.9 %)  113 (36.8 %)  195 (31.3 %)  
Where have you heard 
about these events? 
a)
  
Media 162 (68.1 %)  76 (31.9 %) 238 (38.1 %) 
Co-workers 174 (58.4 %)  124 (41.6 %)  298 (47.8) 
Airline 129 (64.5 %)  71 (35.5 %)  200 (32.0 %) 
Others 59 (60.2 %) 39 (39.8 %)  98 (15.7 %) 
a) The percentages are estimated from  the number of males or females who have heard about 
fume events from a certain source (media, co-workers, airline, others), out of the total number 
of respondents who have heard of such events from the certain source. (Example: 162/238). 
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450 of the respondents have experienced contamination as smell/smoke in the cabin or 
cockpit. There is a positive correlation between those who consider the contamination a 
problem, and the number of times the respondents have experienced contamination (Table 
10). 
Table 10: Cross tabulation of two questions to pilots and cabin crew; “Do you consider such air 
contamination a problem in the aircraft industry?” and “How often have you experienced 
contamination as smell/smoke in the cabin/cockpit?”. 
Question Response 
alter-
natives 
How often have you experienced contamination as 
smell/smoke in the cabin/cockpit (number of times)?  
Total 
(N=450) 
1 time 
(N=51) 
2-5 times 
(N=188) 
6-10 times 
(N=54) 
>10 times 
(N=157) 
Do you 
consider such 
air 
contamination 
a problem in 
the aircraft 
industry? 
a) 
 
Yes 11 (21.6 %)  76 (40.4 %)  27 (50.0 %)  107 (68.2 %)  221 (49.1 %) 
No 20 (39.2 %) 49 (26.1 %) 13 (24.1 %) 14 (8.9 %) 96 (21.3 %) 
I don’t 
know 
20 (39.2 %)  63 (33.5 %)  14 (25.9 %) 36 (22.9 %) 133 (29.6 %) 
a) The percentages are estimated from whether the respondents answered yes/no/I’dont know out 
of the total number of respondents who had experienced contamination as smell/smoke in the 
cabin/cockpit 1 times/2-5 times/6-10 times or >10 times.  
 
418 (92.9 %) out of the 450 respondents who claim to have noticed an unusual smell/smoke in 
the cabin or cockpit, also express that they have registered someone else notice a strange 
smell/smoke. 
No surveys or articles were found that directly describe the knowledge about fume events 
among the general public, or among pilots and cabin crew. 
3.2 Survey Among People on Gløshaugen Campus 
Of 106 persons asked, 100 chose to participate in the survey, which gives a response rate of 
94.3 %. All of the respondents use aircraft as a mode of transport, hence the question “Do you 
fly?” has not been used in the analysis. Of the 100 respondents, 45 (45.0 %) were males and 
55 (55.0 %) were females, with the majority in the age group 18-25 years, 93.3 % and 92.7 %, 
respectively. There were no male or female respondents in the age group 34-41 years. 
The majority of both male and female respondents have never heard or read about fume 
events, 38 (84.5 %) and 47 (85.5 %), respectively. Most of the male respondents, 20 (44.4 %), 
and female respondents, 23 (41.8 %), travel 6-10 times per year (Table 11) 
15 respondents have heard about fume events. Of the total 100 respondents, 5 (5.0 %) report 
to have heard about it either from the newspapers or internet. Most of the male respondents, 4 
(8.9 %), have heard about it through television and internet, and most of the female 
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respondents, 3 (5.5 %), have heard about it from internet. 67 % of the 100 respondents report 
to not have noticed any smoke or unusual smell in the cabin (Table 11). 
Table 11: Cross tabulation of questions to people on Gløshaugen campus. The values are calculated 
from total number (N) of males, females and respondents. 
Question Response 
alternative 
Male 
(N=45) 
Female (N=55) Total (N=100) 
Have you heard about oil 
leakage episodes on 
aircraft? 
Yes 7 (15.6 %)  8 (14.5 %) 15 (15 %) 
How often do you travel by 
aircraft? 
Do not travel 
by aircraft 
0 (0.0 %) 1 (1,8 %) 1 (1.8 %) 
1-5 times per 
year 
19 (42.2 %)  23 (41.8 %)  42 (42.0 %)  
6-10 times 
per year 
20 (44.4 %) 23 (41.8 %) 43 (43.0 %)  
11-15 times 
per year 
4 (8.9 %) 9 (16.4 %) 13 (13.0 %) 
>15 times per 
year 
2 (4.4 %) 0 (0.0 %) 2 (2.0 %)  
Where have you heard/read 
about such contamination? 
(Oil leakage episodes) 
Have not 
heard/read 
about oil 
leakage 
episodes 
38 (84.5 %) 47 (85.5 %) 85 (85.0 %) 
Newspapers 1 (2.2 %)  2 (3.6 %) 3 ( 3.0 %) 
Television 1 (2.2 %) 1 (1.8 %) 2 ( 2.0 %)  
Internet 1 (2.2 %)  3 (5.5 %) 4 ( 4.0 %) 
Television 
and internet 
4 (8.9 %) 1 (1.8 %) 5 ( 5.0 %) 
Newspapers 
and internet 
0 (0.0 %) 1 (1.8 %) 1 (1.0 %)  
Have you ever noticed a 
strange smell/smoke in the 
cabin? 
Yes 2 (4.4 %) 4 (7.3 %) 6 (6.0 %) 
No 31 (68.9 %) 36 (65.5 %) 67 (67.0 %) 
Uncertain 12 (26.7 %) 15 (27.3 %) 27 (27.0 %) 
 
3.3 Frequency of Possible Fume Events  
There were found a total of 701 possible fume events between 2007 and 2014 (Appendix D), 
where 644 (91.9 %) of these were found from the web page “The Aviation Herald”. In 
addition, AAIB and GCAQE each contained 14 (2.0 %) incidents of interest, Arie Adriaensen 
had 10 (1.5 %) reports from incidents of interest, ATSB had 6 (0.9 %) incidents, FAA 3 (0. 4 
%), NTSB, TSB and AAIU each contained 2 (0.3 %) incidents of interest, whereas 1 (0.1 %) 
were found from CAA, Havkom Sverige, Aerotoxic.org and TAIC. 
The least number of the 701 registered incidents occurred in 2007, where only 14 (2.0 %) 
were found. 2008, 2009 and 2010 followed with 84 (12.0 %), 95 (13.5 %) and 100 (14.3 %) 
  3.0 RESULTS 
61 
 
incidents, respectively. In 2011 there were found 133 (19.0 %), which was the year with the 
highest number of registered incidents. In 2012 there was a drop to 89 (12.7 %) incidents, in 
2013 there were found 110 (15.7 %) and in 2014 76 (10.8 %) incidents were found.  
To calculate the frequency of fume events per day, the average of the reported events per year 
from 2007-2014 has been estimated. The frequency of possible fume events was estimated to 
be 0.24 per day. Appendix E illustrates how the average has been calculated.  
The incidents mainly occurred on Boeing and Airbus aircraft, with a total of 278 (39.7 %) of 
701 on Boeing, and 167 (23.8 %) of 701 incidents on Airbus. Most of the incidents, 113 (16,1 
%), occurred on the aircraft type Boeing 737. 
The incidents are most often reported to be noticed in the cabin and cockpit (Table 12), 
respectively 253 (36.0 %) and 233 (33.2 %).  
Table 12: Location of the incidents that were reported to be noticed in the aircraft. 
Location of incident No. of incidents (N=701) 
Cabin 253 (36.0 %) 
Cockpit (Flight deck) 233 (33.2 %) 
On board 104 (14.9 % ) 
Cabin and cockpit 55 (7.9 %) 
Unknown 47 (6.7 %) 
Galley 9 (1.3 %) 
 
Most of the reports following the incidents describe the flight phase when the incidents 
occurred while “grounded”, “initial climb”, “climb”, “en route”, “descent”, “landing”, and 
“unknown". The flight phase of most reported incidents was “en route”, with a total of 340 
(48.5 %) incidents. In 6 (0.9 %) of the 701 incidents, there are no information about flight 
phase (Table 13). 
Table 13: Different flight phases when incidents of possible fume events occurred. 
Flight phase No. of incidents (N=701) 
En route 340 (48.5 %) 
Climb 187 (26.6 %) 
Initial climb 67 (9,6 %) 
Descent 48 (6.8 %) 
Grounded 44 (6.3 %) 
Landing 9 (1.3 %) 
Unknown 6 (0.9 %) 
 
336 (47.9 %) of the 701 incidents contain no information about the cause, and these have been 
defined as “lack of information”. There were many different causes described in the other 
incidents, such as oil leaking into cabin from the air condition packs, and information about a 
malfunction of the air condition system.   
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The incidents are divided into groups according to how they were noticed; “smoke”, “smell”, 
“fumes”, “odour”, “smoke and smell”, “smoke and odour”, “smoke and fumes” or 
“unknown”. Most of the incidents were noticed as either “smoke” or “smell”, respectively 321 
(45.8 %%) and 223 (31.8 %) (Table 14).  
Table 14: Categorization of how the incidents were noticed. 
Categorization of incident No. of incidents (N=701) 
Smoke 321 (45.8 %) 
Smell 223 (31.8 %) 
Fumes 50 (7.1 %) 
Odour 49 (7.0 %) 
Smoke and smell 34 (4.8 %) 
Smoke and odour 14 (2.0 %) 
Smoke and fumes 7 (1.0 %)  
Unknown 3 (0.5 %) 
 
In the reports, there are descriptions about decisions that were made subsequently to the 
incidents. These are divided into the groups: “return”, “divert”, “fly to the destination”, 
“rejected take-off”, and “unknown”. When the incidents occurred, most of the aircraft, 247 
(35.2 %), returned to the departure airport (Table 15). 
Table 15: Overview of the decision made after occurrence of incidence. 
Decision made following the 
incident 
No. of incidents (N=701)  
Return 247 (35.2 %) 
Divert 239 (34.1 %) 
Fly to the destination 129 (18.4 %) 
Unknown 53 (7.6 %) 
Rejected take-off 33 (4.7 %) 
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4.0 Discussion  
The discussion focuses on the results and findings from the literature study. Typically, there 
exist several explanations of the results, and these need to be discussed thoroughly. Hence, it 
is important to pay attention to several considerations to assess the validity before coming to 
any conclusions about the issue of fume events. 
Survey Among Cabin Crew and Pilots  
Certain actions were performed before sending out the survey to pilots and cabin crew to 
facilitate a high response rate of survey recipients, and thus to obtain high validity of the 
survey. This included planning on how to present the digital survey invitation. Information 
about the purpose of the study was sent together with a link to the survey. As no similar 
former survey had been found, it was hard to assess how much information would be 
appropriate. Focus was therefore set on providing clear and specific information. If too 
extensive, one could risk that the information had not been fully grasped by participants, 
whereas too little information could be inadequate to allow questions to be understood, or 
furthermore that the participants themselves had questioned the purpose or motives of the 
survey. By informing in an open and somewhat detailed manner, the goal was to establish a 
framework of the survey that allowed the participants to gain interest, quickly comprehend 
their task to complete the survey, and to not question its motives or purpose. By also sending 
out a reminder of the survey, more people responded to the questionnaire. The actions above 
were anticipated to optimize the validity of the survey.  
The response rate of the survey that was sent out to pilots and cabin crew was 21 %. With this 
rate, it could be argued whether the group are representative of all cabin crew and pilots. The 
fact that 79 % of the persons who received the survey did not answer, may cause selection 
bias. Selection bias may arise if a systematic difference exists between the persons who 
participated in the survey and the persons who did not respond. It is possible that the persons 
who responded to the survey were familiar with fume events to a greater extent than the non-
respondents, and therefore were more interested in the topic. If an absolute selection bias is 
assumed, where the respondents of the survey are the only persons who have any opinions 
regarding fume events, the percentage of the 2952 asked who have heard of fume events can 
be calculated to be 14.9 % (Appendix F). However, it is assumed that there are more than 14.9 
% who are familiar with fume events of the 2952 persons who received the survey, due to the 
fact that the bias is not considered that high. If all the 2952 persons had answered the survey, 
the factual percentage would range between 14.9 % and 70.5 %.   
There were received information from Parat Luftfart about gender and age for 2 929 out of 
2952 persons, consisting of 1233 (42.1 %) males and 1696 (57.9 %) females. The majority of 
these were in the age groups 31-40 and 41-50 years. The same distribution of age also applied 
for the 624 respondents. In addition, there were almost an equal distribution of male and 
female respondents, 317 (50.8 %) and 307 (49.2 %) respectively. Hence, there are almost no 
difference between the respondents and the total population of 2952 persons with regard to 
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gender and age. The respondents are assumed to be representative of the total population due 
to these characteristics.  
No other studies with the purpose to investigate the knowledge about fume events were found, 
and for that reason, the results cannot be compared with previous studies. A question to be 
asked is whether the results are reliable and can be confirmed if a similar study is carried out 
at a later time. Whether the response rate is high enough to confirm statistical validity 
depends on the selection bias. In this thesis, a quantitative method was used. It can be argued 
whether or not qualitative methods should have been applied as well, and if such would have 
supplied additional information of relevance.  
112 (15.2 %) of the participants did not complete the survey, which may be explained by the 
vulnerability and controversiality of the topic of oil leakage into aircraft cabin and cockpit. 
The topic of this thesis is assumed to be controversial, as people have different viewpoints on 
whether fume events pose any problem. Another reason may be that they found the questions 
uninteresting, or did not consider the topic as important.  
Of the participants who completed the survey, 440 (70.5 %) of 624 are familiar with fume 
events in the cabin and cockpit. Possible explanations of the high percentage include 
discussions with co-workers, information given by airlines, media coverage, and other 
sources. Dagbladet has covered the phenomenon of fume events for some years, which might 
have been an information source for the pilots and cabin crew. A short time before the survey 
was sent out to cabin crew and pilots, an article about Richard Westgate, a pilot who died 
after supposedly being exposed to air contamination in the aircraft, was published in the 
newspaper (Hansen, 2015). 200 (32.0 %) of the respondents have heard about fume events 
from their airline, which is a somewhat low percentage. If the airlines do not consider it a 
problem, they probably do not find it necessary to provide any information to their 
employees. Another reason why airlines do not inform about it may be the lack of evidence 
on, and limited research of, the health effects following exposure to fume events. A larger 
number of the respondents in the older age groups have heard about fume events. An 
explanation of this may be that many of them are likely to have longer work experience than 
persons in younger age groups, and therefore possibly have experienced the events or read 
about them to a greater extent. 
There are more male, 258 (81.4 %), than female respondents, 182 (59.3 %), who are familiar 
with fume events in the cabin and cockpit. 450 (72.1 %) of the 624 respondents report to have 
noticed a strange smell or smoke in the cabin/cockpit. Since many of the respondents are 
familiar with fume events in the cabin and cockpit, it may be assumed that they are more 
aware of the smell or smoke in the aircraft and hence more observant if fumes enter the 
aircraft. 128 (20.5 %) respondents report to never have noticed this, and 46 (7.4 %) are 
uncertain. The respondents who are uncertain may have noticed smell or smoke without 
knowing the source. The contaminants can also be odourless, which means that the 
respondents may have been oblivious to their expsosure. 
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It is a somewhat larger proportion of males, 246 (77.6 %), than females, 204 (66.4 %), who 
report to have noticed an unusual smell/smoke in the cabin or cockpit. As the results show, 
most of the male respondents have experienced smoke or smell more than 10 times, while the 
female respondents are highest represented in the group where the respondents have 
experienced it 2-5 times. The air that enters the cabin and cockpit passes through different 
engines, before the air is led to various locations of the aircraft for ventilation (SKYbrary, 
n.d.). This means that if a leakage occurs in one of the engines, the bleed air from this 
particular engine may be led to the cockpit and consequently will only be noticed by the 
pilots. In addition, the air that enters the aircraft is not evenly distributed. In the cockpit the air 
received is 100 % outside air, while the air in the cabin is 60/40 % recycled air (van Netten, 
2005, de Boer et al., 2014). This means that pilots in the cockpit would to a larger extent be 
exposed to contaminated air from the engines. This, in combination with the fact that the 
majority of pilots are males while most cabin crew are females, may be one reason why more 
males in general are familiar with the phenomenon to a greater extent.   
There are a total of 272 (43.6 %) respondents who consider air contamination by oil leakage a 
problem in the aircraft industry. If an absolute selection bias is assumed, where the 
respondents of the survey are the only persons who have any opinions regarding fume events, 
the percentage of the 2952 asked who consider fume events a problem can be calculated to be 
9.2 % (Appendix F). However, it is assumed that there are more than 9.2 % who consider it a 
problem of the 2952 persons who received the survey, due to the fact that the bias is not 
considered that high. If all the 2952 persons had answered the survey, the factual percentage 
would range between 9.2 % and 43.6 %.      
There is a correlation between those who consider fume events a problem, and the increased 
number of times the respondents have experienced contamination. According to Abou-Donia 
(2003), Harrison et al. (2009), Ross et al. (2006), van Netten (2005), among others, there have 
been reports of adverse health effects subsequent to possible fume events. It may for that 
reason be assumed that some of the respondents who consider this a problem, actually have 
noticed symptoms or suffered negative health effects following a fume event. A relatively 
high percentage (31.3 %) of the respondents are uncertain whether they consider such 
contamination a problem or not. This may be because they are not familiar with the topic, or 
due to its controversiality. 96 (21.3 %) of the respondents who report to have noticed smell or 
smoke do not consider air contamination a problem. They may have considered it 
insignificant if they assume that the smell normally occurs in an aircraft. 159 (50.2 %) of the 
male respondents and 113 (36.8 %) of the female respondents consider such contamination a 
problem. This may associate with the fact that more males than females are familiar with the 
events, and that more males report to have noticed smell/smoke in the cabin or cockpit.  
Survey Among People on Gløshaugen campus 
To obtain high validity of the results from the survey among people on Gløshaugen campus, 
certain actions were performed before handing it out. Simple questions were asked to avoid 
any misunderstanding when answering them. Few questions were asked, to limit the time 
required to respond the questionnaire, and so that as many as possible wanted to respond. 
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Given that the initial perception was that few people of the general population have heard of 
the phenomenon in advance, it was assumed that the result would be the same in the survey 
handed out to mainly academics. It is also believed that the group of the population who most 
likely had heard about the phenomenon, except flight crew, were academics. Since most of 
the surveyed academics (85 %) have not heard about fume events, it is reasonable to assume 
that the general public have even less knowledge about the phenomenon.  
100 out of 106 persons agreed to participate in the survey, which gave a response rate of 94.3 
%. Although this is a high response rate, the sample size may be somewhat low. Most of the 
people on campus are students aged 18-25 years. To get a better overview of the general 
population, people of all ages could have been asked the same questions. The results about 
knowledge of fume events among people on Gløshaugen campus cannot be generalized to the 
general public, but it is assumed that it can give tendencies regarding academics’ knowledge 
about the topic.  
As mentioned, 85.0 % of the respondents have not heard or read about fume events. These 
results are different from the survey among cabin crew and pilots, where most of the 
respondents were familiar with such events. However, because of the small sample of people 
on Gløshaugen campus, it is difficult to compare with the group of pilots and cabin crew, and 
make any explanation of why they answered differently. It could only be assumed that people 
on Gløshaugen (mainly students aged 18-25 years) are not concerned with the air quality on 
aircraft, since they probably are not exposed to fume events frequently. It is important to note 
that these assumptions needs further verification, and that studies on a greater number of 
people, not only academics, should be carried out. 
There are not any trends regarding the respondents’ frequency of travelling by air. There is no 
distinction regarding where the respondents have heard about fume events, but based on the 
perception that people use different information sources, such as television, newspaper, 
internet and others, it can be assumed that the outcome would have been the same with a 
larger sample size. Most of the respondents (67.0 %) have never noticed, or are uncertain 
(27.0 %) whether they have noticed smell or smoke in the cabin. This result was expected, 
considering that few of the respondents were familiar with fume events. The respondents may 
have noticed smell or smoke without having any second thoughts about it. The contaminants 
can also be odourless, which means that the respondents may have been oblivious to their 
expsosure. 
Frecuency of Fume Events  
It is assumed that pilots and cabin crew have different training in how registration of a fume 
event will take place, dependent on the policy of their airline, and that not all events that are 
detected will be published to the general public. In addition, the registered events are largely 
inconclusive, as they rarely contain any clarification of the actual cause of the incident. 
Hence, the overview presented in this thesis is believed to show only a small part of reality. It 
was nonetheless chosen to compile such a list, in an effort to show how and where events are 
registered, and to find out if any of the incidents could be categorized as possible fume events. 
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The overview of fume events may not include all the possible fume events that really have 
happened. The reported incidents may have used other words that is associated with fume 
events than those used throughout the search after incidents in our overview, as for example 
“haze”. There are neither a certainty that the 701 incidents found are fume events, since the 
description of cause is not fully detailed. In addition, reports are results of subjective 
interpretations of how fume events can be described. 
Different databases were used to find possible fume events. Most of the incidents are found 
on the web page “The Aviation Herald”. On this site, one person registers aircraft incidents 
which are possibly interpreted and described subjectively. This may lead to incorrect 
information, and it was therefore necessary to view the site critically. In addition, a large part 
of the events occurred without any investigation report available, which means that some of 
them may not be fume events. However, the site is updated with new events regularly, and the 
events have detailed information about airline, flight type, its registration number and the 
destination of the aircraft. It was therefore assumed that the site could give a comprehensive 
overview of possible fume events. There are many databases in different countries that have 
not been reviewed due to the time it would have taken trying to find and critically assess all of 
them, considering the limited amount of time there was to complete this thesis. In addition, 
many of the databases are unavailable without user information/password, and some are 
available only in foreign languages.  
There were found 701 incidents from 2007 to 2014 (Appendix D), and the results did not 
show any clear tendency of either increasing or decreasing number of incidents. In reality, 
there may be a pattern of changes through the years, but because of assumed underreporting 
of incidents, the results found in this overview will not be complete. When disregarding the 
fact that many of the events are not found, and that underreporting most probably occurs, the 
frequence of the events found in this thesis was calculated to be 0.24 events per day. 
Comparing this value with frequencies that have been found in previous studies, respectively 
1-3.8 per 1 000 flights (U.S.) (van Netten, 2005),  0.05-1 % of flights (COT., 2007), , 0.86 
events per day (U.S.) (Murawski and Supplee, 2008), and 0.2 per 1 000 flights (U.S.) 
(Shehadi et al., 2015), is complicated, due to the way the frequencies are presented. It is 
theresefore challenging to give an exact estimate of fume events happening in the world per 
year from the literature and the results presented. Estimates of the frequency vary due to lack 
of oversight of regulatory reporting system. Some studies show the percentage of fume events 
per flights, and others calculate the number of such events per day. In addition, the criteria to 
define an incident to be caused by fume events vary, and some of the studies have only found 
incidents in a specific country.  
Airlines are believed to underreport events (FAA., 2011, Murawski and Supplee, 2008, 
Furlong, 2011, van Netten, 2005). In an article from van Netten (2005), it is claimed that 
underreporting occurs, and that the cause appears to be, among others, subjective assessment 
of the air quality within the aircraft. The flight crew may consider the temporary smell when 
engines start as “normal”,  and since they are somewhat used to it, they do possibly not find it 
necessary to report. Another reason that was assumed is that there is an intimidating factor 
present, which results in underreporting. A pilot does not want to complain about his health to 
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the co-pilot following exposure, because it would target his health status. Pilots should put on 
their oxygen masks with 100 % pure oxygen if an oil leakage occurs and once they notice 
unusual smell or smoke, to avoid possible symptoms of exposure.  
In 336 (47.9 %) of the incidents in our overview, there was no description in the reports about 
the cause of the incidents. The same was found in the case study conducted by Murawski and 
Supplee (2008), where it was stated that many of the databases did not have any decription of 
cause. Since the cause of many of the incidents has not been updated in the databases, it is 
difficult to define all the incidents as fume events. In 40.2 % of the flights in the study done 
by Murawski (2011), the smell was described as “dirty socks”, which is a typical 
characterization of a fume event. In our overview, the reports have mostly described the 
incidents to be noticed by “smell” or “smoke” or a “smell of smoke”, without further details. 
For that reason, the smell could have other causes than oil leaking into the cabin. The 
incidents were nonetheless included in the overview; they may be fume events due to an 
assumed subjetivity of how the incidents were experienced. It was claimed that the reason 
why the cause of incidents are often not found, or is not identified until later, is that no 
monitors assist in identifying fume events, and that sense of smell by the flight crew is 
somewhat unreliable (Murawski and Supplee, 2008). They may sense the smell as electric, 
even though the cause is oil leakage. In addition, it was assumed to be due to the time 
required to find a cause, and that the airline do not want to provide information about the 
cause of an event with absence of exposure data. The cause should be found for as many 
incidents as possible to prevent them occuring again later, and to avoid diversion or 
cancellation that could be expensive for the airlines.  
Boeing 737 is the aircraft that has been reported most frequently in the incident overview. 
Generally, Boeing and Airbus are the two aircraft occuring in most of the reported incidents, 
according to the results in this thesis. The reason for this may be the fact that these are two of 
the leading commercial aircraft manufacturers used by airlines around the world (Boeing, 
n.d., Airbus, n.d.).  
48.5 % of the incidents in our overview with smell and/or smoke in the aircraft occurred while 
it was “en route”, and did not give any further information about the flight phase. In a study 
conducted by Murawski and Supplee (2008), 68 % of the events occurred while “en route”, in 
which the majority was specified to climb (42 %) or cruise (26 %). In our overview most of 
the incidents, 340 (48.5 %) occurred while the aircraft was “en route”, followed by 187 (26.6 
%) incidents during climb. These results show the same tendency as the study done by 
Murawski and Supplee (2008). According to the study by Murawski (2011), the results of 
registered fume events showed that the smell was mainly present prior to take-off (50.6 % of 
the events), while in 39.1 % of the events, the unusual smell occurred while the aircraft was 
“en route”. 45 (6.4 %) of the 701 incidents in our overview occurred while the aircraft was on 
the ground, but there is no information about whether the aircraft had landed or if it was prior 
to take-off. When considering all results, it does not seem to be any pattern of when possible 
fume events occur, which means that they may occur during different phases of the flight.  
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There was almost no distinctions of whether the incidents were reported in cabin or cockpit. 
253 (36.0 %) of the possible fume events occurred in the cabin while 233 (33.2 %) occurred 
in the cockpit. However, many of the incident descriptions did not comprise information on 
the specific location of where smoke or smell was noticed in the aircraft, and some reports 
wrote that the incident occurred “on board”. No former studies have been found to describe 
frequency by location or source of the fume event in the aircraft (Shehadi et al., 2015, 
Murawski and Supplee, 2008, Michaelis, 2010). However, given that oil leakage more 
frequently is noticed in the cockpit, it can be assumed that it occurs more often in this location 
of the aircraft.  
In most of the incidents, when noticing smoke or smell in the aircraft, the aircraft either 
returned to the original airport (in 247 (35.2 %) of the incidents) or diverted to the nearest one 
(in 239 (34.1 %)). On basis of this, it is reasonably to assume that the problem with the 
aircraft was serious, since the crew chose to land. This may indicate that incidents with 
contamination of the cabin or cockpit are so serious that the flight crew would rather land the 
aircraft than risking the aircraft occupants to be exposed to anything. Nevertheless, some 
incidents have reported technical issues such as “faulty APU” or “engine failure”. This 
indicates that there may have been technical problems with one or more engines, which forced 
the aircraft to land. Hence, it is difficult to make any conclusion about why the aircraft landed 
before it reached final destination in almost all the incidents.  
In the study by Murawski and Supplee (2008), 57 % of incidents that occurred while in-flight 
either returned or diverted to the nearest airport, and the aircraft on ground when the incident 
occurred rejected take-off, and were either delayed or cancelled. These decisions are 
consistent with the decisions made in most of the incidents found, where the aircraft in 69.3 % 
of the incidents either returned or diverted, and 4.7 % rejected take-off. In the case study of 
Murawski (2011), it was found that only about half of the flights where smell was reported 
prior to take-off were cancelled or delayed. It is hard to make any conclusion or explanations 
of why many of these aircraft flew to their planned destination, while the incident aircraft in 
our overview chose to land in most cases. One possible assumption may be that the number of 
incidents is not complete due to varieties in reporting among airlines, and that some of the 
databases required internal access. 
Literature Study 
It is a challenge to find and read all relevant literature that exist on the topic for the given 
amount of time. There are many databases which are possible to use, and even though the 
search words were used in various combinations and different search engines, there may still 
be relevant articles and documents not reviewed. Hence, some important results may have 
been missed during the research period, whereas some less significant material is omitted on 
purpose, due to the time limit and scope of this assignment. 
There are discussions among scientists and professionals whether people can get negative 
health effect from possible contamination in jet engine oils and hydaulic fluids. HEPA filters 
in the air recirculation system do not remove gases and vapours from the ventilation air, due 
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to their small molecular sizes, and contamination may thus enter the cabin and cockpit in 
aircraft along with the ventilation air (Hunt et al., 1995, Bull and Roux, 2010). Leakage, aging 
of materials and design flaws are some of the mentioned latent causes that may lead to 
exposure of components from oil or combustion products in the aircraft (Hocking, 2005, p 
200, Spittle, 2003, Balouet et al., 1999). Leakage are sporadic and occur as a result of 
unexpected errors in the engine. A large number of health effects reported by pilots and cabin 
crew exists, which is believed to be a result of exposure to contaminated cabin air (Michaelis, 
2010, Abou-Donia, 2003, Winder and Balouet, 2001, Winder and Michaelis, 2005).  
There are disagreements about the cause of the health effects. Some researchers do not 
consider oil leaking into the cabin or cockpit, with especially focus on exposure to tricresyl 
phosphate (TCP), to pose any health risks to the aircraft occupants, due to results found in 
their studies. There have also been claimed that even though it has been measured harmful 
chemicals in aircraft, the concentrations are too low to have any impact on the health (de Ree 
et al., 2014, Hanhela et al., 2005, Daughtrey et al., 1996, Schindler et al., 2012, Liyasova et 
al., 2011). At the same time, there are pilots, cabin crew, passengers, physicians and 
researchers who claim that fume events actually happen, and that health effects are results 
from these events (Winder and Balouet, 2000, Michaelis, 2010, Abou-Donia et al., 2013, 
Murawski, 2011). Since the reported health effects are very general, and may be due to 
several different factors, it is difficult to prove any connection between fume events and 
health effects.  
Measurements have been done to find chemical substances in aircraft, and hence proof of 
contamination from oil components. Oil leakages, which may cause fume events, are rare and 
sudden, and no measurements have been made at the time they arise, which means that it has 
only been done measurements on normal flights or before/after flights (De Nola et al., 2011, 
Hanhela et al., 2005, Schindler et al., 2012, de Ree et al., 2014). Conclusions from studies 
have in general been that TCP (especially TOCP) alone cannot cause the reported health 
effects after air contamination in aircraft. Further studies should include all components in the 
oils and fluids when evaluating their toxicity, and take possible combustion product and the 
synergistic effects of the components into account. This could reveal whether the reported 
negative health effects are related to exposure of contaminants during fume events.  
Insufficient knowledge exists about which chemicals and combustion products that may enter 
the ventilation system, due to lack of specific information about ingredients and different by-
products in the MSDS from the manufacturers. The MSDS of the jet engine oils and hydraulic 
fluids provides information about the substances found in the oils by use under “normal 
conditions”. By a reaction between two or more chemicals, it may be produced by-products 
with a synergistic effect. These by-products may thus be even more harmful, and it should 
therefore be informed in the MSDS about the possibility of production of them. The 
manufacturers should provide a complete list and amout of ingredients found in the oils and 
fluids, to measure their total toxicity. The base stocks in the jet engine oils are only described 
as synthetic esters, with no further details about which base stocks that can be found in the 
different oils. There are used words as “normal conditions of use”, which is very vague and 
could be interpreted differently.  
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Hovewer, it is known that about 95 % of the engine oils and hydraulic fluids are base stocks, 
which are mostly based on a synthetic polyol (Exxon Mobil, 2014g, Michaelis, 2010, p 70). 
Various additives are used to enhance the lubricant performance of the base stocks, and these 
make up about 3 % of the base stocks (Rudnick, 2006, STAMI, 2003). The remaining 5 % of 
the oils and hydraulic fluids are several different chemicals. Changes in product formulations 
of engine oils and fluids have been made, but still there exists concern about the potential 
toxicity that exposure to these materials may cause (Daughtrey et al., 1996, Winder and 
Balouet, 2002b, Abou-Donia, 2015). It is suggested by Michaelis (2010, p 70) and Abou-
Donia (2015) that several substances give different by-products following combustion, which 
means that the air inhaled after a leakage may comprise a chemical cocktail. A number of 
researchers have attempted to describe the constituents of the oils and fluids used in aircraft 
engines, and their following pyrolytic degradation products (Daughtrey et al., 1996, van 
Netten, 1999, van Netten, 1998). Even though many of the chemicals that are used in jet 
engine oils and hydraulic fluids are known to cause adverse health effects, most of the studies 
reviewed regarding toxicity have focused on the organophosphate TCP.  
Organophosphates are commonly used additives, and due to known negative health effects of 
especially tricresyl phosphate, the major focus of the additives in the literature is on this 
specific substance. Appearing neurological symptoms are mainly thought to be caused by 
isomers of tricresyl phosphate (Singh and Sharma, 2000, Abou-Donia, 2003, Winder and 
Michaelis, 2005). It has been known for many years that ortho-cresyl phosphates are the most 
toxic isomers of TCP, and that mono-ortho-cresyl phosphate (MOCP) and di-ortho-cresyl 
phosphate are more toxic than tri-ortho-cresyl phosphate (Henschler, 1958). Despite this, 
there is only one known study that has measured and discovered concentrations of MOCP, 
(De Nola et al., 2008). The reason why additional experiments including measure of MOCP 
have not been carried out, is uncertain. It is questionable why some researchers have been 
able to measure MOCP, while others claimed that the concentration of MOCP cannot be 
determined, due to unavailable analytic standard of the isomer (de Boer et al., 2014). 
Although most of the reviewed articles claim that concentrations of compounds in the oils, 
with focus on TCP, are not high enough to cause negative health effects, this does not imply 
that the concentrations never reach harmful levels. The total concentration of TCP should be 
measured to include all the ortho isomers for evaluation of the toxicity level.  
There have been concerns about the potential reaction of ingredients in some base stocks, 
especially the organophosphate trimethylolpropane phosphate (TMPP), a potent neurotoxin, 
from the reaction of trimethylol phosphate (TMP) polyols and TCP, when they are subject for 
elevated temperatures (Centers, 1992). No concentrations of TMPP have been found in an 
aircraft to date, only during laboratory experiments (Kalman et al., 1985, Wyman et al., 1987, 
Centers, 1992). More research should therefore be conducted in an attempt to find out 
whether possible concentrations of this potent neurotoxin can become high enough to cause 
severe health effects if aircraft occupants get exposed. Automatic incident samplers, like the 
one developed by Solbu (2011) should be placed in all aircraft that use bleed air to detect the 
possible fume events. These samplers are easy to use, measures long-term air quality when 
activated, and will probably not require large amount of resources. By using these incidents 
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samplers, the potential concentrations of TMPP could be found. A possible solution to find 
the concentrations when fume events happen, is to conduct long term measurements of the 
cabin and cockpit air. 
Both passengers and cabin crew may be exposed to many different air contaminants in the 
aircraft cabin, including CO from engine exhaust, O3 from outside air, and organic 
compounds of biological origins. These factors may explain the health effects related to 
exposure to cabin air contaminants, and must thus be considered. The combination and 
possible synergistic effects between several different factors, such as pressurized 
environment, humidity, and biological agents, are also suggested to play a part (National 
Research Council, 2002, p 52). The pressurized cabin and cockpit is achieved by supplying 
compressed outside air. The air is compressed within the engine, and 2-8 % is bleed air which 
is used for ventilation within the aircraft (Michaelis, 2010, p 47, GCAQE, 2014, van Netten, 
2005). The proportion of oxygen in the air remains unchanged, as the oxygen level is constant 
at 20.9 % at increasing altitude (Dechlow and Nurcombe, 2005). The partial pressure of 
oxygen decreases, and it is proposed that people with certain medical conditions may not 
tolerate the environment of reduced pressure (Winder and Balouet, 2002a, WHO, n.d). 
Bagshaw (2014) have suggested that hyperventilation may be a plausible explanation of the 
experienced health effects of aircraft occupants, but no evidence exist to confirm this theory. 
Due to the wide range of people with various sensibilities to all the possible contaminants in 
flights, they may respond differently during a fume event. Health effects are related to the 
general condition of people, where age, previous clinical picture, general health, and lifestyle, 
are of importance. Health effects from exposure to contaminants in the aircraft have been 
described as both short- and long-termed (Winder and Balouet, 2001). Winder and Balouet 
(2000) claimed that health effects may be reversible following brief exposures, but after a 
significant or long term exposure, a chronic syndrome may occur. Various health effects have 
been reported from studies of individual components from oils and hydraulic fluids used in jet 
engines. Disagreements regarding health effects exist on this area, since conclusions about the 
health effects of the components differ (Winder and Balouet, 2002b, Winder and Balouet, 
2002a, National Transportation Safety Board, n.d, Lewis, 2008, Boman et al., 1980, Kalimo et 
al., 1989). Some of the health effects that have been reported from these studies may have a 
correlation with health effects reported by aircraft occupants.  
Even though it has been over 50 years since the bleed air was taken in use, few regulations to 
either prevent or monitor exposure to oil fumes that sometimes contaminate the cabin and 
cockpit supply air, exist to date. A reason may be that there are so many different chemical 
components that may enter the ventilation air, and therefore it is difficult to set regulations. It 
could be argued whether the established threshold limits for the chemicals used in jet engine 
oils and hydraulic fluids are valid, as an 8-hour threshold for a “normal working day” will not 
equal the exposure for aircraft occupants.   
Before 1962, there was used a bleedless technology called ram air, the outside air was drawn 
into the cabin by the use of turbo compressors or blowers. By the use of this technology, the 
possible contamination was only due to the external sources of the outside air. The argument 
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for choosing bleed air rather than ram air was mainly of economic reasons (GCAQE, 2014, 
van Netten, 2005). The latest Boeing 787 has a bleedless technology, where the fresh air 
intake is by the wing roots, rather than through the engines. One may ask if this denotes that 
the aircraft manufacturers acknowledge there is a problem with the applied bleed air system. 
If so, why have not any solutions been presented to address the problem earlier?  
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5.0 Conclusions 
Given that the response rate of the survey was 21.0 %, it can be argued whether the 
respondents are representative of all flight crew. The results of the survey among pilots and 
cabin crew indicate good knowledge about the phenomenon of fume events, where more than 
two out of three had heard about it. The actual percentage of knowledge among flight crew, if 
all of the 2 952 persons who received the survey responded, would be somewhere between 
14.9 % and 70.5 % when considering the possibility of selection bias. The same would apply 
for the question about whether fume events are considered a problem, where the actual 
percentage would be somewhere between 9.2 % and 43.6 %. Although the response rate of 
the survey among people on Gløshaugen campus was 94.3 %, the number of respondents was 
low. The fact that only 15 % of the 100 respondents had heard about fume events indicates 
that academics have less knowledge and attention about such events than flight crew. 
Fume events occurring worldwide between 2007 and 2014 were found from databases and 
media articles. The total number of these yielded an estimated frequency of 0.24 possible 
fume events per day. This frequency is assumed to be underestimated due to underreporting, 
difficulties to access databases, and different criteria of reporting events by airlines. 
The ventilation air in the cabin and cockpit may get contaminated by jet engine oil and 
hydraulic fluid, forming what is known as a fume event. The phenomenon is facilitated by the 
characteristics of the bleed air system, which is used on most commercial aircraft. Much 
literature regarding fume events exists, but unanswered questions still remain. Frequent fliers 
and predisposed individuals may be vulnerable to long term repeated exposure, and serious 
leaks that enter the cabin air may result in high levels of hazardous chemicals. No 
measurements have been performed during a reported fume event. It is therefore not known 
whether concentrations of contaminants the aircraft occupants may be exposed to, are high 
enough to cause the reported adverse health effects. 
5.1 Further Work 
The exposure limits of contaminants should be adapted and adjusted to fit the aircraft 
environment. The limits need to be reduced due to the fact that humans are more susceptible 
of exposure to toxicants in the reduced pressure environment while in flight. Flight crew who 
may have been exposed to contaminants during a fume event should be inquired about 
symptoms. In addition, the use of human biomonitoring should be carried out to assess the 
exposure of contaminants from fume events. Incident samplers should be placed in all aircraft 
to compare the results from biomonitoring with the levels of contamination measured by the 
samplers. The suggestion is probably challenging to implement, but could provide answers to 
whether there is a connection between symptoms or health effects and fume events. Incident 
samplers could also be used to compare the levels of registered contaminants to find out if the 
concentrations of contaminants in the bleed air during fume events exceed the exposure limit 
values.   
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When evaluating the toxicity level of the jet engine oils and hydraulic fluids, all components 
that constitute the chemicals should be included. In addition, the possible combustion 
products and synergistic effects should be taken into account. To do this, manufacturers must 
provide a complete list and amount of ingredients in the oils and fluids.  
Actions should be implemented to get an overall overview in as many countries as possible to 
estimate a frequency of how often fume events occur. A suggestion is implementation of an 
international incident reporting system, where airlines share a policy of when and how to 
register fume events. The survey among pilots and cabin crew indicated that a majority of this 
group consider fume events a problem in the aircraft industry. Mitigating measures should be 
implemented to prevent such event
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Appendix A: List of Web Pages Considered to Find Possible Fume Events 
Name of agency Area of 
registration 
Limitations of search Web page 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 
Referring to the site of AAIB 
UK 1. Search Titles and Descriptions: Used keywords 
“Smoke”, “oil and smoke”, “oil leakage”, “oil mist”, “fume”, 
“fume event”, “fumes”, “smoke and fumes”, “smell” 
http://www.caa.co.uk/application.as
px?catid=33&pagetype=65&appid=
11 
 
Air Accidents Investigation Branch 
reports (AAIB) 
UK Search: “Smoke”, “oil and smoke”, “oil leakage”, “oil mist”, 
“fume”, “fume event”, “fumes”, “smoke and fumes”, “smell” 
Aircraft category: Commercial-fixed wing 
Date interval 
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports 
 
UK Contaminated Air Events 
Database (UKCAED) 
UK Could not find the database Source found from Michaelis 
(2010) 
British Airline Pilots Association 
(BALPA) 
UK Must log in to use https://www.balpa.org/ 
Sveriges Statens Haverikommisjon 
(SHK) 
Sweden Kategori: Civil luftfart 
Datumintervall: Date interval 
Sök fritext: rök, olja och rök, läcker olja, oljedimma, rök, 
rök händelse, rök, lukt 
http://www.havkom.se/Sok 
Flight Attendant Authority of 
Australia (FAAA) 
Australia Must log in to use http://faaa.net/ 
 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
(ATSB) 
Australia Advanced search 
Occurrence date: Date interval 
Occurrence type: “smoke”, “fumes” 
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publication
s/safety-investigation-
reports.aspx?mode=Aviation 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
(CASA) 
Australia Could not find any place to search after relevant events http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.d
ll?WCMS:HOMEPAGE:11795909
87:pc=PC_90001 
Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) 
US Subjective, anonymous reports registered by anyone http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/da
tabase.html 
  
 
National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) 
US Date: Interval 
Aircraft category: Airplane 
Amateur Built: No 
Operation: Non U.S, commercial 
Enter your own word string below: “Smoke”, “oil and 
smoke”, “oil leakage”, “oil mist”, “fume”, “fume event”, 
“fumes”, “smoke and fumes”, “smell” 
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.
aviation/index.aspx 
Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). Name of data system: 
Accident and Incident Data System 
(AIDS) 
US Narrative search: “Smoke”, “oil and smoke”, “oil leakage”, 
“oil mist”, “fume”, “fume event”, “fumes”, “smoke and 
fumes”, “smell” 
Date: Interval 
Flight conduct: Scheduled aircraft/helicopter 
http://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f
?p=100:12:0::NO 
 
Bundesstelle für 
Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU) 
Germany Select type of aircraft: Airplanes 2000 kg-5700 kg, and 
>5700 kg 
Sorted by date 
http://www.bfu-
web.de/EN/Publications/Investigati
on%20Report/reports_node.html 
Irish Accident Investigation Unit 
(AAIU) 
Ireland Search site: “Smoke”, “oil and smoke”, “oil leakage”, “oil 
mist”, “fume”, “fume event”, “fumes”, “smoke and fumes”, 
“smell” 
Sorted by date 
http://www.aaiu.ie/reports/aaiu-
investigation-reports 
Statens Havarikommisjon for 
Transport (SHT) 
Norge Flykategori: Turbofan/turbojet 
                       Turboprop/turboshaft 
Hendelsesdato: Interval 
http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rappor
ter/Avansert-sok 
Aeronautical Accidents Investigation 
and Prevention Center (CENIPA) 
Brazil Have to log in to get the site in English. http://www.cenipa.aer.mil.br/cenipa
/en/ 
Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada (TSB) 
Canada Search through the aviation reports list: “Smoke”, “oil and 
smoke”, “oil leakage”, “oil mist”, “fume”, “fume event”, 
“fumes”, “smoke and fumes”, “smell” 
Sorted by date 
http://www.bst-
tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-
reports/aviation/index.asp 
Transport Accident Investigation 
Commission (TAIC) 
New Zealand Sorted by date 
Read through title and summary 
http://www.taic.org.nz/ReportsandS
afetyRecs/AviationReports/tabid/78
  
 
 
/language/en-US/Default.aspx 
The Aviation Herald 
(Simon Hradecky registers aircraft 
incidents on this page) 
World wide List by occurrence 
No filters 
Search: “Smoke”, “oil and smoke”, “oil leakage”, “oil mist”, 
“fume”, “fume event”, “fumes”, “smoke and fumes”, “smell” 
Sorted by date 
http://avherald.com/ 
The flight herald  Hard to navigate on the page. Not used as a source. http://theflightherald.com/ 
Aviation safety  (Contributory) cause index: Airplane 
Airplane-Engines-Fuel contamination 
Airplane-Systems-Hydraulics 
 
http://aviation-
safety.net/database/events/event.ph
p?code=AC 
Airdisaster  Search by keywords: “Smoke”, “oil and smoke”, “oil 
leakage”, “oil mist”, “fume”, “fume event”, “fumes”, “smoke 
and fumes”, “smell” 
http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-
bin/database.cgi 
Global Cabin Air Quality Executive 
(GCAQE) 
 No filter. 
Some of the links did not work anymore. Found some of the 
reports elsewhere. 
http://www.gcaqe.org/media.html 
Arie Adriaensen   Reports received on e-mail directly 
from Arie Adriaensen 
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Appendix C: Information About the Survey Sent to Pilots 
and Cabin Crew 
 (The information was written and sent out in Norwegian to the respondents) 
We are two students conducting a master in Health, Safety and Environment at NTNU 
(responsible institution), now we are writing our master’s thesis. The topic of the thesis is 
possible oil contamination of air in aircraft cabin. 
 
The air entering the cabin and cockpit is originally clean air from the environment outside the 
aircraft. This air goes through the engine before it is used as ventilation air, and is inhaled by 
people in the plane. In the engine, leakage may occur which may cause the oil to mix with the 
ventilation air that enters the cabin, commonly known as fume events. It has been questioned 
whether such contamination of ventilation air can have negative health effects. Air 
contaminated by oil may be noticed as the odour of engine/oil, wet dog or smelly socks, or it 
may appear as smoke. 
 
Through this survey, we wish to find out whether cabin crew and pilots in Norway are aware 
that there may be contamination of the air in the cabin, caused by turbine oil. In addition, we 
want to find out how extensive this subject is, by considering how many who have 
experienced incidents of contaminated air in aircraft cabin. It is voluntary to participate in the 
survey and you can at any time choose to withdraw without justification. Responses to the 
questionnaire will be treated confidentially and all data will be anonymized by the end of the 
project. Individuals will not be recognizable in the final task. 
The survey takes approximately 5 minutes to conduct. 
 
The deadline for responding to the survey is Friday 17
th
 of April 2015. 
Expected completion of the project is 11.06.2015. 
 
Responsible for the survey: 
 
Tonje Trulssen Hildre (student) 
Email: tonjetru@stud.ntnu.no 
 
June Krutå Jensen (student) 
Email: junekj@stud.ntnu.no 
 
Professor Kristin Hirsch Svendsen (supervisor)  
Email: kristin.svendsen@iot.ntnu.no 
 
Click on the link below to open the survey: 
https://survey.svt.ntnu.no/TakeSurvey.aspx?SurveyID=9lK34m21 
  
 
 
Appendix D: Overview of Possible Fume Events 
Date Aircraft type Flight 
phase 
Contamin
ated area   
Short summary Description of cause 
2014 
26. 
Dec 
Boeing 737-800 Climb Cabin The crew reported smell of smoke in the cabin, but nothing visible. 
The aircraft returned to the departure airport. 
Attending emergency services found 
no trace of fire, heat or smoke. 
22. 
Dec 
Airbus A319-
100 
Descent Cockpit The crew reported an unusual odour in the cockpit. Emergency services found no trace 
of fire, smoke or heat. 
18. 
Dec 
Airbus A320-
323 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin The flight crew donned oxygen masks, and returned to airport. 
Flight crew noticed a musty smell as the aircraft climbed through 
5000 feet. Cabin crew at the front and rear had noticed the smell. 
Some felt light headed and a little nauseous. 
Hydraulic fluid was leaking from a 
hydraulic actuator, and ingested into 
the air inlet for the APU. 
17. 
Dec 
Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information. 
6. Dec Airbus A330-
200 
Cruise Unknown The crew decided to divert, declaring a medical emergency after 11 
crew and 2 passengers reported feeling ill and showing red eyes, a 
number vomited. All crew and the two ill passengers were taken to 
a hospital. 
A malfunction of the aircraft's air-
conditioning system was suspected, 
based on initial examination. 
4. Dec Boeing 757-300 Climb Flight 
deck 
The crew donned their oxygen masks due to smoke on the flight 
deck. The crew suspected the smoke was coming from oil in the 
left hand engine. The cause is not confirmed. 
Lack of information. 
29. 
Nov 
Boeing 757-200 Cruise Galley The crew decided to divert due to smell of smoke near the aft 
galley. 
The maintenance inspection did not 
find any problem. The aircraft was 
able to continue the flight. 
21. 
Nov 
Boeing 767-300 Initial 
climb 
Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and returned to airport. Emergency services did not find any 
smoke, but detected smell of smoke 
in the cockpit area. 
13. 
Nov 
Boeing 737-800 Climb Flight 
deck 
The crew decided to return to departure airport due to fumes on the 
flight deck. Nothing was noticed in the cabin. 
Tests were conducted by 
maintenance, but nothing was found. 
Further tests were conducted after 16 
  
 
hours after landing the aircraft, again 
without any finding. 
6. Nov Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit. Following the initial 
inspection by emergency services the crew requested to be 
followed to the gate, stating they had smoke and fumes in the 
cockpit and cabin. 
Lack of information. 
5. Nov Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted. The 
occurrence aircraft was still on the ground 3.5 days after landing. 
Lack of information. 
3. Nov Boeing 757-200 Cruise On board The crew decided to turn around due to fumes on board. 
Passengers reported an odour on board of the aircraft. 
Technical problem. 
31. Oct Boeing 737-800 Cruise On board The crew donned their oxygen masks due to fumes on board. Lack of information. 
12. Oct Airbus A320-
200 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin A burning smell developed throughout the cabin prompting the 
crew to stop the climb and return to airport. 
Lack of information. 
3. Oct Airbus A340-
300 
Cruise On board The crew decided to return to the airport due to a strong odour on 
board. Passengers reported a strong odour on board, one passenger 
mentioned smoke on board. 
Lack of information. 
19. Sep Airbus 320 Cruise Cabin An engine problem resulted in smoke entering the aircraft's cabin. Probable cause was an engine 
problem. 
19. Sep Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted. Attending emergency services found 
no trace of fire, heat or smoke. 
13. Sep Airbus A319-
100 
Descent On board The aircraft did an emergency landing due to fumes on board, with 
a number of passengers and cabin crew complaining of sore 
throats, headaches and eye irritations. Ambulance took three 
persons to an urgent care centre. 
Lack of information. 
5. Sep Airbus A320-
200 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew donned their oxygen masks, declared emergency, 
stopped the climb and reported they had a strange smell in cockpit 
and cabin. 
Lack of information. 
1. Sep Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
27. 
Aug 
Transport 
Regional ATR-
72-212A 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin Smoke with a strong burning smell was detected in the aircraft 
cabin, the crew declared emergency and performed a normal 
landing. The occurrence was rated a serious incident. 
An investigation was opened. 
27. Embraer ERJ- Climb Cockpit The crew stopped the climb reporting smoke in the cockpit, and Lack of information. 
  
 
Aug 145 diverted. 
25. 
Aug 
Boeing 767-300 Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew stopped the climb due to what appeared to be white 
smoke in the aft cabin, and returned to the airport.  
Attending emergency services did 
not find any trace of fire or heat. 
22. 
Aug 
Transport 
Regional ATR-
72-212A 
Initial 
climb 
Cockpit The crew stopped the climb, declared emergency reporting smoke 
in the cockpit, and returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
21. 
Aug 
Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Cabin The crew stopped the climb, reported smoke in the cabin and 
diverted. 
Lack of information. 
18. 
Aug 
Airbus A330-
200 
Cruise On board The crew decided to return to the airport, due to an unbearable 
odour on board. One passenger was treated at the airport, while 
four needed to be taken to a hospital with injuries. 
Emergency services searched the 
aircraft, but were unable to identify a 
source of the odour. 
15. 
Aug 
Embraer ERJ-
145 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin The cabin crew reported smoke in the cabin and declared 
emergency. The crew requested to return to the airport for landing. 
Lack of information. 
12. 
Aug 
Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and returned to the aircraft. Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
31. Jul Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Galley The cabin crew observed smell in the aft galley. Both galley ovens 
were switched off, but the smell continued and filled half of the 
cabin in the back of the aircraft. The crew decided to divert. Two 
of the cabin crew became incapacitated as result of the smell, and 
all of the crew members were taken to hospitals. 
Lack of information. 
30. Jul Embraer ERJ-
145 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cabin and 
requested to return immediately. 
Lack of information. 
29. Jul Airbus A321-
200 
Descent Cabin and 
cockpit 
An odour of old socks was noticed in cabin and cockpit. All crew 
went to see the doctor after landing. (Same aircraft as 28.07.2014.) 
Underwent maintenance. Lack of 
more information. 
28. Jul Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cockpit The crew stopped the climb and diverted, reporting smoke in the 
cockpit. 
Lack of information. 
27. Jul Airbus A321-
200 
Descent Cabin and 
cockpit 
There was highly intense fume (smell of old socks) in the cockpit 
and forward cabin, affecting all crew members including the pilots. 
Both pilots donned their oxygen masks. The return flight was 
postponed to perform a "Pack Burn" overnight on the airport. 
During the return flight the next day there was again highly 
noticeable fumes throughout the entire aircraft, though weaker than 
the day before. All crew members showed symptoms like 
headache, nausea and dizziness. 
The incident was investigated by the 
BFU, and rated a serious incident. 
  
 
26. Jul McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Cruise On board The crew reported a smoky odour on board and decided to divert.  Lack of information. 
26. Jul Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew donned their oxygen masks reporting a constant 
suspected oil smell in the cabin. The crew continued to use their 
oxygen masks until after vacating the runway. 
Engineering issue. 
22. Jul Boeing 767-300 Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and returned to the airport. Lack of information. 
20. Jul Boeing 737-500 Climb Cabin The crew stopped the climb, reporting smoke in the cabin and 
returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
14. Jul Airbus A330-
200 
Climb Unknown The crew reported an odour of burning plastic, but decided to 
continue the flight. The aircraft was en route when the crew 
declared emergency reporting several flight attendants were 
reporting sick. One flight attendant was transported to a medical 
facility. The other flight attendants and one passenger were 
examined by medical staff at the airport. 
Maintenance inspected the aircraft 
and was unable to reproduce the 
fumes. 
9. Jul McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Cruise Cockpit The flight crew donned their oxygen masks, declared emergency 
reporting smoke in the cockpit, and decided to divert. On approach 
to the runway, the crew advised that the smoke appeared to be 
dissipating after they had turned off some of the equipment. 
Emergency services reported no 
trace of fire, smoke or heat. 
3. Jul Boeing 767-300 Climb Cockpit The crew stopped the climb reporting a burning smell in the 
cockpit, and returned to the airport. 
The airline reported the aircraft 
encountered a minor Technical 
problem. 
28. Jun Airbus A320 Unknown Unknown The crew began noticed a strange smell and got dizzy shortly into 
the trip. A spokeswoman confirmed that three out of seven crews 
working on the flight were unable to work for weeks. The captain 
and co-pilot were not affected and the spokeswoman said no 
passengers had complained.  
The problem was found to be caused 
by oil dripping into a motor at the 
rear of the plane. 
28. Jun Boeing 747-400 Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke and fumes in the cabin. Lack of information. 
19. Jun Havilland Dash 
8-300 
Climb Flight 
deck 
Smoke was observed on the flight deck prompting the crew to 
return to the airport. 
Passengers were told a fan inside the 
cockpit was emitting smoke. 
18. Jun Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew noticed white smoke in the cockpit, which dissipated 
after about 15 seconds, the odour however remained. 
A supplied pneumatic pressure to the 
aircraft due to the non-availability of 
the APU had broken down and 
possibly contaminated the pneumatic 
ducting. 
  
 
9. Jun Airbus A330-
200 
Climb Cabin Fumes were detected in the cabin, which affected two cabin crew. 
The two cabin crew were removed from service. 
Lack of information. 
5. Jun Airbus A330-
200 
Cruise On board The crew reported fumes on board. While descending, the crew 
reported that the fumes had disappeared. 
Lack of information. 
31. 
May 
Airbus A320-
200 
Grounded Unknown While turning off the runway, smoke was observed from the main 
landing gear. 
Caused by hydraulic fluid dripping 
onto the hot brakes of the aircraft. 
22. 
May 
Avro RJ-85 Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks and reported smoke in the 
cockpit. The aircraft returned to the airport. 
Cause was investigated. 
20. 
May 
Havilland Dash 
8-400 
Descent Cabin and 
cockpit 
During the descent, the crew observed smoke in cockpit and cabin. 
The crew donned their oxygen masks. 
Lack of information. 
10. 
May 
Airbus A330 Cruise Unknown The aircraft diverted because several of the flight attendants was 
feeling ill. Nine crew reported feeling 'nauseous and dizzy' while 
suffering from watering eyes. 
The US National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) as well as the 
Irish Air Accident Investigation Unit 
(AAIU) was to investigate the 
incident. 
10. 
May 
Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew decided to return to the airport reporting smoke in 
cockpit and cabin. 
Lack of information. 
6. May Unknown Grounded Cabin A spokesman commented that the cabin crew claimed that the 
smoke had an odour that occurs during flight training. He claimed 
it is not toxic or harmful in any way, and that a small amount of oil 
could lead to smoke, which then may be pulled into the cabin 
through the ventilation system from engines. 
Lack of information. 
28. Apr Unknown Cruise Cockpit The aircraft made an emergency landing at the airport after its crew 
smelled a burning odour in the cockpit. 
An initial inspection by fire-fighters 
discovered no issues with the 
aircraft. 
28.Apr Airbus A321-
200 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew stopped the climb due to smoke in the cabin and returned 
to the airport. Russia's Ministry of Interior initially reported the 
aircraft returned because of a fire indication for the right hand 
engine. The airline later reported the aircraft returned due to smoke 
in the cabin. 
Lack of information. 
24. Apr Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb On board The crew stopped the climb, donned their oxygen masks and 
decided to divert, reporting smoke on board. 
Lack of more information. 
  
 
20. Apr Airbus A330-
300 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin Passengers reported that there was a strong burning smell, then 
visible haze and smoke about mid cabin. The smoke began to 
dissipate and was gone by the time of touch down. 
Cabin crew fetched portable fire 
extinguishers and checked the cabin, 
including walls and overhead bins, 
for possible sources of heat or fire, 
but did not find any cause.  
15. Apr MD90 Grounded Cabin and 
cockpit 
Delta issued a statement saying, "During the aircraft's taxi out, a 
smoky odour was observed in the cockpit and cabin. In an 
abundance of caution, the flight crew returned to the gate. 
Passengers were re-accommodated on a new aircraft." 
Lack of information. 
13. Apr Boeing 737-800 Descent Cabin The crew declared emergency, reporting a smell of burning rubber 
in the cabin. Emergency checked the aircraft on ground, the crew 
reported that the odour had subsided and everything was normal in 
the cabin. 
Emergency checked the aircraft. 
Lack of more information. 
11. Apr Boeing 737-200 Cruise On board The crew reported the smell of smoke as well as haze on board. 
The flight crew received a #2 air conditioning system trip off 
indication; shut the system down, the haze and smell dissipated 
thereafter. 
Lack of information. 
6. Apr Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit. The passengers in the 
forward cabin noticed a strong smell prompting diversion. 
Cause was investigated. 
3. Apr Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. 
When approaching the airport, the crew reported the smoke had 
subsided. 
The airline stated a maintenance 
issue caused the diversion. 
31. 
Mar 
Embraer ERJ-
190 
Climb Cockpit Smoke in the cockpit prompted the crew to return to the airport. 
The airline confirmed smell of smoke on board of the aircraft. 6 
passengers received medical assistance after landing. The FAA 
reported 6 passengers received injuries following smoke in the 
cockpit. 
The source of the smoke was under 
investigation. 
30. 
Mar 
Boeing 757-300 Climb On board The crew reported an unidentified smell on board and requested 
emergency services on standby. 
Lack of information. 
21. 
Mar 
Airbus A319-
100 
Descent Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting oily fumes in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
21. 
Mar 
Boeing 737-700 Cruise Cabin The crew reported a burning odour and smoke in the cabin. The 
crew shut down the cabin utility power after which smoke and 
odour subsided. 
The Canadian TSB reported a 
recirculation fan was reported failed. 
  
 
5. Mar Airbus A320-
200 
Climb On board The crew stopped the climb and entered a hold. The crew 
subsequently initiated another climb to continue the flight but 
again aborted the climb, reporting fumes on board. 
AAIB rated the occurrence as a 
serious incident and opened an 
investigation. 
1. Mar Boeing 737-700 Descent Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew noticed strong fumes in the cockpit and cabin. The crew 
worked the relevant checklists after which the fumes dissipated. 
Maintenance was unable to re-
produce the problem. No further 
evidence of fumes was found, all 
systems operated normally, hydraulic 
and oil quantities were all found at 
serviceable levels. 
26. Feb Unknown Descent Unknown Passengers had to make an emergency evacuation at the gate 
because of smoke in the plane. 
A spokesperson claimed the source 
of the smoke came from an air 
conditioning pack. 
23. Feb Unknown Initial 
climb 
Cabin and 
cockpit 
The aircraft returned short time after take-off, due to oil mist in the 
cabin and cockpit. Both crew and passengers got medical check. 
Engine oil was the suspected cause. 
20. Feb Boeing 767-300 Climb Cabin About 5 minutes into the flight, a burning smell and white smoke 
appeared in the cabin. 
A minor oil leak from the right hand 
engine was identified as source of 
the smell and smoke. The oil 
vaporized, got into the air 
conditioning system and thus was 
transported into the cabin. 
15. Feb Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
Fumes were detected in the front of the cabin and in the cockpit. 
The crew decided to don their oxygen masks. 
Lack of information. 
11. Feb Airbus A300-
600 
Climb Cabin Diversion was considered, due to cabin smoke smell/fumes. On the ground, inspection was 
carried out on all the related systems 
including engine, air conditioning, 
hydraulics, and all found 
satisfactory. 
3. Feb Airbus A321-
200 
Descent On board The crew declared emergency reporting smoke on board of the 
aircraft. While taxiing to the terminal, emergency services were 
told there was smoke and vibrations from the right hand engine. 
Lack of information. 
31. Jan Boeing 777-200 Cruise On board The crew reported the smell of smoke on board of the aircraft and 
decided to divert. Three passengers were taken to a hospital for 
check, after possible smoke inhalation. 
Lack of information. 
29. Jan Canadair CRJ-
700 
Climb On board The crew initiated a rapid descent due to problems with the air 
conditioning system. The FAA reported smoke on board of the 
Lack of information. 
  
 
aircraft. 
14. Jan Canadair CRJ-
900 
Grounded Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew rejected take-off about 10 seconds after applying take-off 
thrust, after the captain smelled smoke in the cockpit. Flight and 
cabin crew established there was smoke in cockpit and cabin. The 
occupants rapidly deplaned onto the runway while emergency 
services responded. 
The cause of the smoke was 
investigated. 
2013 
10. 
Dec 
Airbus A319-
100 
Descent Cockpit  An odour of burning oil was noticed in cockpit causing irritation of 
respiratory tracts of all 3 pilots in the cockpit. All three donned their 
oxygen masks, queried the cabin where a similar odour was reported. 
The captain assumed control and continued for a safe landing. All 
three pilots and one flight attendant went for a medical examination, 
which was without findings according to feedback by the crew 
members receiving their test results. 
An investigation was opened. 
30. 
Nov 
Transport 
Regional ATR-
72-500 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and returned to the airport 
for a safe landing. 
The "smoke" was most likely steam 
out of the air conditioning system. 
29. 
Nov 
Airbus A380-
800 
Cruise Unknown Fume events during the flight caused a number of cabin crew to feel 
unwell. The crew received abnormally high indications of oil 
quantities for engine #3 and deactivated the bleed air supply from 
engine #3, the fumes dissipated thereafter. All cabin crew went to 
seek medical assistance, eight flight attendants were written sick. 
An engine oil overfill was 
identified as cause of the fume 
event. 
28. 
Nov 
Havilland Dash 
8-100 
Climb Cockpit The crew noticed a vague burning odour on board, which was 
shortly followed by the #2 bleed air hot indication cycling on and 
off. The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit. 
It was suspected that de-icing fluid 
in the engine intakes was the 
source of the odour. The bleed 
system was investigated by 
maintenance. 
26. 
Nov 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-90 
Grounded Unknown While turning off the runway, the crew radioed tower they had an 
issue with the left hand engine, later adding there was smoke. 
Emergency services responded and checked the left hand engine. 
The cause of the smoke was 
investigated. 
14. 
Nov 
Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting a burning smell in the cabin 
and requested to turn around and divert. 
Lack of information. 
13. 
Nov 
Canadair CRJ-
900 
Climb On board The crew reported a burning odour on board, donned their oxygen 
masks and advised they needed to return. 
Lack of information. 
  
 
9. Nov Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, declared Mayday reporting 
smoke in the cockpit, and diverted. 
Lack of information. 
8. Nov Airbus A321-
200 
Climb Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting a burning odour in the 
cockpit. The airline reported a safety landing because of an 
unidentified odour. 
Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
8. Nov Boeing 737-800 Climb Cabin The airline reported that a passenger noticed fumes in the cabin. The 
crew stopped the climb and decided to divert. 
Examination of the aircraft 
revealed three air conditioning 
ducts out of position in the area 
where the smoke originated. 
Maintenance determined an air 
conditioning fault causing a pipe to 
blow dust and/or debris into the 
cabin. 
3. Nov Airbus A319-
100 
Climb Cabin The aircraft was performing a positioning flight without passengers 
when smoke in the cabin forced the crew to use their oxygen masks. 
Italy's ANSV was investigating this 
as a serious incident. 
1. Nov Boeing 777-300 Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew stopped the climb reporting a strong smell of smoke in the 
cabin. The aircraft subsequently entered a hold to dump fuel before 
returning to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
31. Oct Boeing 737-300 Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted. Lack of information. 
29. Oct Airbus A340-
300 
Descent Cockpit Crew noticed an unidentifiable smell in the cockpit, possibly burning 
rubber or burning plastics. The captain donned his oxygen mask for 
the remainder of the approach and landing. The aircraft lost the flight 
management system #1, about 5 minutes prior to the fumes and did 
not know if there was a link between the failure and the smell. 
Lack of information. 
24. Oct Airbus A319-
100 
Climb On board The crew stopped the climb and returned to the airport reporting a 
smoky odour on board. 
Lack of information. 
22. Oct Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit Smoke started to fill the cockpit, and flight crew donned their 
oxygen masks. Passing through 10 000 feet, the smoke had 
dissipated enough to allow them to remove their masks. 
Seal in a Low Pressure Fuel Pump 
had failed, allowing fuel to enter 
the oil system and the bleed air 
system. Maintenance found engine 
oil in the fan duct, the quantity in 
the oil reservoir had reduced by 
about 1/3. 
13. Oct Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks and stopped the climb. They 
declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit, and diverted. 
Lack of information. 
  
 
1. Oct Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted. Lack of information. 
24. Sep Airbus A319-
100 
Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, stopped the climb reporting 
smell of smoke in the cockpit and returned to the airport. The airline 
reported the following day that the crew detected the smell of smoke. 
However, there was no smoke in the cockpit. 
Lack of information. 
23. Sep Boeing 777-200 Cruise On board The crew reported a burning smell on board and decided to divert. Lack of information. 
23. Sep Boeing 757-200 Cruise On board The crew reported a burning smell on board and decided to divert. 
Later on approach the crew reported an unknown smoke in the cabin. 
Passengers reported a smell like burning plastics. 
Lack of information. 
20. Sep Airbus A319-
100 
Climb Cockpit The crew stopped the climb, reporting smoke in the cockpit, donned 
their oxygen masks and returned to the airport. Passengers reported 
that during take-off, a smell like burning batteries appeared in the 
cabin, shortly after becoming airborne smoke entered the cabin from 
the cockpit. 
Passengers were later told that a 
faulty air conditioning system was 
identified as cause of the smoke. 
20. Sep McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Climb Cabin Fumes in the cabin were getting the flight attendants irritated. Emergency services did not find 
any trace of fire, heat or smoke. 
20. Sep Airbus A320-
200 
Initial 
climb 
Unknown The crew advised oil fumes were detected shortly after becoming 
airborne. 
Lack of information. 
19. Sep Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and diverted. The aircraft was examined to 
identify the source of the smoke. 
18. Sep Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smell of smoke in the cockpit and diverted. Lack of information. 
10. Sep Airbus A321-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew noticed an unusual, unidentifiable smell near the lavatory. 
Two of the cabin crew members were taken to a hospital, and 
diagnosed with smoke inhalation. 
It could not be identified where the 
smell came from. 
3. Sep McDonnell 
Douglas MD-90 
Cruise On board The crew reported smell of smoke on board and decided to divert. Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
28. 
Aug 
Airbus A330-
200 
Climb Cockpit The crew stopped the climb reporting smoke in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
26. 
Aug 
Boeing 757-300 Cruise Cabin The crew reported smell of smoke in the cabin and diverted. Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
  
 
21. 
Aug 
Boeing 767-300 Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew stopped the climb, and decided to return to the airport due 
to smoke in the cabin. The smoke dissipated during the return. 
The airline reported that a faulty air 
conditioning system was identified 
as source of the smoke. 
16. 
Aug 
Boeing 737-800 Grounded Cockpit The crew noticed a strong odour in the cockpit. Passengers were 
disembarked and switched to a replacement aircraft. 
The aircraft was inspected by 
engineers and cleared to return to 
service. 
14. 
Aug 
Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted. Lack of information. 
30. Jul Embraer ERJ-
135 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smell of smoke in cockpit and cabin, and decided 
to divert. 
Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
29. Jul Havilland Dash 
8-300 
Cruise Cockpit The pilot advised air traffic control of smoke in the cockpit.  The incident was investigated. 
Lack of information. 
28. Jul Boeing 777-300 Grounded Cabin People were boarding at the gate when the crew noticed a strong 
burning odour on board and saw smoke in the cabin. 
Lack of information. 
26. Jul Boeing 737-800 Cruise Unknown The crew reported a smoke indication and decided to divert. On final 
approach the crew advised the fumes had dissipated, they requested 
emergency services to follow them to the gate. 
Attending emergency service found 
no trace of fire, heat or smoke. 
25. Jul Havilland Dash 
8-400 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return to the 
airport. 
The airport reported emergency 
services did not find visible smoke. 
25. Jul Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported a smoky odour on board and decided to return to 
the airport. 
Lack of information. 
23. Jul Boeing 767-400 Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported smoke in cockpit and cabin, turned the aircraft 
around and diverted. 
Lack of information. 
22. Jul Embraer ERJ-
140 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported the left hand engine needed to be shut down and 
decided to divert. The crew subsequently also reported smoke in the 
cockpit while descending towards the airport. 
Lack of information. 
16. Jul Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cockpit The flight crew noticed a smell of burning plastics in the cockpit, 
checked with cabin crew who confirmed the smell was also present 
in the cabin. 
The cause of the fumes could not 
be identified, despite extensive post 
incident maintenance inspection 
and engine run ups. 
28. Jun Airbus A340-
600 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft diverted, due to an irritating smell which made some 
passengers sick. Medics checked one passenger and three crew 
members. 
Lack of information. 
26. Jun Airbus A320- Landing Cabin The aircraft was about to vacate the runway when the crew advised Lack of information. 
  
 
200 they had a strong smell in the cabin. The aircraft taxied to the gate, 
where passengers and crew disembarked normally. The crew 
underwent medical checks reporting dizziness, breathing difficulties, 
nausea and lack of concentration. 
21. Jun Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported the smell of smoke in the cockpit and decided to 
divert. The crew advised on approach that the smell was dissipating. 
The airline reported maintenance 
did not find anything out of the 
ordinary, and the aircraft was 
returned to service. 
19. Jun Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, turned around and diverted. Lack of information. 
17. Jun Boeing 737-800 Climb Cabin Smoke appeared in the cabin obviously originating from the air 
conditioning outlets. The crew stopped the climb and decided to 
return to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
12. Jun Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smell of smoke in the cockpit and decided to 
divert. 
Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
8. Jun Boeing 757-200 Grounded On board Smoke appeared on board of the aircraft prompting the evacuation of 
the aircraft via slides. 
There was no fire, the smoke 
originated from the APU. 
7. Jun Airbus A321-
200 
Cruise On board The cabin crew noticed a very strong, bad smell on board. Three 
flight attendants quickly developed symptoms like concentration 
problems described as "brain fog", tickling and irritation in the throat 
combined with a metallic taste, headache, dizziness and weakness of 
legs. The three flight attendants were taken to hospital. One flight 
attendant remained without symptoms. The hospital took blood and 
urine samples of the affected flight attendants and performed tests 
for blood oxygen levels, calcium, haemoglobin and other substances 
as well as tests for organophosphates, however, no markers were 
identified. The flight attendants were discharged 24 hours later. 
Lack of information. 
30. 
May 
Airbus A320 Grounded Cabin Passengers disembarked shortly after boarding, after a "strong smell" 
was noticed in the cabin. Some passengers reported sore eyes and 
first aid treatment was offered. 
According to a spokeswoman, the 
smell was believed to be related to 
the de-icing process that was 
occurring, due to the cold weather. 
26. 
May 
Havilland Dash 
8-300 
Cruise Cabin Flight attendant reported smoke in the cabin. The incident aircraft underwent a 
series of checks according to the 
manufacturer's maintenance 
procedures, however no fault was 
identified. It was believed that a 
  
 
transient fault in the air 
conditioning system caused the 
smoke. 
22. 
May 
Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported fumes in the cockpit and decided to divert. On 
final approach to the airport, the crew advised they still had a smell 
"back there" but no smoke. 
Lack of information. 
17. 
May 
Embraer ERJ-
190 
Climb On board The crew reported a burning smell on board and requested to return 
to the airport. The aircraft stopped the climb and returned, advising 
the smell was persistent and did not dissipate. 
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
14. 
May 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-82 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smell of smoke in the cockpit together with a 
number of other indications. 
Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
14. 
May 
Havilland Dash 
8-300 
Cruise Cockpit The crew noticed light smoke in the cockpit and a burning odour, 
declared emergency and diverted. 
The Canadian TSB reported 
maintenance was examining the 
aircraft to determine the source of 
the smoke. 
12. 
May 
Airbus A319-
100 
Initial 
climb 
Cockpit The crew stopped the climb at about 4000 feet reporting smoke in 
cockpit, and returned to the airport. 
Emergency services found no trace 
of fire or heat. 
12. 
May 
Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, declared emergency reporting 
fumes in the cockpit and diverted. The crew was still wearing 
oxygen masks during landing. 
Lack of information. 
7. May Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported an odour in the cockpit and decided to divert. The 
airline reported passengers had smelled an odour similar to a nail 
polish remover. 
Lack of information. 
7. May Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cockpit The auto throttle disconnected unexpectedly. The crew worked the 
relevant checklists and consulted with dispatch, then reengaged auto 
throttle. Seconds later a burning smell developed in the cockpit, 
dissipated and reappeared. Suspecting a causal link between the auto 
throttle disconnect and the burning smell the crew disengaged auto 
throttle, the burning smell dissipated again. Sometime later the 
burning smell appeared again, one of the cabin crew reported feeling 
unwell prompting the flight crew to don their oxygen masks and 
divert. The aircraft landed without further incident. The cabin crew 
member did not require medical treatment. 
A preliminary investigation did not 
identify any problem with auto 
throttle. However, a recirculation 
fan of the air conditioning system 
was found seized due to a defective 
bearing causing the burning smell. 
The occurrence was rated a serious 
incident, the investigation was 
continued.  
  
 
7. May Canadair CRJ-
200 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
A loud bang occurred, the left hand engine showed vibrations and 
rolled back, and thick black smoke appeared in cockpit and cabin. 
The crew donned their oxygen masks, stopped the climb at about 
11,000 feet reporting smoke in the cockpit and reduced both engines 
to idle thrust. The passengers oxygen masks was released, and the 
aircraft returned - with both engines still running. 
Lack of information. 
6. May Airbus A320-
200 
Descent Cabin A burning odour was noticed in the business class cabin. The aircraft 
continued for a safe landing. The crew reported that after landing 
smoke became visible in the cabin, but they did not report further 
details. 
Lack of information. 
26. Apr Embraer ERJ-
190 
Grounded Cockpit A strong odour and white smoke appeared in the cockpit. The smoke 
dissipated after the engine thrust had been reduced to idle. 
The Canadian TSB reported 
maintenance identified the left 
hand air cycle machine as source of 
the odour and smoke, and replaced 
the machine, the recirculation fans 
and filters. Following engine 
ground runs went without residual 
odour. 
24. Apr Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the aft cabin and decided to divert. Lack of information. 
24. Apr Boeing 757-200 Climb On board The crew reported fumes on board and decided to divert. On 
approach to the airport the crew reported the fumes were getting 
stronger and requested parking as close as possible to the runway, so 
that people could disembark as quickly as possible. 
Lack of information. 
21. Apr Airbus A320-
200 
Climb On board The crew stopped the climb reporting a burning odour on board, and 
decided to return to the airport.  
Lack of information. 
18. Apr Boeing 777-200 Descent Galley The crew in the forward business galley noticed a burning smell 
prompting the flight crew to declare emergency. 
An inspection found no anomaly. 
17. Apr Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. On 
final approach, the crew, audibly on oxygen masks, advised they had 
an aft lavatory fire indication.  
Lack of information. 
14. Apr Boeing 777-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. The incident was investigated. 
14. Apr Boeing 737-800 Climb Unknown The crew declared emergency, reporting an unidentified smoky 
smell throughout the entire aircraft and requested to return to the 
aircraft. 
The airline claimed the cause of the 
smell was under investigation. 
  
 
10. Apr Airbus A320-
200 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin A strong burning smell became noticeable in the aft cabin shortly 
followed by visible smoke. The crew stopped the climb and returned 
to the airport. 
A malfunction of the air 
conditioning system was suspected 
as cause of the smell and smoke. 
10. Apr Airbus A319-
100 
Initial 
climb 
On board The crew reported smoke on board and decided to return to the 
airport. 
Lack of information. 
8. Apr Havilland Dash 
8-400 
Descent On board The crew reported smell of smoke on board. Emergency services found no trace 
of fire, heat or smoke. 
31. 
Mar 
British 
Aerospace ATP 
Cruise On board The crew decided to divert, due to a smell of smoke on board. Sweden's accident investigation 
was investigating. 
30. 
Mar 
Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin An odour developed in the cabin causing four passengers to feel 
unwell, one required medical attention. 
Lack of information. 
22. 
Mar 
Boeing 737-800 Initial 
climb 
Cabin The cabin crew alerted the flight crew of smoke in the cabin. Shortly 
after, the smoke became also visible on the flight deck. 
The Canadian TSB reported 
maintenance determined de-icing 
fluid had been ingested into the 
APU resulting in the smoke. 
22. 
Mar 
Boeing 757-300 Descend On board An odour on board made three flight attendants feel unwell, two 
flight attendants became temporarily unconscious. The first officer 
donned his oxygen mask. On Mar 18th 2014 the CIAIAC released 
an interim statement stating: "In April 2013 the health of one of the 
flight attendants who had been on board during the flight of 22 
March 2013 worsened, requiring hospitalization. The medical report 
from the hospital indicated poisoning caused by some type of 
neurotoxin." 
After landing the crew activated the 
APU to determine the cause of the 
odour, following the activation the 
odour re-intensified. Spanish and 
German Authorities are 
investigating the cause. 
20. 
Mar 
Boeing 767-300 Climb On board The crew decided to return to the airport reporting a smell of smoke 
on board. 
Lack of information. 
19. 
Mar 
Airbus A300-
600 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, stopped the climb and 
returned to the airport. On approach, the crew reported they had 
received a fire indication for the avionics bay and had observed a 
light odour in the cockpit, and that the indication had extinguished in 
the meantime.  
Emergency services reported 
seeing no smoke around the 
aircraft. They did not detect any hot 
spots. 
17. 
Mar 
Embraer EMB-
120 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported light haze and an odour in the cabin and decided 
to divert. 
The airline reported the air 
conditioning system was identified 
as cause of the odour. 
  
 
14. 
Mar 
Airbus A321-
100 
Cruise Cabin The crew decided to return to the airport, due to a strange odour in 
the cabin. A number of passengers described the smell as 
electric/electronic, others characterised the smell similar to oil 
fumes. The smell was light, but clearly detectable. 
The airline confirmed a strange 
smell on board, and prompted the 
return to the airport. The cause of 
the smell was not determined. 
9. Mar McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. On 
approach, the crew advised they did have a smoke event, however 
the smoke had dissipated and a normal landing would commence. 
The airline reported that smoke 
appeared in the cockpit when some 
anti-ice equipment was activated, 
and dissipated when the system 
was turned off again. 
8. Mar Boeing 747-400 Cruise On board The crew reported smoke on board of the aircraft and decided to 
divert. 
Lack of information. 
6. Mar Unknown Cruise Cockpit Pilots reported a smell of smoke in the cockpit, the aircraft diverted. Lack of information. 
4. Mar Airbus A321-
200 
Cruise On board The crew reported fumes on board and decided to divert to Phoenix. 
All crew were medically checked at the airport, but did not need 
treatment. 
The airline claimed the cause of the 
fumes was under investigation. 
4. Mar Boeing 737-800 Initial 
climb 
Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, stopped the climb at 2000 feet 
reporting smoke in the cockpit and cabin. 
Lack of information. 
2. Mar Boeing 737-500 Initial 
climb 
Cockpit NTSB reported that the odour of old socks was present immediately 
after take-off for about 3 minutes, and about 5 minutes prior to 
landing, again for 3 minutes. Both of the flight crew donned their 
oxygen masks while the smell was present in the cockpit and front 
galley. 
The airline confirmed that the left 
hand engine was replaced after 
landing. It was determined that 
anti-ice fluid had caused the odour. 
Austria's VERSA was investigating 
the incident. 
26. Feb Boeing 737-800 Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew stopped the climb, reporting an unusual odour in the cabin 
and decided to return to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
26. Feb Embraer ERJ-
140 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew reported a smell/smoke in the cabin and requested an 
immediate return to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
23. Feb Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin An acrid odour and haze developed in the cabin, prompting the crew 
to don their oxygen masks and stop the climb, indicating they 
wanted to return to the airport. About 4 minutes later, the crew 
reported they had smoke in the cockpit, which had started to 
dissipate at that point. 
Lack of information. 
20. Feb Embraer ERJ-
140 
Initial 
climb 
Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit. A 
passenger reported that immediately after becoming airborne the 
cabin started to fill with smoke, that appeared to come from the 
Lack of information. 
  
 
cockpit area, the smoke quickly dissipated again and was gone by 
the time of landing. 
20. Feb Havilland Dash 
8-200 
Descent Unknown The airline reported the aircraft was still at cruise level when smoke 
occurred. 
 Emergency services found no trace 
of fire or heat. 
20. Feb Boeing 737-500 Climb Cockpit Autopilot disconnected, followed by the smell of smoke in the 
cockpit. 
Lack of information. 
17. Feb Airbus 320-200 Initial 
climb 
Cabin The cabin crew reported acrid hazy and oily fumes in the cabin, 
prompting the crew to don their oxygen masks, declare emergency, 
stop the climb at 6000 feet, shut the bleed air systems down and 
return to the airport. During positioning for a landing on the runway 
the fumes began to subside. All 6 crew went for a medical check 
after landing. 
The right hand engine was 
replaced. Lack of more 
information. 
17. Feb Boeing 737-700 Grounded Cockpit The aircraft had been de-iced prior to taxiing. The aircraft had been 
instructed to line up and wait, the aircraft was waiting for take-off 
clearance when heavy smoke developed in the cockpit. The crew 
requested emergency services to attend the aircraft and worked the 
relevant fire/smoke checklists, after switching the APU off the 
smoke quickly dissipated. 
The Canadian TSB reported 
maintenance determined de-icing 
fluid had entered the APU's bleed 
air system, and became the source 
of the smoke. No other problem 
was identified. 
15. Feb Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cabin, and 
decided to return to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
14. Feb Boeing 747-400 Cruise On board The crew decided to return to the airport, due to fumes on board. The 
crew donned their oxygen masks and diverted the aircraft, requesting 
medical assistance to await the aircraft. They had four crew 
members feeling unwell. 
Lack of information. 
10. Feb Boeing 777 Cruise Unknown A pilot became nauseous and incapacitated after smelling toxic oil 
fumes. Despite the fumes causing eye- and throat irritation, the pilots 
were able to divert. Oxygen masks were used. 
Lack of information. 
8. Feb Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew turned around reporting smoke in the cockpit, dumped fuel 
and diverted. 
Emergency services advised 
nothing abnormal was seen. 
8. Feb Boeing 737-800 Climb On board The crew stopped the climb, due to smell of smoke on board, and 
decided to return to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
6. Feb Airbus A340-
300 
Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks and decided to return to the 
airport, due to smoke in the cockpit. 
There was no damage to the 
aircraft. Spanish Authorities was 
investigating the incident as a 
serious incident. 
  
 
4. Feb Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Cockpit The crew stopped the climb reporting smoke in the cockpit. The 
crew donned their oxygen masks. 
Lack of information. 
24. Jan Airbus A321-
200 
Climb Cabin The crew stopped the climb at about 9000 feet, reporting smoke in 
the cabin, and decided to return to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
21. Jan Havilland Dash 
8-100 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew received a smoke indication followed by an odour in 
cockpit and cabin. The crew stopped the climb, closed the bleed air 
valves, shut the recirculation fans down, and returned to the airport. 
The Canadian TSB reported 
maintenance investigated to 
identify the source of the odour. 
21. Jan Boeing 737-500 Cruise Cabin Smell of smoke was detected in the cabin, prompting the crew to 
turn around and divert. 
Lack of information. 
16. Jan Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew stopped the climb at 8000 feet, reporting smell of smoke in 
cockpit and cabin. 
Lack of information. 
7. Jan Dash 8-100 Cruise Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks and declared emergency, 
reporting a loud noise of unknown origin and smoke in the cockpit. 
The crew shut down both bleed air systems and observed the smoke 
lighten afterwards. (Same aircraft as 10.01.2013) 
Maintenance determined that oil 
had entered the environmental 
control system at the left hand 
engine, resulting in oil related haze.  
5. Jan Embraer ERJ-
175 
Cruise On board The crew reported smell of smoke on board and diverted. Lack of information. 
4. Jan Dash 8-100 Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew donned their oxygen masks and declared emergency 
reporting smoke in the cockpit. Cabin crew informed the flight deck 
about intensifying smoke in the cabin, passengers were breathing 
through articles of clothing. 
Maintenance identified oil had 
entered the environmental control 
system and produced haze, due to a 
leaking seal at the right hand 
engine. The engine was replaced. 
1. Jan Airbus A319-
100 
Climb Cabin The crew stopped the climb, reported smell of smoke in the cabin 
and returned to the aircraft. 
The aircraft was examined. 
2012 
14. 
Dec 
Lufthansa A321 Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
Reporting of smell and smoke in cockpit and cabin. The aircraft 
returned to the airport for a safe landing.  
The incident was investigated. 
9. Dec Condor Airbus 
A320-200 
Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in cockpit and cabin. 
The aircraft diverted and the passenger disembarked via stairs after 
landing. The airport reported there was smell of burning plastics and 
smell of smoke in cockpit and cabin, the flight crew had donned 
their oxygen masks. Two of the four flight attendants were taken to a 
hospital with breathing problems. 
The incident was investigated. 
  
 
6. Dec Jetblue E190 Climb Cabin The crew reported a smoky odour in the back of the cabin. The crew 
requested to return to the airport. On approach, the crew reported the 
smell had subsided and the aircraft landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
3. Dec Boeing 737-800 Climb Cabin A passenger reported a distinct smell of exhaust fumes in the cabin. 
The crew announced Technical problems and returned to the airport. 
Technical problem. 
2. Dec Boeing 777-236 Cruise Flight 
deck 
The flight crew experienced a series of smoke events on the flight 
deck. They declared an emergency and the First Officer donned his 
oxygen mask. The aircraft diverted.      
The cause of the smoke was 
identified as a bearing failure of the 
primary equipment cooling supply 
fan. 
28. 
Nov 
GROB G115  Landing Cockpit Smoke was coming from behind the instrument panel with 
associated burning smell. A/C was stopped and crew vacated, while 
fire crew attended the scene. 
Lack of information. 
17. 
Nov 
Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Unknown The aircraft suffered a fume event at some point of the flight. 
Germany's BFU made the fumes event stated that the occurrence 
was rated an accident in December 2014, after it became known that 
a flight attendant received permanent and serious injuries as result of 
the fumes event. The flight attendant had since been unable to work 
and was declared unfit to fly.  
The BFU reported that a 
preliminary investigation had been 
initiated immediately after the first 
notice of the occurrence was 
received. Lack of more 
information. 
12. 
Nov 
Boeing 747-400 Cruise Cockpit The cabin crew entered a holding due to fumes in the cockpit. The 
crew subsequently decided to return to the airport, dumped fuel and 
landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
8. Nov Boeing 737-300 Cruise Galley The cabin crew decided to don their oxygen masks and to turn 
around and return to the airport, after a flight attendant in the 
forward galley observed blue haze and a pungent chemical odour 
near the ceiling of the galley, confirmed by other flight attendants. 
The flight attendant working in the forward galley felt unwell. At the 
time of the haze and odour the ovens were not in use and the galley 
lighting had been dimmed down to about 50%. 
Lack of information. 
5. Nov Boeing 747-400 Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting an unidentified smell of 
smoke in the cabin, and requested to divert. 
Lack of information. 
1. Nov Boeing 737-800 Climb Cabin The crew decided to stop the climb, due to fumes in the cabin. The 
aircraft landed safely back on the airport. 
Engine wash prior to flight. 
31. Oct Airbus A380-
800 
Cruise On board The crew decided to return to the airport, due to a strong smell on 
board. 
The incident was investigated. 
29. Oct Boeing 737-800 Cruise Unknown The crew decided to divert, due to a smell of fuel. Lack of information. 
  
 
29. Oct Airbus A320-
200 
Descent Cabin The cabin crew detected a burning smell in the cabin, prompting the 
flight crew to declare emergency. 
Lack of information. 
26. Oct Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cockpit The crew stopped the climb and returned to the airport, due to a 
smoky odour in the cockpit. 
Lack of information. 
21. Oct Airbus A321-
131 
Landing Cabin and 
flight deck 
Whilst on the approach to the airport, a strong smell became 
apparent on the flight deck, which resulted in eye and throat 
irritation experienced by both pilots. Having established that there 
was a similar problem in the cabin; both pilots donned oxygen masks 
and landed the aircraft without further incident. Despite medical 
examinations of the affected crewmembers and an investigation of 
the engines and air conditioning system, no explanation for the 
odour or symptoms experienced by the crew could be found. 
Lack of information. 
20. Oct Boeing 737-800 Cruise On board The crew decided to divert, due to a pungent odour of melting 
plastics on board. Two passengers required medical attention, were 
treated by a doctor at the airport and recovered quickly. 
Emergency services found no trace 
of fire. 
19. Oct Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit, and 
requested to divert. 
Minor technical issue. 
19. Oct Boeing 737-804 Grounded Cockpit As the aircraft commenced its take-off roll, both pilots commented 
on a strange smell. A few seconds later, due to what appeared to be 
smoke in the cabin, the Cabin Service Director (CSD) alerted the 
flight crew to an emergency situation. The take-off was abandoned 
and the aircraft stopped on the runway. Visual inspection by the 
commander confirmed the appearance of a significant amount of 
smoke in the cabin. No source for the smoke was identified, but 
excessive moisture in the air conditioning system was identified as a 
possible factor. 
Excessive moisture in the air 
conditioning system. 
18. Oct Boeing 737-400 Grounded Cockpit The crew smelled strong odour of oil in the cockpit. Oil entering the right hand engines 
bleed air system. 
13. Oct Boeing 717-200 Cruise On board The crew reported smell of smoke on board and diverted. Lack of information. 
12. Oct Airbus A340-
600 
Cruise Galley Two flight attendants working in the aft galley began to complain 
about serious headache, that they thought was caused by glue like 
fumes in the galley. 
Emergency services identified a 
container containing Polyalkyl 
amines (derivative of ammonia) as 
possible source of the fumes. The 
container, however, showed no 
indication of damage or leakage. 
  
 
11. Oct Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting visible smoke in the cabin. 
The aircraft dumped fuel, and returned to the airport. 
Steam from the air conditioning 
system. 
11. Oct Boeing 757-28A Grounded Cabin and 
flight deck 
Smoke and fumes entered the flight deck and cabin during passenger 
disembarkation. Both engines were shut down at the time, but the 
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) was running. 
A faulty APU was identified as the 
source of the smoke and fumes. It 
was suspected that residual oil may 
have remained in the air 
conditioning- or equipment cooling 
systems. 
9. Oct CRJ-700 Grounded Cabin While take-off, the crew reported smoke in the cabin, and the take-
off was rejected.  
Lack of information. 
2. Oct Boeing 737-700 Cruise Cabin  The crew reported smoke in the cabin and diverted, advising the 
smoke was subsiding. 
Lack of information. 
1. Oct Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, stopped the climb, and 
returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
29. Sep Boeing 757-200 Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, declared emergency reporting 
fumes in the cockpit and returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
26. Sep Airbus A330-
300 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported a strong acrid smell, thin visible smoke and a 
temperature rise in the cockpit and requested an immediate return to 
the airport. 
Air conditioning system. 
23. Sep ERJ-145 Climb On board A strong burning smell developed on board. The crew declared 
emergency and returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
9. Sep Dash 8-200 Climb Cabin Passengers and cabin crew smelled smoke in the cabin, prompting 
the flight crew to stop the climb and divert. 
Emergency services found no trace 
of fire or heat. 
3. Sep Boeing 737-800 Landing On board Passengers reported the smell of kerosene on board, and smoke 
appeared. 11 passengers needed treatment by medical service at the 
airport. The airline reported that upon touchdown, smoke exited the 
air conditioning vents for a couple of seconds. There was no smoke, 
but a vapour of hydraulic fluid that produced a pungent odour. 
The airline claimed that a defective 
hydraulic check valve near the 
wheel well was found.  
28. 
Aug 
Boeing 737-200 Climb Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin, stopped the climb, and 
returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
19. 
Aug 
Boeing 757-200 Climb Cockpit The crew decided to return to the airport, reporting smoke in the 
cockpit. During the descent, the crew reported that the smoke 
appeared to dissipate and indicated they would be able to vacate the 
runway. 
The airline said the aircraft 
returned to the airport due to an 
unusual odour aboard, which was 
later linked to the air conditioning 
system.  
  
 
16. 
Aug 
Airbus A321-
200 
Cruise On board A burning odour developed on board, prompting the crew to return 
to the airport. 
Malfunction of the air conditioning 
system. 
5. Aug Boeing 747-400 Climb Cabin A burning odour developed in the cabin, prompting the crew to 
return to the airport. Passengers reported that after the burning smell 
developed the cabin lights went out temporarily. 
Vapour from the air conditioning 
system. 
3. Aug Embraer ERJ-
190 
Climb On board The crew declared emergency, reporting a strange fume on board 
and returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
29. Jul Airbus A321-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and diverted. Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
27. Jul Airbus A319-
100 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, stopped the climb and 
diverted. 
Lack of information. 
27. Jul Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise On board A smell of fuel developed on board, and the crew told ATC they 
suspected a fuel leak at the left hand systems. The aircraft diverted 
for a safe landing. 
A fuel transfer valve had failed. 
23. Jul Dash 8-100 Cruise Unknown  The crew noticed the right hand engine's temperature had risen 
above 1000 degrees Celsius. The flight crew requested cabin crew to 
check the engine. The cabin crew reported light smoke coming from 
a vent tube. The crew shut the engine down and returned to the 
airport. 
Lack of information. 
21. Jul Airbus A319-
100 
Descent Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smell of smoke and loose 
plastic parts in the cockpit while descending. 2 minutes later, the 
crew reported smoke in the cockpit. 
Lack of information. 
18. Jul Boeing 757-300 Climb On board The crew stopped the climb due to an unidentifiable smell on board, 
and returned to the airport. The aircraft returned to the gate, boarded 
the passengers again for a second time, and departed. The aircraft 
returned to the airport due to the same unidentifiable smell. 
Lack of information. 
10. Jul Airbus A330-
300 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft diverted due to an odour in the cabin, and on the way 
reported medical issues. The airline reported 5 cabin crew were 
taken to a hospital feeling nauseous as result of fumes in the cabin. 
Lack of information. 
8. Jul Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted, subsequently 
reporting that the smoke had dissipated. 
Lack of information. 
4. Jul  CRJ-900 Grounded Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew rejected take-off after smoke and a burning smell was 
observed in the cockpit and cabin. 
Air conditioning system.  
2. Jul Boeing 767-300 Cruise On board A strong burning smell developed on board, prompting the crew to 
declare emergency. 
No trace of fire or smoke was 
detected. 
  
 
20. Jun Airbus A330-
300 
Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew decided to divert, due to visible smoke in the cabin and 
smell of smoke in the cockpit. While manoeuvring to the runway, 
the crew reported smoke was no longer visible in the cabin. 
Lack of information. 
12. Jun Boeing 737-700 Climb Cockpit The crew reported fumes in the cockpit, declared a precautionary 
emergency and returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
12. Jun Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. Lack of information. 
9. Jun Boeing 757-300 Cruise On board The crew reported a burning odour on board and diverted. Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire or smoke. 
However, it was confirmed an 
abnormal smell in the cockpit, and 
a source of heat. 
8. Jun Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Flight 
deck 
The crew reported smell of smoke on the flight deck, and declared 
emergency. While on final approach to the runway, the crew 
reported that the smell had dissipated and there was no longer smell 
of smoke present. 
Lack of information. 
3. Jun Airbus A319-
100 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin and 
cockpit 
The captain noticed oil fumes in the cockpit shortly after take-off. 
The first officer, pilot flying, donned his oxygen mask as a 
precaution. The odour of oil was subsequently also reported from the 
front of the cabin, but seemed to subside en route. During the 
descent the odour intensified again, both pilots now used their 
oxygen masks while continuing for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
21. 
May 
Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and decided to divert. Technical problem. 
9. May Boeing 777-300 Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and decided to divert. On 
approach the crew reported the smoke had subsided. 
Lack of information. 
1. May Boeing 767-400 Cruise Cabin The crew reported a smoky odour in the cabin, turned around and 
diverted. On approach, the crew advised they didn't need any 
assistance. 
Lack of information. 
30. Apr Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, reported smell of smoke in the 
cockpit, turned around and diverted. 
Lack of information. 
26. Apr Airbus A321-
200 
Climb On board Shortly after becoming airborne and activation of the air 
conditioning system, a strong odour developed on board. The flight 
crew assessed the circumstances and decided to continue the flight 
using their oxygen masks. 
Lack of information. 
  
 
25. Apr Boeing 737-800 Initial 
climb 
Cabin A strong acrid smell was noticed in the cabin. The crew levelled off 
and returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
20. Apr Fokker 50 Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew received a fire indication for the right hand engine, 
associated with a strong burning smell in cockpit and cabin. They 
stopped the climb, shut the engine down, activated the fire 
suppression system and diverted. 
The incident was investigated. 
17. Apr Boeing 737 Climb Cockpit The captain reported a burning smell in the cockpit during take-off, 
and dissipated at the top of climb. The cabin supervisor and the other 
cabin crew member reported they suffered minor side effects of the 
fumes.  
Recent engine wash.  
14. Apr McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Climb Cabin Cabin crew noticed a smell of smoke in the cabin, prompting the 
flight crew to return to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
3. Apr ERJ-145 Landing Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, and the aircraft was 
evacuated. One passenger was taken to a hospital. The extent of 
injuries was not known.  
Engine seal leak. 
20. 
Mar 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Climb Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting they had smoke in the cabin 
out of the air conditioning vents, no trace of fire. The aircraft 
stopped the climb and returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
16. 
Mar 
Boeing 737-700 Initial 
climb 
On board A strong rotten smell developed on board, which slowly dissipated 
during cruise. Germany's BFU reported that during the flight, one 
cabin crew member already complained about severe headache, after 
landing the entire crew complained about nausea and went to see the 
airport's doctor.  
The incident was investigated. 
12. 
Mar 
Boeing 767-300 Initial 
climb 
Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew received an aft toilet smoke warning, and a strong smell of 
burnt oil developed in cockpit and cabin. The pilot flying donned his 
oxygen masks, the third flight crew member was sent back to the 
cabin to assess the situation and returned reporting there was no 
trace of smoke in that area. Germany's BFU reported that a number 
of cabin crew reported headache and burning eyes. 
Lack of information. 
12. 
Mar 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Climb Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and decided to return to the 
airport. 
Lack of information. 
5. Mar Airbus A330-
300 
Grounded Cabin The crew was preparing for departure, when a strong smell of oil 
fumes developed in the cabin. The departure preparations were 
continued and the aircraft departed. Following take-off, oil fumes 
were noticed in the aft cabin, about 30 minutes after departure a 
Lack of information. 
  
 
number of crew complained about headache, racing heart, dazed 
feelings as well as irritations of eyes and noses. 
24. Feb Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cockpit The crew initiated a diversion reporting fumes in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
21. Feb Beechcraft 
B100v 
Climb Cabin The flight crew noticed very light smoke in the cabin. The flight 
crew declared an emergency and requested a return to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
18. Feb Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise On board The crew reported smell of smoke on board, and decided to divert. Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
12. Feb Canadair CRJ-
900 
Climb On board Increasing oil fumes on board prompted the flight crew to don their 
oxygen masks, stop the climb and return to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
11. Feb Boeing 737-33V Climb Cabin During the climb the flight crew noted the sudden onset of airframe 
vibration. There were no abnormal engine or system indication, but a 
burning smell was reported in the cabin. The commander declared 
MAYDAY and initiated a diversion back to the airport. The source 
of the vibration and burning smell was subsequently identified to be 
a failed bearing assembly in the right air conditioning pack turbofan. 
Failed bearing assembly in the right 
air conditioning pack turbofan.  
6. Feb Boeing 737-800 Climb Cabin The crew reported smell of smoke in the cabin and decided to return 
to the airport. 
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
2. Feb British 
Aerospace Avro-
146-RJ100 
Climb Unknown About five minutes after take-off, the commander noticed nausea 
and dizziness and handed over the controls to the co-pilot. The flight 
was cancelled and the aircraft returned to the airport. The Assistant 
driver handled the remaining time of the flight with only 
sporadically participation from the commander. The commander was 
taken to hospital for examination. 
Presumed to be TCP-
contamination. 
27. Jan Boeing 757-200 Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew stopped the climb, reporting smoke in the cabin and 
returned to the airport. 
Technical problem. 
24. Jan Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cabin Smoke became visible in the cabin. The crew declared emergency, 
turned around, and diverted. On the way back, the aircraft dumped 
fuel. The crew reported they believed the incident was due to an air 
conditioning re-circulation fan. The fan was turned off and the 
smoke dissipated shortly thereafter. The crew requested a full turn 
out of emergency services to check for any indication of smoke on 
Air conditioning re-circulating fan 
was suspected as cause. 
  
 
the outside of the aircraft. 
21. Jan CRJ-440 Climb Cockpit One of the pilots donned his oxygen mask and declared emergency 
reporting they had smoke in the cockpit. 
The incident was investigated. 
20. Jan CRJ-200 Initial 
climb 
Cabin Cabin crew reported burning smell/fumes in the cabin. While the 
flight crew initiated a diversion and actioned the "Smoke and 
Fumes" quick response check, cabin crew attempted to identify the 
source of the smell. After the flight crew had completed the quick 
response check the smell dissipated. 
Lack of information. 
15. Jan Boeing 737-300 Initial 
climb 
Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and returned to the airport. Lack of information. 
13. Jan Airbus A330-
200 
Climb Cabin A burning odour became noticeable in the aft cabin, followed by 
visible smoke. The BFU reported that the rotor of an air cycle 
machine, usually rotating at 35 000 revolutions per minute (to 
prepare engine bleed air for use in the air conditioning system), had 
seized. The turbine had overheated and unprocessed, humid engine 
bleed air had entered the cabin. Later a valve closed, automatically 
preventing such bleed air to enter the air conditioning system. 
The rotor of an air cycle machine 
had seized. 
13. Jan Havilland Dash 
8-400 
Climb Cockpit The crew detected a burning smell in the cockpit, and shortly 
afterwards saw wisps of smoke. The crew performed the smoke drill, 
donned oxygen masks and goggles, declared emergency and 
returned to the airport.  
Overheated and damaged engine 
intake heater adapter, which caused 
the odour to develop and distribute 
through the engine intake, via the 
bleed air and the air conditioning 
system into the aircraft. 
11. Jan Havilland Dash 
7-100 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The lavatory smoke detector triggered, and smell of smoke was 
noticed in cabin and cockpit. 
Fluid evaporated in the air 
condition system. 
8. Jan Canadair CRJ-
200 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit. Ingestion of anti-ice fluid that had 
been applied prior to departure. 
8. Jan Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise On board The crew reported an oil leak on the #1 engine and smell of smoke 
on board, shut the engine down and diverted. 
Oil leak from the #1 engine. 
8. Jan McDonnell 
Douglas MD-11 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported they had smoke in the cabin and cockpit. The 
aircraft dumped fuel and returned to the airport. 
Lack of information. 
7. Jan Airbus A320 Cruise Unknown The flight crew detected a strong chemical odour, unable to 
determine its origin. The flight crew donned oxygen masks and 
declared emergency. 
Air distribution system. 
  
 
4. Jan McDonnell 
Douglas MD-82 
Climb Cabin Crew reported light smoke in the cabin, stopped the climb and 
returned to the airport. The smoke dissipated on approach. 
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
1. Jan Boeing 737-800 Grounded Cockpit During take-off, fumes entered the cockpit via the air-vents, which 
were accompanied by a very foul smell. The fumes and the smell 
seemed to ease slowly after reaching cruising altitude, but occurred 
again during landing phase with the results of both pilots having 
headaches. 
Lack of information. 
2011 
31. 
Dec 
Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cabin  A smell of smoke was detected in the cabin prompting the crew to 
return to the airport.  
Technical problem. No traces of 
fire, heat or smoke were found.  
30. 
Dec 
Canadair CRJ-
400 
Grounded Cockpit Rejected take-off from due to smoke entering the cockpit.  De-icing fluid entered the air 
conditioning packs. 
27. 
Dec 
Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin The crew observed a strong burning smell in the cabin near the 
forward galley and in the cockpit with smoke becoming visible in 
the galley. The aircraft landed safely.  
The incident was The incident was 
under investigation. 
24. 
Dec 
Boeing 747-400 Cruise Cockpit The aircraft was en route when the crew reported smoke in the 
cockpit and diverted the airport for a safe landing.  
Lack of information. 
22. 
Dec 
Fokker 100 Initial 
climb 
Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, and returned to the airport 
for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
21.Dec Bombardier 
Challenger CL-
600 
Climb Cockpit Smoke accompanied by an acrid odour entered the cockpit on 
departure. The smoke subsequently cleared.  
Maintenance found glycol in the 
APU area.  
16. 
Dec 
Boeing 737-300 Climb On board The crew requested to return to due to a burning smell on board. Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
15. 
Dec 
Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin Passengers and cabin crew smelled smoke in the cabin prompting 
the flight crew to divert for a safe landing.  
Lack of information. 
11. 
Dec 
Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, and the aircraft landed 
safely. 
Lack of information. 
10. 
Dec 
Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise Cabin Passengers reported smoke began to appear in the cabin. The aircraft 
landed safely.   
Engine failure. 
9. Dec Boeing 747-400 Grounded Cabin Smoke appeared in the cabin prompting the captain to initiate an 
evacuation of the aircraft. 
Lack of information.  
8. Dec Boeing 747-401 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported fumes in the cockpit and diverted for a safe 
landing.  
Lack of information. 
  
 
7. Dec Boeing 737 Climb Cabin The crew reported an in-flight electric or plastic burning odour, 
verging on intense, from the aft cabin vent. The crew declared an 
emergency and returned to the airport without further incident.  
Maintenance determined that the 
right pack ACM was the source of 
the smell. 
7. Dec Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported the smell of dirty socks in the back of the aircraft 
which could even be smelled in the cockpit. The aircraft returned for 
a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
3 .Dec Boeing 737-700 Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported smoke in cabin and cockpit, and returned for a 
safe landing. 
Flight lubrication applied to 
baroscopic plugs may have leaked 
onto the engine. 
2. Dec McDonnell 
Douglas DC-9 
Initial 
climb 
Unknown The crew reported smoke after take-off. The pilots declared 
emergency, and the flight returned to airport.  
Technicians found excessive 
residual oil from the APU.  
01. 
Dec 
Boeing 737 Landing Cabin A flight attendant detected a burning plastic or rubber odour in the 
front main cabin. The pilots declared an emergency and continued 
the landing. 
Maintenance replaced air 
circulation filters that were found 
clogged.  
31. 
Nov 
Boeing 757-200 Climb Unknown The crew noticed a strong odour and a burning feel in eyes and 
throat. Both crew donned their oxygen masks, and returned to the 
airport for a safe landing.  
Lack of information.  
30. 
Nov 
Fokker 70 Climb On  board The crew reported a burning smell on board and decided to return to 
the airport. The aircraft landed safely. 
Lack of information.  
28. 
Nov 
Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cabin The cabin crew reported burning smell/fumes in the cabin.  Lack of information.  
26. 
Nov 
Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin The crew reported an acrid smell in the cabin and returned to the 
airport. The aircraft landed safely.  
APU bleed. 
24. 
Nov 
Boeing 767 Cruise Unknown A flight attendant reported a burning rubber odour, and it became 
stronger. The airplane returned to the airport and landed without 
further incident.  
Maintenance replaced air 
circulation filters that were found 
clogged.  
23. 
Nov 
Boeing 767-200 Climb On board The crew reported a burning smell on board, and returned to the 
airport for a safe landing. 
The incident was The incident was 
under investigation. 
20. 
Nov 
Avia Yakovlev 
Yak Yak-42 
Climb On board A burning smell developed on board. The engine was shut down, 
and the crew burned off fuel and landed safely. 
One of the engines failed while 
climbing, and caused a temperature 
rise, and a burning smell in the 
cabin. 
20. 
Nov 
Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted to Pittsburgh 
for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
  
 
18. 
Nov 
Boeing 737-700 Climb On board A pungent smell developed on board of the aircraft. With the 
increasing intensity of the fumes the health condition of the first 
officer, pilot flying, deteriorated, about 5 minutes into the flight the 
first officer suffered from a sudden and strong nausea.  
The investigators consider an 
overfilling of engine oil possible. 
18. 
Nov 
Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted for a safe 
landing.  
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
18. 
Nov 
Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cabin The crew decided to divert due to smoke in the cabin. The aircraft 
landed safely. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
15. 
Nov 
Saab 340A Cruise On board A burning smell was observed on board.  Maintenance replaced the right air 
cycle machine due to a suspected 
bearing failure. Responding 
emergency services found no trace 
of fire or heat, and the aircraft 
taxied to the apron. 
14. 
Nov 
Canadair CRJ-
100 
Grounded Cabin Smoke appeared in the cabin.  Fault in the air conditioning system 
is assumed. 
12. 
Nov 
Boeing 757-200 Climb Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and diverted for a safe 
landing. 
Did not find any Technical 
problem. by inspection. 
11. 
Nov 
McDonnell 
Douglas DC-9 
Climb Cabin The right air conditioning pack began overheating with smoke in the 
cabin and did not react to "auto" selection. The flight returned to the 
airport. 
Cabin cooling system. 
11. 
Nov 
Embraer EMB-
145LR 
Climb Cabin Crew reported that, after ice protection test, smoke came into the 
cabin and cockpit along with a loud humming sound over the wing 
root area. The crew declared emergency and returned to the airport.  
Maintenance removed and replaced 
on of the air cycle machines 
(ACM). 
10. 
Nov 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Climb Cabin A loud bang was heard from the right hand engine followed by 
smoke entering the cabin through the air conditioning system. The 
crew returned to the airport for a safe landing.  
Engine failure. 
5. Nov Airbus A321-
200 
Cruise On board A number of passengers noticed a burning smell on board, which 
was confirmed by cabin crew prompting the flight crew to declared 
emergency and to accelerate approach and land. The aircraft landed 
safely.  
Responding emergency services 
found no evidence of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
3. Nov Embraer ERJ-
170 
Climb Cabin The crew reported smell of smoke in the cabin. About a minute later 
the smell dissipated, the aircraft however returned to the airport for a 
safe landing. 
One of two air conditioning 
modules had failed. 
  
 
18. Oct McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Cruise Cabin The crew decided to divert due to a smell of smoke in the rear of the 
cabin. The aircraft landed safely.   
Emergency services found no trace 
of fire, smoke or heat. The incident 
was under investigation. 
13. Oct Airbus A321-
100 
Descent Cockpit The aircraft diverted after the crew reported smoke in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
13. Oct McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Climb Cabin The crew reported smoke in a lavatory and the aircraft returned to 
the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
10. Oct Canadair CRJ-
900 
Cruise Cockpit A passenger on board reported the captain announced a burning 
smell in the cockpit forced them to return. 
Lack of information. 
8. Oct Airbus A388-
800 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
A strong chemical odour of dirty socks was noticed in cockpit and 
cabin. The cabin crew was told that the bleed air supply was 
deactivated on that engine and the odour dissipated. The aircraft 
continued the flight. During the descent, the odour re-appeared, and 
the aircraft landed safely at the destination. 
Lack of information. 
3. Oct Boeing 737-800  Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin. The aircraft returned for a 
safe landing.  
Excess lubricant burning off from 
the fan blades. 
30. Sep Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported smoke in the cockpit. Passengers reported they 
could smell but not see smoke. The aircraft continued for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information.  
26. Sep Douglas DC-9-
30 
Climb Cabin Passengers saw smoke in the cabin prompting the return of the 
aircraft for a safe landing.  
The aircraft suffered a hydraulic 
leak due to the high pressure the 
fluid evaporated causing the 
impression of smoke. 
25. Sep Airbus A330-
200 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
An unusual odour of wet pullovers was observed in the cockpit and 
cabin, especially in the forward area of the cockpit. The crew 
identified a loss of 4 quarts of oil for the left hand engine with the 
right hand engine's oil consumption remaining normal.  
Carbon seals at the left engine's 
spinner were leaking substantial 
amounts of oil. 
19. Sep Airbus A320-
233 
Cruise Cockpit The aircraft experienced smoke in the cockpit. The airplane landed 
uneventfully at its original destination.  
The incident was under 
investigation. 
13. Sep Airbus A321-
100 
Climb Cabin Grey smoke with the smell of burning plastics was observed in the 
cabin. The crew levelled off and returned to the airport for a safe 
landing.  
The incident was under 
investigation. 
12. Sep Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported a popping sound followed by smoke in the 
cockpit. The crew decided to divert for a safe landing.  
Lack of information.  
  
 
10. Sep Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin, levelled off and diverted for a 
safe landing.  
Emergency services found no trace 
of fire or heat. The passengers 
deplaned normally via stairs. 
8. Sep Airbus A321-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and decided to divert for a 
safe landing.  
Emergency services utilizing 
thermal imaging found no trace of 
fire, heat or smoke. 
8. Sep  de Havilland 
Dash 8-400 
Cruise Cabin Smell of smoke was observed about mid-cabin. The crew to divert 
for a safe landing.  
Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
1 . Sep Boeing 737-700 Cruise Cabin The crew requested priority reporting a smoke problem in the back 
of the cabin. The aircraft continued for a safe landing. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
30. 
Aug 
Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and diverted for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information. 
30. 
Aug 
Boeing 737-800  Cruise On board The crew decided to divert after a passenger complained about smell 
of smoke on board. The aircraft landed safely.  
Lack of information.  
14. 
Aug 
Embraer ERJ-
170 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting they apparently had smoke 
in the cabin. The aircraft levelled off and diverted for a safe landing. 
Lack of information.  
14. 
Aug 
Cityhopper 
Fokker 70 
Cruise On board The crew decided to divert due to fumes on board. The crew 
reported both pilots feeling unwell. The aircraft landed safely. 
Lack of information.  
13. 
Aug 
Boeing 767-200 Cruise On board The crew donned their oxygen masks and declared emergency 
reporting smoke on board of the aircraft. The crew decided to divert 
and the aircraft landed safely. The crew told attending emergency 
services that they had been on oxygen masks for about 10 minutes 
due to smoke in the cabin.  
Fire fighters reported no trace of 
smoke. 
12. 
Aug 
Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and accelerated the approach. 
The aircraft landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
8. Aug Boeing 767-300 Climb Unknown Cabin crew reported fumes from the air conditioning system. Cabin 
crew began reporting dizziness, sickness, pale complexion and 
hypoxia. The aircraft landed safely. The Canadian TSB reported the 
affected cabin crew members were sent to the hospital for medical 
attention.  
Air conditioning system. 
7. Aug Boeing 757-200 Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, levelled off at returned to 
the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
31. Jul Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
Passengers reported an unusual smell in the cabin and the crew 
reported a burning smell in the cockpit. The crew decided to divert 
Lack of information.  
  
 
for a safe landing.  
30. Jul  McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin The crew reported smell of smoke in the cabin, levelled off and 
returned to for a safe landing.  
Lack of information. 
29. Jul Embraer ERJ-
145 
Grounded Cockpit The aircraft rejected take-off when smoke entered the cockpit.  Oil in the left hand engine. 
Germany's BFU reported that due 
to defective strip seal in an engine. 
Oil ingress into the air conditioning 
system. Emergency services found 
no trace of fire or heat. 
27. Jul Boeing 737-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. The 
aircraft landed safely. 
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
27. Jul Avion de 
Transport 
Regional ATR-
72 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin. The crew continued for a safe 
landing.  
The incident was under 
investigation.  
26. Jul Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cabin The crew reported smell of smoke in the cabin and decided to divert 
to Omaha, where the aircraft landed safely.  
The incident was under 
investigation. 
19. Jul Airbus A330-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency, reported smell of smoke in the cabin 
and requested to divert. The airplane landed safely.  
Technical problem. 
17. Jul Avion de 
Transport 
Regional ATR-
72-200 
Descent Cabin A smell of fuel developed in the cabin followed by smoke. The crew 
declared emergency and accelerated approach for a safe landing. 
Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
15. Jul Boeing 737-300 Cruise On board Passengers reported the crew announced there were problems with 
the air conditioning system, and oxygen masks were released. A 
burning smell developed on board and it became very hot in the 
cabin. 
Air conditioning system. 
6. Jul Boeing 747-400 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert for a 
safe landing. 
Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
4. Jul Boeing 737-800 Cruise On board The crew decided to return to the airport due to engine trouble. The 
aircraft landed safely. Passengers reported they heard strange 
sounds, a burning smell developed on board shortly afterwards.  
Technical problem with an engine. 
  
 
4. Jul Boeing 737-800 Cruise Unknown The flight crew began to feel unwell (slight breathing anomaly, 
headache, lack of concentration). Almost at the same time cabin 
crew inquired whether the air conditioning was working okay 
reporting all passengers behaved conspicuously quiet, cabin crew 
also complained about headache. The flight crew rearranged air 
conditioning, descended the aircraft to FL330 in order to improve 
cabin air however without noticeable improvement, cabin crew 
reported smelling oil fumes in the cabin. The crew therefore decided 
to divert where the aircraft landed safely. Flight and cabin crew were 
taken to a local hospital for blood tests. 
Inoperative APU. 
28. Jun Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return to the 
airport. The aircraft landed safely  
Not identified. 
27. Jun Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise On board One of the crew donned the oxygen mask, the crew subsequently 
reported a burning smell on board and decided to divert. The aircraft 
landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
27. Jun ERJ 190-200 LR 
Embraer 195 
Cruise Flight 
deck 
The aircraft had departed with a single air conditioning pack 
operating, as permitted by the Minimum Equipment List. When 
passing FL100, the flight crew noticed smoke and a strong 
sulphurous smell in the flight deck. They donned oxygen masks, 
declared a PAN and elected to return to gate. After approximately 
five minutes the smoke and smell had cleared and the aircraft landed 
without further incident. 
Failed second stage turbine rotor. 
15. Jun Airbus A319-
100 
Descent Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported they were on oxygen due to fumes in the cockpit 
and requested emergency services available at the gate. The crew 
continued for a safe landing on runway. While taxiing to the gate 
still on oxygen the crew requested paramedics at the gate reporting 
they had burning fumes in the cockpit and some odour in the cabin, 
the flight crew was suffering from burning eyes and a burning in the 
nose. One of the flight crew was subsequently taken to a local 
hospital. 
Not yet identified. 
10. Jun Boeing 757-200 Cruise Galley The crew reported medium smoke in the area of the forward galley. 
The crew continued for a safe landing. 
The incident was under 
investigation.  
9. Jun Embraer ERJ-
145 
Initial 
Climb 
Cockpit  The crew donned their oxygen masks and declared emergency 
reporting smoke in the cockpit. The aircraft levelled off and returned 
to the airport for a safe landing.  
Lack of information. 
  
 
5. Jun Embraer ERJ-
170 
Cruise Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, declared emergency reporting 
smoke in the cockpit and diverted. The aircraft made an emergency 
descent to 9000 feet. The crew declined any instrument navigation 
reporting the cockpit was filling with smoke.  
Lack of information. 
21. 
May 
Douglas DV-9-
50 
Cruise Galley The crew reported a strange odour/smell of smoke in the forward 
galley and decided to divert for a safe landing. 
Emergency services found no trace 
of fire, heat or smoke. 
16. 
May 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return to the 
airport. The aircraft levelled off and landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
15. 
May 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-82 
Initial 
climb 
Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, stopped the climb at 5000 
feet and decided to return to the airport for a safe landing. 
Small fluid leak in the APU. 
13. 
May 
Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cabin  The crew reported smoke in the cabin and diverted for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information. 
6. May Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and returned to the airport, 
where the aircraft landed safely.  
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
6. May Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smell of smoke in the cockpit and decided to 
divert, and it landed safely.  
Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. The incident was under 
investigation.  
5. May Boeing 737-800 Initial 
Climb 
Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported a smell of fuel throughout the entire cabin and 
cockpit and decided to return to the airport, where the aircraft landed 
safely. 
Lack of information. 
5. May Canadair CRJ-
200 
Climb Cabin The cabin started to fill with smoke. The crew decided to return to 
the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
3. May Airbus A318-
100 
Climb Cabin Passengers observed a strong burning smell soon followed by visible 
smoke in the cabin. The crew returned to the airport for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information. 
1. May Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew decided to divert due to a smoky odour in the cockpit. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
28. Apr Airbus 319-100 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported a burning smell in the cockpit and decided. The 
aircraft landed safely.  
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
25. Apr Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cabin The crew reported passengers had smelled smoke in the aft section 
of the aircraft. The crew decided to divert and landed safely.   
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
  
 
23. Apr Airbus A320-
200 
Initial 
Climb 
Cabin and 
cockpit 
 The crew donned their oxygen masks and declared emergency 
reporting smoke in the aircraft later adding there was smoke in 
cockpit and cabin. The airplane levelled off and returned for a safe 
landing.  
Emergency services reported on 
crew request to see no smoke from 
the aircraft. 
22. Apr Boeing 737-700 Cruise Cabin The crew decided to divert due to a burning smell in the cabin. The 
aircraft landed safely.  
Lack of information. 
18. Apr Avion de 
Transport 
Regional ATR-
72 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported a burning smell in the cockpit and set course to 
divert, where the aircraft landed safely. 
Lack of information.  
14. Apr Embraer ERJ-
190 
Initial 
Climb 
Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported smoke in cockpit and cabin, levelled off at 4000 
feet, joined a right hand pattern and returned to the airport for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information.  
13. Apr Boeing 747-400 Cruise Cockpit  Smoke appeared in the cockpit. The crew donned their oxygen 
masks, declared emergency and diverted to the airport for a safe 
landing. 
Defective strip seal in an engine. 
13. Apr Embraer ERJ-
190 
Cruise Cockpit The crew observed smoke in the cockpit, donned their oxygen 
masks, declared emergency and returned to the airport for a safe 
landing. 
Suspecting a failure of #1 air 
conditioning system. 
11. Apr Boeing 777-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted for a safe 
landing. 
Technical problem. 
9. Apr Airbus 330-200 Cruise On board The crew considered to return to the airport due to strong smell of oil 
on board. The airplane landed safely. 
Not yet identified. 
8. Apr Airbus A330-
200 
Cruise On board The crew observed smell of oil on board. The flight was continued 
for a safe landing.  
Not yet identified. 
5. Apr Boeing 757-300 Climb On board The crew reported a burning smell on board and stopped the climb at 
16,000 feet. The airplane returned to the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
3. Apr Boeing 737-300 Cruise Cabin A burning smell developed in the cabin prompting the crew to divert 
for a safe landing. 
Technical problem. 
2. Apr Airbus A330-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported the left hand engine had to be shut down and 
decided to divert for a safe landing. A passenger reported that there 
was smoke in the cabin. Other passengers tweeted about smoke, 
burning smell and failed lights in the cabin after a sound like an 
explosion. 
Technical failure in an engine. 
  
 
30. 
Mar 
Boeing 747-400 Climb Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cabin and 
returned to the airport for a safe landing. Passengers reported there 
had been smoke in the rear of the aircraft. 
Technical problem. 
30. 
Mar 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-82 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported an odour of smoke without any visible smoke in 
the cabin and due to a thunderstorm front in their south decided to 
divert. During the approach to place of diversion, the crew reported 
the odour was dissipating. The aircraft landed safely.  
Lack of information. 
28. 
Mar 
Avro RJ-85 Cruise On board The crew donned their oxygen masks and declared emergency 
reporting smoke on board. The crew continued for a safe landing. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
22. 
Mar 
Embraer ERJ-
135 
Initial 
Climb 
Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return to 
Louisville. The airplane landed safely on the runway about 8 
minutes after departure. 
Lack of information.  
22. 
Mar 
Boeing 757-200 Cruise Galley The cabin crew noticed an acrid smell of smoke in the rear galley, 
however no smoke was visible. The flight crew decided to return to 
the airport. The airplane landed safely.  
Lack of information.  
15. 
Mar 
Boeing 737-800 Initial 
Climb 
Cabin The crew requested to level off at 7000 feet and return to the airport 
reporting a strong burning smell in the cabin. The airplane returned 
for a safe landing. 
Possibly from the left hand engine. 
4. Mar Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Cockpit The crew noticed smell of smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert 
for a safe landing.  
Responding emergency services 
did not find any trace of fire, heat 
or smoke. 
28. Feb Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cabin A passenger reported seeing smoke. The crew decided to divert for a 
safe landing.  
Emergency services found no trace 
of fire, heat or smoke. 
21. Feb McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Cruise Cockpit  The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted o for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information.  
21. Feb Airbus A340-
300 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return to the 
airport where the aircraft landed safely. 
Technical problem. 
19. Feb Boeing 757-200 Cruise On board The crew reported a burning smell on board and decided to turn 
around and divert. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information.  
14. Feb Boeing 777-300 Cruise Cabin The crew diverted reporting smoke in the cabin. The aircraft dumped 
fuel and landed safely. 
The incident was under 
investigation.  
14. Feb Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. The 
aircraft landed safely. 
Emergency service found no trace 
of fire or heat. 
1 3. 
Feb 
Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting a lavatory smoke alert and 
smell of smoke in the cabin. The aircraft levelled at 5000 feet and set 
Engine #2 produced smoke in the 
bleed air system. 
  
 
up for an approach to the airport. 
11. Feb Boeing 737-800 Climb Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting fumes in the cockpit and 
requested an immediate return to the airport, however did not request 
emergency services on standby. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
9. Feb Boeing 737-500 Climb Cockpit The crew reported smell of smoke in the cockpit and decided to 
return to the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
3. Feb Boeing 737-700 Cruise On board The crew decided to divert due to an unusual smell on board. The 
aircraft landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
29. Jan Boeing 777-300 Cruise Cabin The aircraft returned to the airport after smoke was seen in the cabin. 
The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information.  
29. Jan Boeing 777-200 Cruise On board The crew decided to turn around and divert reporting no serious 
problem and no assistance required after smell of fuel was noticed 
on board. The airplane landed safely on runway. After touchdown 
the crew reported they had quite some strong fumes on the flight 
deck and requested emergency services to follow them to the apron. 
Oil leaked from the APU into the 
air conditioning system.  
26. Jan Boeing 737-900 Initial 
Climb 
Cockpit  Smoke became visible in the aircraft prompting the crew to don 
their oxygen masks, declare emergency reporting smoke in the 
cockpit, level off at 3000 feet and return to the airport. 
Suspected to be related to the de-
icing procedure before take-off. 
26. Jan Boeing 737-700 Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, declared emergency reporting 
smoke in the cockpit and requested an immediate return. The 
airplane levelled off at 3000 feet, the crew reported the smoke 
seemed to subside.  
Lack of information.  
25. Jan McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Climb Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit and 
decided to divert. On approach the crew reported the smoke was 
dissipating, a short time later they advised the smoke was returning, 
during final approach the crew reported the smoke had again 
dissipated with just smell of smoke remaining, no smoke had been 
observed in the cabin, they would advise after landing whether an 
evacuation would be necessary. The crew continued for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information. 
24. Jan Avions de 
Transport 
Regional ATR-
72-200 
Grounded Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew noticed white smoke from on board and almost 
simultaneously fire alerts activated.  
De-icing fluid entering the air 
condition system. 
  
 
18. Jan Airbus A319-
100 
Initial 
Climb 
Cabin The cabin crew advised of smoke with a smell of glycol in the cabin. 
The flight crew levelled off at 4000 feet and returned to the airport 
for a safe landing.  
Found no anomaly. 
15. Jan Canadair-
bombardier/ 
challenger 
 Cabin and 
cockpit 
Smoke and burning odour in the cockpit and the rear of the aircraft.  
Evacuation after returning to the gate. High carbon monoxide levels 
in the SIC after medical examination.  
Lack of information.  
12. Jan Boeing 737-700 Cruise Cockpit  The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information.  
11. Jan Boeing 737-300 Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return to the 
airport for a safe landing. 
The incident was under 
investigation.  
6. Jan Airbus A319-
111, G-EZFI 
Grounded Cabin The airport’s runway and taxiways had been treated with de-icing 
chemicals. After landing, the aircraft vacated the runway, with 
reverse thrust still deployed. Smoke began to enter the cabin and the 
cabin manager advised the flight crew. As the smoke became 
thicker, the cabin manager recommended to the flight crew that an 
evacuation was necessary. 
De-icing chemicals were most 
probably the source of the smoke, 
the density of which was probably 
exacerbated by the prolonged use 
of reverse thrust.  
6. Jan Boeing 737-700 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smell of smoke in the cockpit and decided to 
divert for a safe landing. 
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
3. Jan Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
An unusual odour was observed in the cockpit and cabin of the 
aircraft. The crew decided to return to the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
2010 
31. 
Dec 
Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin The crew reported visible smoke in the cabin as well as cargo and 
lavatory fire alerts. The aircraft returned to the airport for a safe 
landing.  
APU failure. 
25. 
Dec 
Jazz de 
Havilland Dash 
8-300 
Cruise Cabin Mist and an acrid smell entered the cabin. The crew declared 
emergency and diverted. The airport closed all runways to 
accommodate the aircraft. The airplane landed safely. 
Engine fault. 
21. 
Dec 
Boeing 737-8AS Landing Cabin and 
cockpit 
Smoke was observed in both the cockpit and cabin.  The aircraft was 
stopped, the engines were shut down and an evacuation was carried 
out. No technical defect was found during the subsequent 
examination. 
It is probable that the smoke was 
caused by the engines ingesting 
granular urea, which had been used 
to de-ice the runway during a very 
cold weather period. 
  
 
20. 
Dec 
Boeing 737-700 Grounded Cabin Haze developed in the cabin. The crew aborted the climb and 
prepared for a possible return, but were able to clear the haze and 
identify by the smell that de-icing fluid had entered the air 
conditioning system. The crew therefore decided to continue the 
flight and climbed the aircraft to FL300 before they decided to 
divert, where the aircraft landed safely. 
De-icing fluid had entered the air 
conditioning system. 
19. 
Dec 
Airbus A319  Cruise  Cockpit The two pilots noticed an abnormal smell after turning on to the base 
leg. Noticed adverse effect on their physical and cognitive 
performance a short time later. They donned their oxygen masks and 
declared emergency. Both sought medical treatment after landing. 
None of the passengers noticed any of the events in the cockpit.  
Not revealed any indication of a 
technical malfunction. 
17. 
Dec 
Dornier D-328-
300 
Climb Cabin The crew noticed a chemical odour and smoke like haze around the 
map and instrument lights. At the same time the flight attendant 
called the flight deck reporting smoke and odour in the cabin. At the 
same time a smoke indication for the rear toilet illuminated. The 
crew declared emergency, stopped the climb and decided to return to 
the airport.  
Worn and slightly damaged carbon 
seal in the right hand engine. 
16. 
Dec 
Boeing 737-800 Cruise On board The crew decided to turn around and return to the airport after some 
passengers and cabin crew complained about nausea as well as some 
fumes on board. During the approach to the airport the crew initially 
reported they had 4 people complaining upgrading the count to 30 
people some time later. The airplane landed safely, where medical 
services were awaiting the aircraft and took care of the affected 
people. 
De-icing before departure. 
16. 
Dec 
Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cabin One of the air conditioning system emitted smoke into the cabin. 
The airplane returned to airport, and landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
16. 
Dec 
Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise On board The crew reported smell of smoke on board. The crew continued for 
a safe landing. 
Responding emergency services 
found no trace of fire, heat or 
smoke. 
14. 
Dec 
de Havilland 
Dash 8-400 
Initial 
Climb 
On board The crew decided to return to the airport due to an acrid smell on 
board. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
  
 
11. 
Dec 
Airbus A319-
100 
Descent Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks and declared emergency 
reporting smoke in the cockpit. The aircraft continued for a safe 
landing and vacated the runway, where responding emergency 
services examined the aircraft. The crew was subsequently able to 
taxi to the gate, where passengers disembarked normally. The first 
officer and a flight attendant were treated at the airport for smoke 
inhalation. 
Lack of information.  
6. Dec Canadair CRJ-
100 
Grounded Cabin and 
flight deck 
The aircraft rejected take-off because of smoke in the cabin and 
flight deck. The airplane slowed safely, the smoke dissipated after 
engines spooled down.  
De-icing ingested into the aircraft 
bleed system. Responding 
emergency services found no trace 
of fire, heat or smoke.  
29. 
Nov 
Avions de 
Transport 
Regional ATR-
72-500 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smell of smoke in the cockpit and returned to the 
airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
23. 
Nov 
Airbus A340-
300 
Climb On board A strong oily odour on board convinced the crew to return to the 
airport. The airplane levelled off at 6000 feet and performed a safe 
landing. 
New inboard left hand engine. 
22. 
Nov 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-11 
Descent Unknown The crew reported they had smoke coming from the back of their 
airplane and requested emergency services. 
Lack of information.  
19. 
Nov 
Boeing 737-300 Initial 
Climb 
On board The crew noticed an abnormal odour on board prompting the return 
to the airport. The airplane landed safely. 
Newly changed engine. 
18. 
Nov 
Boeing 757-200 Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, reported smoke in the cockpit 
and decided to return to the airport. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information.  
17. 
Nov 
Canadair CRJ-
200 
Grounded Cabin The aircraft rejected take-off from runway after passengers smelled 
smoke and a smoke detector triggered. The crew requested 
emergency services to attend the aircraft reporting a possible fire on 
board. 
De-icing fluid into the air 
conditioning system. 
6. Nov Boeing 717-200 Cruise Cabin  The crew reported an odour and some smoke in the cabin. The crew 
diverted for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
31. Oct Boeing 767-200 Cruise Cabin The crew reported a smell of smoke in the cabin and diverted for a 
safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
29. Oct Boeing 767-300 Cruise Unknown The crew declared emergency and returned due to smoke throughout 
the aircraft. The airplane descended for a safe landing.  
Internal oil leak in the right hand 
engine. 
28. Oct Boeing 747-400 Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return to the Lack of information.  
  
 
airport for a safe landing. 
25. Oct de Havilland 
Dash 8-200 
Cruise Cabin The crew received a fire alert for the lavatory, a short time later 
smoke was observed in the lavatory and in the passenger cabin. The 
flight crew decided to return to the airport. The airplane landed 
safely. 
Oil leak in the bleed air system. 
24. Oct Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and diverted for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information. 
16. Oct Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cabin Passengers thought to smell fireworks. As a precaution the captain 
decided to divert for a safe landing.  
Air conditioning system. 
10. Oct Boeing 737-300 Climb Cabin A smoke detector triggered and a smell of smoke developed in the 
cabin. The crew immediately returned to the airport for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information. 
8. Oct Embraer ERJ-
170 
Cruise Cabin Smoke was observed in the cabin. The crew diverted for a safe 
landing, the passengers were evacuated.  
Problem with the right hand air 
conditioning system. 
4. Oct Embraer ERJ-
190 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and diverted for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information. 
27. Sep McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Climb Cockpit The crew detected smoke in the cockpit shortly after take-off. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
19. Sep McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
 Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. The 
smoke began to appear in the cabin as well. The crew managed a 
safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
17. Sep Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit  The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. On 
approach the crew reported that the smoke had dissipated. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
17. Sep Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cabin A smell of smoke was noticed in the cabin prompting the crew to 
return to the airport for a safe landing.  
Lack of information. 
10. Sep Embraer ERJ-
190 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and returned to the airport for 
a safe landing. 
Lack of information.  
6. Sep Aerospatiale 
ATH-72-500 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft diverted after a smell of fuel developed in the cabin. The 
airplane landed safely. All occupants were checked by medical 
services, one crew member was taken to a hospital as a precaution. 
Lack of information. 
3. Sep Boeing 767-400 Cruise Cockpit The crew decided to divert due to a smell of smoke in the cockpit. 
The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
30. 
Aug 
Embraer-170 Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
Reporting of smoke/fumes in cockpit. Crew reported faint visible 
smoke in cabin as well, with smoke/sulphur smell throughout the 
Pack 2 failure. 
  
 
cabin. Aircraft landed without incident. 
29. Jul Airbus A340-
300 
Grounded Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, levelled off at 5000 feet and 
returned to the airport for a safe landing. The smoke dissipated 
before touchdown. 
Lack of information. 
27. Jul Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The airport said that the crew declared emergency reporting smoke 
in the cockpit. Passengers reported, that smell of smoke was noticed 
in the back of the cabin. 
Hydraulic leak.  
24. Jul McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Cruise Cabin Passengers saw smoke in the back of the aircraft. The crew diverted 
where the airplane landed safely. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
23. Jul Boeing 757-200 Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew stopped the climb, donned their oxygen masks, declared 
emergency reporting a strong smell of smoke in cockpit and cabin 
but no visible smoke and diverted. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
23. Jul Boeing 737-700 Climb Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit and 
returned to the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
22. Jul Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported they had a strong smell of smoke in the cockpit 
but were unable to locate the source. In the meantime the smell had 
subsided.  
Lack of information.  
17. Jul Fokker 70 Climb Cabin The crew reported smoke in the back of the aircraft and requested to 
return to the airport as a precaution. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
14. Jul Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin The cabin crew reported a hot oily smell in the cabin prompting the 
flight crew to return to the airport. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information.  
10. Jul Airbus A321-
200 
Cruise On board The crew reported smell of smoke on board and decided to divert. 
The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
9. Jul Aerospatiale 
ATR-72-500 
Cruise On board The aircraft diverted to Dunedin after a burning smell was noticed 
on board. The airplane landed safely.  
Not yet identified. 
6. Jul Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin The crew decided to divert due to a burning smell in the rear of the 
cabin. The airplane landed safely. 
Not any information  
1. Jul Airbus A320 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and returned to the airport. 
The airplane landed safely.  
The incident was under 
investigation. 
30. Jun Boeing 737-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted for a safe 
landing. 
Lack of information. 
29. Jun Boeing 737-700 Cruise Unknown The crew received an abnormal indication for the right hand engine's 
generator, smell of oil developed in the aircraft. The crew throttled 
the engine back and decided to divert for a safe landing.  
Malfunction of one generator in 
engine. 
  
 
27. Jun Canadair CRJ-
200 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and returned to the airport 
for a safe landing 19 minutes after departure. 
Lack of information. 
21. Jun Embraer EMB-
190 
Descent Cabin The flight attendants reported smoke and fumes in the cabin, and 
shortly after a smell on the flight deck. The crew donned oxygen 
masks.  
Lack of information.  
20. Jun Boeing 737-700 Cruise Cabin The crew reported smell of smoke in the cabin, levelled off at 3000 
feet and returned to the airport for a safe landing. 
Residual engine cleaning fluid. 
16. Jun Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew reported smell of smoke in the cabin and requested to 
divert, where the airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
13. Jun McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Cruise Cabin  The crew reported smoke in the cabin and decided to divert. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Unknown cause. 
11. Jun Boeing 767-400 Cruise Cabin The crew reported a bit developing smoke in the cabin, declared 
emergency and decided to dump fuel, turn around and divert. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
8. Jun Aerospatiale 
ATR-72-500 
Climb Cabin The aircraft was about 5 minutes into the flight when smoke became 
visible in the cabin. During the return to the airport the air 
conditioning system failed. The airplane landed safely. 
Air conditioning system had failed. 
1. Jun Boeing 767-300 Descent Cabin Three flight attendants noticed some fumes in the cabin and shortly 
afterwards began to feel unwell complaining about nausea and 
stinging eyes. The airplane continued for a safe landing at the 
destination, the flight attendants were taken to a local hospital. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
29. 
May 
Airbus A320-
200 
Descent Cabin The airport reported that the flight crew had donned their oxygen 
masks and reported cabin pressure problems as well as possible 
fumes in the cabin causing a number of people to feel unwell. Two 
flight attendants needed medical assistance after landing. 
Lack of information. 
15. 
May 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-90-
3 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit. The airplane returned, and 
landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
11. 
May 
Boeing 737-800 Climb On board The cabin crew noticed an oily smell on board prompting the flight 
crew to return to the airport for a safe landing. 
Cleaning agent used to remove ash 
from the engine. 
7. May Aerospatiale 
ATR-72-500 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft returned to the airport when smoke entered the cabin 
shortly after take-off. 
Lack of information. 
27. Apr Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smell of smoke in the cockpit updating audibly on 
oxygen masks a short time later that visible white haze developed in 
the cockpit. The airplane landed safely.   
Hydraulic leak.  
  
 
26. Apr Avro RJ-85 Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cabin. The 
airplane continued for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
21. Apr Boeing 757-200 Climb Unknown The crew reported engine bleed air problems, possibly through a 
contaminated valve, and a strong smell of ashes. The crew decided 
to return to the airport, where the aircraft landed safely. 
Engine bleed air problem, a 
contaminated valve. 
16. Apr Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. While 
the airplane was on approach to the place of diversion, the smoke 
started to dissipate. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
14. Apr Boeing 757-200 Cruise On board The crew reported a smell of smoke on board and diverted to Sioux 
Falls, where the airplane landed safely 20 minutes later. 
Lack of information. 
8. Apr Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert to 
Tampa. The airplane landed safely about 25 minutes later.  
Lack of information. 
8. Apr Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew smelled smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
4. Apr Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cockpit The aircraft diverted after the crew reported smell of smoke in the 
cockpit. The airplane landed safely.  
Lack of information. 
4. Apr Boeing 737-200 Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Generator control unit failure. 
31. 
Mar 
Airbus A320-
211 
Cruise Cabin In cruise, 1 of the 3 hydraulic systems failed. The flight continued 
toward destination where the flight made an uneventful landing. 
While stopped on the runway awaiting a tow, smoke entered the 
cabin and an evacuation was ordered. Two crew members and 2 
passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation. 
1 of the 3 hydraulic system failed. 
26. 
Mar 
de Havilland 
Dash 8-400 
Grounded Cockpit The crew reported an irregular smell in the cockpit shortly after take-
off and returned to the airport for a safe landing. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
24. 
Mar 
Boeing 737-300 Climb On board The crew reported a burning smell on board and decided to return to 
the airport. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
23. 
Mar 
Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin The airline reported that there had been an acrid smell in the 
passenger cabin. Upon touch down the crew noticed a steering 
problem related to a hydraulics problem. Passengers reported that 
there had been acrid smell in the cabin. Some time into the flight the 
crew announced the airplane had hydraulics problem, but a normal 
landing would follow, emergency services would be on standby. 
After touch down the acrid smell worsened and smoke became 
visible in the cabin. 
Hydraulic leak.  
  
 
23. 
Mar 
Canadair CRJ-
100 
Climb On board The crew decided to return to the airport reporting an unusual odour 
on board. The airplane landed safely. 
Remains of a cleaning fluid in the 
engines following an engine wash. 
13. 
Mar 
Airbus A330-
300 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported light continuous smoke in the cockpit coming out 
of a shielding, declared emergency and turned around to divert. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
12. 
Mar 
Airbus A320-
200 
Departure Cabin The aircraft has just departed, when a strong smell of burned plastics 
and smoke began to fill the cabin prompting the crew to return to the 
airport. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
11. 
Mar 
Airbus A320-
200 
Descent On board Passengers started to complain about chemical chlorine like smell on 
board. Later six passengers and as well as four cabin crew felt light 
headed and complained about nausea. Two doctors on board 
monitored their health status. The flight crew continued to the 
destination for a safe landing, where medical services were awaiting 
the aircraft.  
The incident was under 
investigation. 
9. Mar Canadair CRJ-
700 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and return to the airport for 
a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
8. Mar Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise On board Passengers reported an unusual smell on board prompting the crew 
suspecting a technical defect to divert. The airplane landed safely. 
Possible technical defect. 
6. Mar Embraer ERJ-
190 
Climb Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin and decided to return to the 
airport. While on approach to the runway, the crew reported that the 
smoke had not cleared. The aircraft landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
4. Mar Avro RJ-100 Cruise On board The crew reported a fuel leak and smoke on board. The airplane 
landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
22. Apr Embraer ERJ-
190 
Climb Unknown The flight crew smelled some strange fumes and decided to return. 
The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
17. Apr Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin The cabin crew reported a smoky smell in the cabin prompting the 
flight crew to return to the airport. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
8. Apr Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew smelled smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
7. Apr Boeing 737-300 Cruise Cabin The crew donned their oxygen masks due to smoke in the cabin.  Emergency services checked the 
airplane but found no smoke, fire 
or heat. 
25. Feb Embraer ERJ-
145 
Initial 
climb 
On board The crew reported a smoky odour on board, levelled off at 2500 feet 
and returned to the airport for a safe landing. 
Recently de-icing of aircraft. 
  
 
18. Feb Boeing 757-200 Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks reporting fumes in the cockpit 
and returned to the airport for a safe landing.  
Lack of information. 
14. Feb Airbus A380-
800 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, stating a bit later that the 
smoke had cleared. They decided to return to the airport while 
dumping fuel. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
12. Feb Boeing 757-200 Cruise On board The aircraft returned to the airport after the crew reported fumes on 
board. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
10. Feb Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin shortly after take-off and 
returned to the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
1. Feb Boeing 757-200 Cruise On board The crew reported smell of smoke on board and set course to divert, 
where the airplane landed safely. 
Oil through the air conditioning 
system. 
1. Feb de Havilland 
Dash 8-400 
Descent Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, reported smoke in the cockpit 
and continued for an accelerated landing at the destination. The 
airplane touched down safely and stopped on the runway, the 
passengers were evacuated. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
27. Jan Canadair CRJ-
100 
Cruise On board The crew reported a smoky odour on board and decided to divert. 
The airplane landed safely.  
Attending emergency services 
found no trace of fire or heat. 
25. Jan de Havilland 
Dash 8-100 
Climb Cockpit The crew observed smoke in the cockpit, declared emergency and 
returned to the airport.  
Lack of information. 
9. Jan de Havilland 
Dash 8-400 
Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks and declared emergency 
reporting smoke in the front of the cockpit. The airplane returned to 
the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
8. Jan Embraer ERJ-
145 
Grounded Unknown The aircraft rejected take-off due to a smell of smoke during the 
take-off run, slowed safely and turned left off the runway and 
stopped.  
The incident was under 
investigation, suspects of de-icing 
fluid. 
2. Jan Embraer ERJ-
145 
Grounded Cabin The crew reported they needed an emergency return to the airfield 
because of smoke in the cabin. The crew donned their oxygen 
masks. On downwind the crew reported that they had pretty good 
smoke in the cabin which was now dissipating.  
Lack of information. 
2. Jan McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The crew reported they had smoke in the cabin and needed to return 
immediately. The crew later explained that they had seen light 
smoke in the cockpit and smoke in the cabin, which appeared to be 
under control and dispersing by then. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
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30. 
Dec 
Boeing 737-700 Initial 
climb 
Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return to the 
airport. 
Lack of information. 
20. 
Dec 
Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit. The airplane landed safely, 
the passengers quickly disembarked. 
Lack of information. 
19. 
Dec 
Bombardier 
Dash 8 Q400 
Cruise Cockpit During the cruise a warning caption in the cockpit illuminated and a 
burning smell was noted. The Commander decided to divert.  
Overheated and mechanical failure 
of right engine air intake heated 
adapter. 
17. 
Dec 
Canadair CRJ-
100 
Climb Unknown The crew observed sparks and a puff of smoke coming from the 
overhead panel. The smoke dissipated quickly, the crew nonetheless 
declared emergency and returned to the airport for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
16. 
Dec 
Dash 8-400 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit following a smoke detector 
alert. The airplane diverted, and landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
29. 
Nov 
Avro RJ-85 Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The aircraft returned to the airport when smoke developed in the 
cockpit and became also visible in the forward rows of the passenger 
cabin shortly after take-off. The airplane landed safely. 
De-icing fluid had entered the air 
conditioning system. 
25. 
Nov 
Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cockpit A smoke detector triggered prompting the crew to declare 
emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit and to divert. The airplane 
landed safely. 
Emergency services did not find 
any traces of smoke or fire. 
12. 
Nov 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-11 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit when the airplane was en 
route.  
A thrust reverser actuator on the 
left hand engine leaked hydraulic 
fluid onto a bleed air duct. 
1. Nov Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit, and returned to the airport. 
The airplane landed safely, the passenger disembarked normally. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
31. Oct BA184 Unknown Unknown More than 200 passengers were at the centre of a fumes alert at the 
airport after at least six fainted during a transatlantic British Airways 
flight. 
Lack of information. 
27. Oct de Havilland 
Dash 8-300 
Cruise Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting a smell of smoke in the 
cockpit about 10 minutes into the flight. The crew donned their 
oxygen masks and managed a safe landing. 
Lack of information.  
12. Oct Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. The 
airplane landed safely. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
6. Oct Boeing 777-300 Climb Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit while climbing through 15 
000 feet departing the airport about 8 minutes into the flight and 
decided to return.   
Left engine pressure 
regulating/shut off valve. 
  
 
2. Oct Embraer ERJ-
195 
Descent Cabin A burning smell developed in the cabin. The crew declared 
emergency and accelerated descent, approach and landing for a safe 
touchdown.  
Attending emergency services 
identified an overheated bearing in 
the air conditioning system as 
cause of the smell.  
20. Sep Fokker 100 Cruise Cabin The aircraft diverted after the crew reported smoke in the cabin. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
19. Sep Airbus A321-
200 
Cruise On board The aircraft diverted due to smoke on board. The airplane landed 
safely. 
Lack of information. 
18. Sep Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Unknown The crew reported smell of smoke and strange sounds and diverted. 
The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
12. Sep Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cockpit The aircraft diverted after the crew reported smoke in the cockpit. 
The airplane landed safely.  
No trace of fire or heat was found. 
9. Sep Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise On board The crew noticed a smell of smoke on board. The airplane landed 
safely. 
Lack of information. 
2. Sep Boeing 737-300 Cruise On board The aircraft diverted after cabin crew noticed a smell of smoke on 
board. The airplane landed safely. 
Failed seal of the air conditioning 
system. 
2. Sep Embraer ERJ-
135 
Cruise Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit and 
decided to divert, where the airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
26. 
Aug 
Boeing 737-700 Cruise On board The aircraft returned to the airport after the crew reported smell of 
smoke on board. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
26. 
Aug 
Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise On board The crew reported smoke on board while on approach to the 
destination. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
25. 
Aug 
Boeing 747-400 Cruise On board A burning smell developed on board. The airplane landed safely.  Lack of information. 
23. 
Aug 
Embraer ERJ-
145 
Climb Unknown A burning smell developed about 10 minutes into the flight followed 
by a smoke detector triggering. The airplane returned to the airport 
and landed safely. 
Lack of information.  
21. 
Aug 
Boeing 757-200 Cruise Unknown The crew reported fumes in the aircraft and requested emergency 
services on standby for their diversion. The aircraft landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
19. 
Aug 
DHC-8-402 
Dash 8 
Grounded Cabin Smoke entered the cabin and flight deck soon after take-off. The 
aircraft returned to the airport and a successful evacuation was 
carried out on the runway after landing.  
Failed internal oil seal in the left 
engine. 
19. 
Aug 
Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin The flight crew decided to divert after passengers noticed a strong 
smell of burning oil in the cabin. The airplane landed safely. 
  
Fire services could not find any 
source of heat, fire or smoke. 
  
 
18. 
Aug 
Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cabin The aircraft returned to the airport after the sound of the air 
conditioning system changed becoming nerve wrecking, a burning 
smell developed in the cabin and light white haze became visible a 
few minutes after departure. The crew dumped fuel before landing 
safely. 
Attending fire services could not 
find any source of heat or fire. 
17. 
Aug 
Embraer ERJ-
190 
Cruise Cabin Passengers reported that they had smelled smoke about 30 minutes 
into the flight shortly after the airplane had reached cruise level. 
Later smoke became visible and developed into thick smoke, and 
then the oxygen masks came down followed by announcements to 
use the masks. About 10 minutes later the airplane levelled off. 
Failure of air conditioning system. 
17. 
Aug 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The aircraft diverted to the airport after the crew reported smell of 
smoke in the cabin and later in the cockpit. The airplane landed 
safely. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
16. 
Aug 
Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency and decided to return to the airport, 
when cabin crew reported smoke in the cabin. The airplane landed 
safely back to the airport.  
Lack of information. 
2. Aug Boeing 757-200 Climb Cockpit The crew donned their oxygen masks, declared emergency reporting 
smoke in the cockpit and returned to the airport. The airplane landed 
safely. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
2. Aug Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cabin The right hand engine failed about 30 minutes into the flight. The 
airplane landed safely. Passengers reported, they noticed a sharp 
bang followed by a burning smell.  
Technical problem. The incident 
was under investigation. 
2. Aug Boeing 757-236 Descent Cabin The aircraft declared an emergency during descent. A status message 
was seen on the flight deck along with smoke in the cabin. An acrid 
smoke was also smelled on the flight deck. The flight crew went on 
oxygen and declared emergency. The flight landed normally.  
Lack of information. 
30. Jul Airbus A330-
200 
Climb Cabin Light haze appeared in the cabin due to an air conditioning problem. 
The crew declared emergency and returned to the airport, where the 
airplane landed safely. 
Air conditioning problem. 
26. Jul Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit  The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert, 
where the airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
25. Jul Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency, reported smoke in the cabin, and 
requested to return to the airport. About 5 minutes later the crew 
reported that the source of the smoke had been put out.  
Lack of information. 
  
 
24. Jul de Havilland 
Dash 8-400 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft diverted when haze/smoke began to come down from 
the ceiling of the cabin. The airplane landed safely. 
Technical failure. 
20. Jul Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The aircraft diverted after the crew declared emergency and reported 
smoke in both cabin and cockpit. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
19. Jul Boeing 747-400 Cruise On board The aircraft diverted after smell of smoke developed on board 
followed by white haze appearing at the ceiling of the airplane. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Leak from air conditioning system. 
17. Jul Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The aircraft diverted after the crew reported smoke in the cockpit. 
The airplane landed safely. 
Attending fire fighters found some 
haze, but no fire or heat. 
17. Jul Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft returned to the airport after smell of smoke was detected 
in the cabin. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
17. Jul Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin A strong noxious ammonia smell developed causing nausea to some 
cabin crew and passengers. The airplane landed safely. 
Found no explanation  
14. Jul CRJ-900 Cruise On board Smell of smoke was noticed on board. The crew decided to divert, 
where airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
11. Jul Boeing 747-436 Unknown Cabin Fumes and smoke were noticed in the cabin when the engines were 
being started during pushback. The intensity of the fumes increased 
and as the aircraft came to a halt on the stand an emergency 
evacuation was carried out.   
Found no explanation.  
7. Jul McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Cruise Cockpit The aircraft diverted after the crew declared emergency and reported 
smoke in the cockpit. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
6. Jul McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Cruise Cabin The airplane diverted when a smoky odour was noticed in the cabin. 
The airplane landed safely after the crew considered diverting. 
Lack of information.  
3. Jul Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin The airplane diverted due to smoke in the cabin. The airplane landed 
safely, a passenger needed to be treated at the airport. 
Lack of information. 
2. Jul Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew declared emergency due to smoke in the 
cockpit. Attending emergency services observed fire detectors going 
off. However, they saw no smoke.  
Lack of information. 
2. Jul Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin Smoke started to appear in the cabin. The crew declared emergency 
and returned to the airport, where the airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
30. Jun Airbus A319-
100 
Cruise On board A flight attendant detected a burning acrid smell on board. The crew 
decided to divert. In the meantime passengers in the first 10 rows 
started to cough. The airplane landed safely. Three passengers 
complaining about shortness of breath and burning eyes were taken 
to a hospital. 
Lack of information. 
  
 
30. Jun de Havilland 
Dash 8-100 
Climb Cabin The aircraft returned to the airport after an engine showed a 
temperature indication shortly after take-off and had to be shut 
down. The airplane landed safely. Passengers reported a strong smell 
of burning rubber in the cabin developing after take-off. 
Lack of information. 
29. Jun Boeing 737-500 Cruise Cabin Smoke filled the cabin. The airplane diverted and landed safely, no 
injuries occurred. 
Technical defect. 
29. Jun Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and decided to return to the 
airport, where the airplane landed safely shortly after take-off. The 
airline reported, that there was no fire on board, some light haze 
smelling of oil was visible and an oil indication illuminated. 
Oil leakage. 
28. Jun Airbus A310-
300 
 Cabin Smoke started to fill the cabin. The crew declared emergency and 
returned to the airport, where the airplane landed safely.  
Air conditioning system. 
27. Jun Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the rear of the 
cabin shortly after take-off from the airport and decided to return. 
The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
27. Jun Airbus A330-
300 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft diverted after smoke became visible in the cabin about 
50 minutes into the flight and a source of the smoke could not be 
determined by the flight attendants. The airplane diverted and landed 
safely. 
Attending fire services could not 
detect any source of heat or fire. 
22. Jun McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Landing Cabin The crew started the auxiliary power unit (APU) after landing. 
Smoke appeared in the cabin immediately thereafter prompting the 
crew to initiate an evacuation.  
APU. 
21. Jun Airbus A319-
100 
Climb Cabin A smell of smoke developed in the cabin. The aircraft returned to the 
airport.  
The airplane landed safely, 
emergency services could not 
establish any fire or heat. 
5. Jun Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cabin Intermittent smell in the rear of the cabin while cruising. Did not 
detect the source. Cabin crew presented various symptoms on 
descent prior to landing. Two of them used oxygen before 
recovering sufficiently to resume their duties.  
No explanations of the cause. 
4. Jun Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin A loud bang was heard from the left hand engine. Shortly thereafter 
smoke began to fill the cabin. The crew shut down the engine, 
declared emergency and diverted, where the airplane landed safely. 
Oil leakage. 
2. Jun Boeing 757-200 Cruise On board The crew declared emergency reporting smoke on board and 
diverted. The airplane descended and landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
1. Jun Embraer ERJ- Initial Cabin A burning smell of rubber developed in the cabin. The airplane Fluids entering the cabin via the air 
  
 
170 climb returned and landed safely. conditioning system. 
20. 
May 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Landing Cabin Smell of burning plastics was noticed in the cabin. While the 
airplane taxied to the gate, thick smoke entered the cabin appearing 
to come from the air conditioning vents. The airplane was stopped 
and evacuated onto the taxiway. Passengers reported that the smoke 
affected respiration and eyes. 
Technical problem. 
18. 
May 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-83 
Cruise Cockpit The crew reported smoke in the cockpit. The airplane landed safely 
on runway and taxied to a gate, where passengers disembarked 
normally. 
Lack of information. 
15. 
May 
Boeing 757-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit and 
diverted. The airplane made a safe visual landing. The smoke 
dissipated after landing. 
Emergency services could not 
establish a source of fire or heat. 
Engineers are currently examining 
the aircraft to find the source of the 
smoke. 
12. 
May 
Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cabin The aircraft was en route, when cabin crew observed smoke in the 
cabin. The flight crew declared emergency and diverted for a safe 
landing. 
Emergency services could not 
establish a source of fire or heat.  
12. 
May 
Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise Cockpit The crew rearranged the bleed transfer resulting in smoke appearing 
in the cockpit and in the lavatory. The crew declared emergency, 
reset the bleed transfer to the previous setting and shut the APU 
down. The smoke dissipated again, the aircraft landed safely. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
6. May Avro RJ-85 Cruise Cabin The aircraft initiated an emergency descent due to smoke in the 
cabin.  
Lack of information. 
29. Apr Embraer ERJ-
170 
Climb Cabin Smoke originating from the air conditioning system entered the 
cabin shortly after take-off. The airplane landed safely. The airplane 
taxied to the gate, passengers disembarked normally. 
Lack of information. 
24. Apr Embraer ERJ-
135 
Descent Cockpit  The crew reported smoke in the cockpit about 7 minutes prior to 
estimate landing. The landing was accelerated, the airplane landed 
safely.  
Technical defect. 
1. Apr Boeing 767-300 Climb Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit and 
diverted. The airplane landed safely. 
Emergency services found no trace 
of heat or fire, the cause of the 
smoke is being investigated. 
29. 
Mar  
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-82 
Climb Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit. The 
airplane landed safely. 
Fire-fighters could not establish 
any source of fire or heat. 
  
 
13. 
Mar 
Airbus A330-
200 
Climb Cabin and 
cockpit 
The aircraft returned to the airport after thick smoke entered cockpit 
and cabin after take-off. 
Problem with the air conditioning 
system. 
12. 
May 
British 
Aerospace 
BAe146-300 
Climb Cockpit An acrid smell and visible haze developed in the cockpit. Both pilots 
started to feel unwell, the captain noticed deterioration in his own 
performance. Both pilots donned their oxygen masks, declared 
emergency and returned to gate for a safe landing. 
The incident was under 
investigation. 
12. 
May 
Aerospatiale 
ATH-42-300 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft returned to the airport when a strong burning smell 
developed in the cabin about 15 minutes into the flight followed by 
visible smoke out of the air conditioning system shortly thereafter.  
Lack of information. 
30. Apr Boeing 747-400 Cruise On board The passengers noticed a burning smell on board about 2 hours prior 
to expected arrival. The crew declared emergency and decided to 
divert. The airplane landed safely. 
Hydraulic leak.  
14. Apr Embraer ERJ-
190 
Grounded Cabin The crew reported smoke in the cabin after take-off and requested to 
return to the airport. The crew reported, that the smoke started to 
dissipate, but there was still haze in the mid cabin and it was still 
warm there. The airplane landed safely.  
Lack of information. 
14. 
Mar 
Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cockpit The aircraft returned to gate after a burning smell developed in the 
cockpit during climb. The airplane landed safely. 
Lack of information. 
26. Feb Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency after a smoke detector went off in the 
cargo department and passengers reported smelling smoke shortly 
before touchdown. The airplane landed safely.  
Lack of information. 
21. Feb Embraer ERJ-
170 
Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
The aircraft returned to the airport after smoke was noticed in both 
cabin and cockpit. The landing was safe. 
Malfunction of the air conditioning 
system. 
19. Feb Boeing 737-800 Grounded Cabin  The aircraft rejected take-off when smoke entered the cabin. Malfunction of the air conditioning 
system. 
15. Feb Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cabin and 
diverted for a safe landing.  
The incident was under 
investigation. 
13. Feb Aerospatiale 
ATR-72-500 
Cruise Cockpit The aircraft was evacuated right before departure due to smoke in 
the cockpit.  
Air conditioning system. 
10. Feb Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cabin and 
diverted for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
5. Feb Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft diverted due to smoke in the cabin. Lack of information. 
28. Jan Boeing 737-800 Grounded Cabin Strange fumes in the cabin prompted the crew to return to the gate. Lack of information.  
  
 
24. Jan Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency and diverted to the nearest when 
smoke became visible in the cockpit and smell of smoke was noticed 
in the first class cabin. The flight crew donned their oxygen masks, 
and the passenger oxygen masks were not deployed. 
Lack of information. 
24. Jan Boeing 737-300 Cruise Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit and 
diverted for a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
15. Jan Airbus A320-
200 
Cruise Cabin The crew declared emergency and diverted after passengers reported 
to have smelled smoke. The airplane landed safely. 
No traces of fire or smoke were 
found. 
15. Jan de Havilland 
Dash 8-100 
Cruise Cabin The flight crew smelled smoke and shortly thereafter saw smoke. 
The cabin crew confirmed seeing smoke in the cabin, too. The crew 
requested to descend and return to the airport.  
While at 11 000 feet the crew 
turned off both bleed air valves, 
which brought the smoke to 
dissipate.  
11. Jan Embraer ERJ-
190 
Cruise Cockpit Smoke appeared in the cockpit while the airplane was en route. The 
aircraft diverted and landed safely.  
Lack of information. 
6. Jan Boeing 777-200 Cruise Unknown The aircraft returned to the airport after the left hand engine failed 
with a loud metallic sound while climbing through 8000 feet, 
followed by an acid burning smell and a fire warning for the left 
engine.  
Lack of information.  
5. Jan Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cockpit The crew declared emergency reporting smoky haze in the cockpit. 
The haze dissipated before the landing. The landing was safe, and 
the passengers disembarked normally. 
The incident was under 
examination. 
2008 
29. Des Canadair CRJ-
200 
Initial 
climb 
Cockpit Crew reported smoke in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
26. Des Canadair CRJ-
700 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin Crew declared emergency reporting a smoke detector had gone off 
shortly after take-off. The airplane returned or a safe landing. 
Passengers reported that smoke became visible in the cabin. 
Lack of information. 
25. Des de Havilland 
Dash 8-100 
Cruise Cockpit Crew declared emergency reporting smoke filling the cockpit and 
diverted. 
Emergency services found no trace 
of fire. 
24. Des Boeing 737-800 Grounded Cabin and 
cockpit 
The flight crew reported that the de-icing began before the airplane 
had completed the push back. The APU was running at the time. 
Smoke began filling the cockpit and cabin. The flight crew got the 
de-icing crew to stop, and began smoke removal procedures. FAA 
spokesman reported at least 23 people complaining about eye 
irritation were brought to hospital. The airport had earlier reported 2 
The airplane filled with smoke 
while the de-icing was in progress. 
Maintenance was investigating how 
the fumes could enter the cabin. 
  
 
people in critical condition. 
11. Des Boeing 767-300 Initial 
climb 
Cabin Crew declared emergency about one minute after take-off, reporting 
a smoke detector had just gone off. The airplane returned for a safe 
landing about 10 minutes after take-off. The airplane was inspected 
by emergency services. A passenger reported that a strange smell 
appeared and white smoke swept along the ceiling. 
Lack of information. 
7. Des Boeing 737-800 Climb Cabin Toxic smoke began to emerge from the air conditioning outlets, with 
passengers panicking and showing first indications of suffocating. 
The oxygen masks in the cabin were not released. As the airplane 
descended, the smoke began to disperse. The landing 15 minutes 
later was safe, medical emergency services immediately entered the 
aircraft to provide help. 
The smoke was likely caused by 
hydraulics oil. The problem was 
within the air conditioning system. 
5. Des Boeing 767-300 Cruise Cockpit Crew declared emergency and diverted after a smell of smoke 
developed in the cockpit of the airplane. 
Lack of information. 
3. Des Embraer EMB-
120 
Initial 
climb 
Cockpit Shortly after take-off, smoke started to fill the cockpit.  Fire services did not find any trace 
of fire, but had to remove the 
smoke from the cockpit. The cause 
of the smoke has not yet been 
determined. 
30. 
Nov 
Boeing 737-800 Cruise Cabin Crew declared emergency following engine problems and decided to 
divert. During the diversion the cabin started to fill with smoke. 
Lack of information. 
28. 
Nov 
Canadair CRJ-
200 
Climb Cockpit Crew smelled smoke in the cockpit. Attending fire services found no 
trace of fire. 
25. 
Nov 
de Havilland 
Dash 8-400 
Climb Cabin A smell of smoke developed on board. The cabin started to fill with 
white haze. 
Lack of information. 
24. 
Nov 
Canadair CRJ-
200 
Cruise Cabin and 
cockpit 
Crew declared emergency due to smoke filling both cockpit and 
cabin and returned to the airport.  
Attending fire services found no 
trace of fire, the source of the 
smoke is unclear. 
19. 
Nov 
Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin Crew declared emergency due to smell of smoke in the cabin. The 
airplane landed safely. 
British Midland claimed the 
aircraft would be checked to find 
the source of the smell. 
18. 
Nov 
de Havilland 
Dash 8-200 
Descent Cockpit Crew declared emergency about 10 minutes prior to landing at the 
destination because of smoke in the cockpit. 
Engineers were inspecting the 
aircraft. 
11. 
Nov 
Boeing 717-200 Cruise Cabin Crew declared emergency and diverted due to smoke in the cabin. Lack of information. 
  
 
5. Nov Airbus A319-
100 
Initial 
climb 
Cockpit Crew declared emergency shortly after take-off due to a smell like 
burning rubber in the cockpit, stopped climbed and returned to 
Winnipeg. 
Air Canada reported, that the air 
conditioning units had been 
serviced and residual lubricant 
produced a burning smell in the 
aircraft. 
24. Oct Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cabin Aircraft returned to the airport after a chemical smell, also described 
as fuel smell, was noticed in the cabin after take-off. 
Lack of information. 
23. Oct Embraer EMB-
170LR 
Cruise Cockpit Crew declared emergency and diverted after the crew noticed smoke 
in the cockpit. 
Lack of information. 
16. Oct Airbus A340-
500 
Cruise Cabin The aircraft returned after a chemical odour, also described as 
burning smell, was detected in the cabin. Passengers reported that no 
smoke or haze was visible inside the cabin. A flight attendant had 
smelled the odour in the back of the cabin. 
The Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority (CASA) indicated to 
open an investigation into the 
incident. 
13. Oct Boeing 757-200 Descent Cabin The crew declared emergency while approaching the destination due 
to fumes in the cabin. 
Lack of information. 
11. Oct Boeing 777-300 Cruise Cabin The aircraft returned after smoke was detected in the cabin. The cause of the smoke was 
investigated. 
10. Oct Airbus A340-
300 
Cruise Cockpit Aircraft returned after smoke appeared in the cockpit. The airplane was examined by 
emergency services after it stopped. 
2. Oct Aerospatiale 
ATR-72-200 
Initial 
climb 
On board The aircraft returned after take-off due to smell of smoke on board. No traces of fire or technical 
malfunctions were found. The 
smell was identified to come from 
the air conditioning system due to 
overload. 
29. Sep McDonnell 
Douglas MD-11 
Cruise Cabin Passengers noticed a smell of smoke coming from the air-
conditioning. While cabin crew started to search the cabin for the 
source of the smell, the flight crew was able to isolate the faulty air 
conditioning unit and brought the smell to dissipate. 
The airline confirmed a break down 
in one of the airplane's air 
conditioning system. 
28. Sep Boeing 737-700 Descend On board Crew declared emergency because of a strong burning plastics like 
smell on board. 
The airplane was checked out by 
fire services. No fire was detected. 
26. Sep Embraer ERJ-
135 
Cruise Cockpit Crew declared emergency and diverted after smoke was smelled in 
the cockpit. 
Fire fighters did not find any trace 
of fire, the source of the smoke was 
unclear. 
18. Oct Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Cockpit Crew declared emergency and returned to the airport due to smoke 
in the cockpit. 
Emergency services standing by 
the arrival determined that there 
  
 
was no fire. The source of the 
smoke was unclear. 
14. Sep Boeing 737-300 Cruise Cabin Crew declared emergency and diverted due to fumes in the cabin. Lack of information. 
13. Sep Airbus A319-
100 
Climb Cabin The passengers reported that about 15 minutes into the flight a 
burning smell developed in the cabin. The aircraft returned to the 
airport. 
Oil lubrication problem developed 
in one of the engines. 
13. Sep Embraer ERJ-
135 
Cruise Cabin Crew declared emergency because of smoke in the cabin about 20 
minutes into the flight and diverted. 
The cause of the smoke was 
unknown. 
10. Sep Airbus A319-
100 
Climb Cockpit Cockpit crew smelled smoke in the cockpit, apparently coming from 
the air conditioning. The crew decided to return to the airport for a 
safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
8. Sep Airbus A320-
200 
Climb Unknown Crew noticed a hydraulics leak shortly after take-off from the airport 
and decided to return. 
The airline confirmed a hydraulics 
leak, the fluid of which entered 
engines and air conditioning 
systems causing the smell on 
board. 
4. Sep McDonnell 
Douglas MD-82 
Cruise Cockpit Crew declared emergency due to an acrid smell and haze in the 
cockpit. The airplane returned to the airport for a safe landing. 
American Airlines reported that 
apparently residual oil in the 
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) was 
heated up causing the smell and 
haze. 
4. Sep Boeing 767-300 Grounded Cabin and 
cockpit 
White smoke developed in the cockpit and the cabin. Engineers are currently conducting 
a thorough investigation into the 
cause of the incident, which is 
understood to be related to a 
cooling fan malfunction, which was 
immediately deactivated." 
23. 
Aug 
Airbus A319 Descend Cockpit Crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit while 
approaching the destination. 
No trace of fire was found. 
15. 
Aug 
Boeing 737-800 Grounded Unknown The aircraft was evacuated shortly before take-off, when dense 
smoke appeared in the rear of the airplane. 
Lack of information. 
7. Aug Boeing 737-700 Climb Unknown Crew declared emergency and returned to the airport after they 
smelled smoke. 
Responding fire fighters found no 
trace of fire. 
  
 
6. Aug Airbus A320-
200 
Descent Cockpit Crew declared emergency reporting smoke in the cockpit and an 
active fire alert while approaching the destination.  
When the airplane was entered by 
fire fighters, there was no report of 
fire, only a strange smell on board. 
The cause of the fire alert was 
investigated. 
6. Aug Boeing 767-200 Unknown On board Burning smell on board. The crew requested to return to the airport.  Lack of information. 
6. Aug Boeing 777-200 Grounded Cabin Crew rejected take-off, when smoke was detected in the cabin. One 
passenger, who left his seat in panic while the airplane was still 
moving, received minor injuries. 
It was assumed, that the smoke 
came from the engine exhaust. 
5. Aug Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin Aircraft returned to the airport after smoke appeared in the cabin. 
Passengers reported that they smelled smoke about 20 minutes into 
the flight, then haze started to fill the cabin. Oxygen masks were 
deployed. 
The FAA reported that a broken oil 
seal had allowed oil to spray into 
the engine, contaminating bleed air 
supplying the air conditioning 
system with haze. 
1. Aug Embraer ERJ-
195 
Cruise Unknown Crew declared emergency and diverted after smell of smoke was 
noticed by the flight crew. 
Flybe reported that a failure of the 
air conditioning system was 
suspected as cause of the smell. 
31. Jul Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit Crew declared emergency and diverted reporting smoke in the 
cockpit. 
No evidence or indication of fire 
was discovered on board of the 
aircraft. 
28. Jul McDonnell 
Douglas MD-88 
Cruise Cockpit Aircraft diverted due to smoke in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
22. Jul Boeing 737-600 Initial 
climb 
Cockpit Crew declared emergency and returned to the airport shortly after 
take-off, when the crew reported smelling smoke in the cockpit. 
Westjet said the problem was a 
strange odour. The airplane was 
thoroughly checked to identify the 
source of the smell. 
16. Jul Canadair CRJ-
700 
Cruise Cockpit Crew reported light smoke in the cockpit and decided to divert. 
When the crew switched the air conditioning off in flight, the smoke 
dissipated. 
Lack of information. 
14. Jul Boeing 737-800 Grounded Cabin A severe thunderstorm arrived over the airport. The crew decided to 
delay departure until the thunderstorm had passed, when suddenly 
smoke appeared in the cabin. The passengers were evacuated. 
Engineers suspected a fault in the 
air conditioning system as cause of 
the smoke. 
13. Jul Canadair CRJ-
900 
Descend Cabin Passengers smelled and saw smoke in the cabin. Lack of information. 
  
 
24. Jun Boeing 757-200 Cruise Galley Crew diverted due to smoke in the galley. Lack of information. 
23. Jun Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cockpit The crew noticed smoke and smell of fuel in the cockpit. As the 
airplane had loaded hydrochloric acid, a hazmat material, hazmat 
crews were dispatched, but found the container intact and no fluid 
spilled. 
The cause of the smoke and smell 
of fuel in the cockpit has not been 
identified. 
19. Jun Boeing 757-200 Climb Cabin Passengers and crew noticed a strange odour inside the aircraft. 
Many passengers complained about the fumes saying they were 
sickened by the odour. 
Lack of information. 
18. Jun Embraer ERJ-
145 
Descend Cabin Crew declared emergency while on approach to the destination 
reporting smoke in the cabin.  
The airplane was checked out by 
fire services, but no trace of fire 
was found. 
17. Jun Boeing 747-400 Cruise Cabin Fumes in the cabin were noticed about one hour into the flight. Lack of information. 
16. Jun Embraer 120 
Brasilia 
Cruise Cabin Crew declared emergency and diverted after smoke developed in the 
passenger cabin.  
Lack of information. 
14. Jun Boeing 737-700 Descend Unknown Crew reported that they smelled smoke. The landing was safe. Lack of information. 
8. Jun Boeing 737-300 Cruise Cabin Passengers smelled smoke in the cabin. Southwest sent a maintenance team 
to inspect the airplane. Lack of 
information. 
6. Jun Boeing 737-700 Initial 
climb 
Cabin Shortly after take-off after passengers in the rear of the cabin 
smelled smoke. The smoke stopped and dissipated before landing. 
Origin and cause of the smoke 
were investigated. 
5. Jun Fokker 100 Descend Cabin The crew performed an emergency descent due to a leaking door 
seal causing rapid loss of pressurization. Oxygen masks in the cabin 
were manually deployed by the crew. Passengers reported smell of 
smoke a bit later, which dispersed again as the airplane levelled off. 
Lack of information. 
2. Jun de Havilland 
Dash 8-300 
Cruise Cabin Crew reported problems with the left hand engine, subsequently 
followed by smell of smoke in the cabin. 
Lack of information. 
30. 
May 
Boeing 737-700 Descend Cockpit Crew declared emergency because of smell of smoke in the cockpit. The smell was found to originate 
from a re-circulator of the air 
conditioning system. 
11. 
May 
Aerospatiale 
ATR-72 
Grounded Cockpit Smoke developed in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
8. May Boeing 757 Cruise Cabin Smell of smoke in the cabin. No sign of fire was found on the 
aircraft.  
  
 
2. May Boeing 737-300 Descend Cabin Smoke and strong burning smell developed in the cabin. The crew 
managed a safe landing followed by an immediate evacuation. 
Lack of information. 
30. Apr Boeing 707 Initial 
climb 
Unknown Aircraft returned to the airport after burning smell developed 
immediately after take-off. 
Lack of information. 
27. Apr Boeing 737-800 Initial 
climb 
Cockpit Fumes were detected in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
22. Apr Embraer ERJ-
145 
Cruise Cockpit Flight crew noticed smoke in the cockpit. The smell was traced back to 
Trichlorpropylane, which got into 
the engine bleed air. 
17. Apr Boeing 757-200 Grounded Cabin Passengers noticed some strange smell when they boarded the 
airplane. Maintenance workers and the captain told them that the 
smell would clear once in flight with the air conditioning system 
working. The smell didn't subside after departure, and about 20 
minutes into the flight smoke appeared and the airplane returned for 
a safe landing. 
Lack of information. 
16. Apr Boeing 737-300 Cruise Cabin Aircraft diverted after smoke was seen in the rear of the airplane. Result of a hydraulics problem. 
14. Apr MD-87 Climb On board A smell of smoke was noticed on board of the airplane. After 
landing the smell subsided, fire brigades could not find any source of 
smoke.  
Lack of information. 
4. Apr MD-88 Cruise Cockpit Aircraft diverted after smoke developed in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
3. Apr Boeing 737-200 Initial 
climb 
Cabin and 
cockpit 
Shortly after take-off smoke poured out of the air conditioning 
outlets. 
According to the crew there was a 
problem with one of the engines. 
1. Apr Boeing 757-200 Unknown Cabin Aircraft returned to the airport after a pressure warning illuminated 
and passengers and flight attendants reported a chemical smell in the 
cabin. 
Lack of information. 
30. 
Mar 
Embraer 145 Descent Cockpit Crew declared emergency while on approach to Indianapolis after 
smoke appeared in the cockpit. 
Lack of information. 
30. 
Mar 
MD-82 Climb Cabin Passengers noticed a smoky smell in the cabin. Lack of information. 
28. 
Mar 
MD-82 Initial 
climb 
Cabin Passengers noticed a smoky smell in the cabin. Lack of information. 
20. 
Mar 
Embraer 145 Initial 
climb 
Cockpit Smoke appeared in the cockpit. Lack of information. 
18. B777-300ER Cruise Cockpit Crew smelt smoke in the cockpit. No cause for the smoke was found. 
  
 
Mar 
9. Mar ATR-42 Grounded Unknown A burning smell was noticed in the aircraft. The crew elected to not 
begin take-off and evacuated the airplane on the spot. 
The air conditioning system had a 
malfunction. 
27. Feb Dash 8-100 Cruise Unknown The aircraft returned to airport after a strange smell developed 
inside. 
Lack of information. 
27. Feb Boeing 37-200 Cruise Cabin Aircraft diverted after smoke developed in the cabin that was 
released by a faulty air conditioning system. 
Faulty air conditioning system. 
26. Feb Boeing 747-400 Cruise Cabin Smoke appeared in the cabin. No fire was found. 
4. Feb Boeing 767-300 Cruise Unknown Flight attendant reported smell of smoke. The origin or cause of that smell 
could not be established. 
31. Jan Boeing 757-200 Cruise Cabin Smoke developed in the cabin, apparently stemming from the back 
of the plane.  
Lack of information. 
22. Jan Airbus A320-
200 
Unknown Cockpit The crew reported visible light smoke in the cockpit Lack of information. 
2007 
31. Des Boeing 777-200 Cruise Cabin The left hand engine started to run rough with "terrible" noises 
(according to passenger reports) and a smell of burning oil 
developed in the cabin. 
Lack of information. 
21. Des Airbus A319 Descent Cabin Smoke developed in the cabin. Lack of information. 
21. Des Boeing 777 Cruise Cockpit Smoke developed in the cockpit about one hour into the flight. Lack of information. 
14. Des Boeing 777-200 Descent Cabin Smoke was filling the cabin. The crew was unable to determine the 
source of the smoke. The first officer noticed a low engine oil 
indication of engine #2. 
The NTSB released their final 
report stating that the probable 
cause of the accident was: "...the 
failure of an engine bearing, 
allowing oil to migrate into the 
environmental system, and resulted 
in the smoke in the cabin." 
23. 
Nov 
Airbus A319 Initial 
climb 
Cabin Dense smoke appeared in the rear passenger cabin, accompanied by 
a smell of burnt plastic. During return to land, the smoke cleared. 
The source of the smoke has not 
been identified. 
  
 
23. 
Nov 
Boeing 767 Cruise Cabin A passenger reported to a flight attendant that he could smell fumes 
coming from the gasper air vent above his seat. The passenger later 
reported that the fumes smelled like jet exhaust. The passenger 
became unconscious, and was administered oxygen. He regained 
consciousness within a few seconds of being administered oxygen. 
A second passenger, seated in the area, also reported feeling 
nauseous at the time. There were no other reports of adverse effects 
from any of the other passengers or crew on board the flight.  
Application of corrosion inhibiting 
compounds in the aircraft's cargo 
bays. The investigation could not 
determine whether the passengers' 
symptoms were as a result of fumes 
in the aircraft cabin, or whether 
there were other unidentified 
medical conditions that may have 
contributed to the symptoms 
exhibited by the two passengers. 
6. Sep BAe 146-300 Cruise Unknown The flight crew became aware of an unusual smell, and there was no 
smoke or haze. The commander later described how he felt as 
similar to being inebriated and that he found it difficult to 
concentrate. The co-pilot initially felt she had a reduced capacity to 
fly the aircraft, but this feeling quickly passed. One cabin crew 
member felt light headed, sick and distressed. The other cabin crew 
member felt tired and slightly sick. The origin of the fumes was 
traced to the forward toilet and was probably due to a chemical in 
the toilet. It was not possible to positively determine to what extent 
the symptoms of the crew were a result of the fumes or of the stress 
associated with the in-flight fumes emergency, or a combination of 
both. 
The fumes may have been as a 
result of formaldehyde, released as 
a degradation product of a toilet 
chemical added during 
maintenance. 
5. Aug S.A.A.B Aircraft 
AB 340B 
Initial 
climb 
Cabin and 
cockpit 
First flight after a routine compressor wash carried out on the 
engines. An odour, which had been apparent inside the aircraft 
during the pre-flight procedure and taxi, and which was described as 
'similar to curry', became much stronger from just before rotation 
until about two minutes after take-off. The operator reported that 
their compressor wash procedure had been followed, and was unable 
to explain the subsequent ingress of fumes to the cockpit and cabin 
of the aircraft. 
Compressor wash fluid was heated. 
23. Jul Fokker 27 Initial 
climb 
Cabin During the initial climb, the cabin crew advised the flight crew that 
there was smoke haze in the cabin. 
An examination of the right engine 
indicated that the number-4 bearing 
air/oil seal had failed. 
  
 
22. 
May 
Airbus A320-
200 
Descent Cabin Smoke developed in the cabin during final approach. German authorities said that the 
cause of the incident was oil fumes 
developing in an engine, which 
were distributed into the cabin 
through the air conditioning 
system, rating the incident as 
"harmless". 
30. 
Mar 
Dornier 228-202 Cruise Unknown The 2-pilot crew became light-headed and felt faint. They 
subsequently made a full recovery. The safety issues identified were 
the failure of the cockpit voice recorder to function as designed and 
the lack of portable oxygen for sustained flights at moderate 
altitudes.  
No cause could be identified. 
16. 
Mar 
McDonnell 
Douglas MD-80 
Descent Flight 
deck 
Smoke on the flight deck. Lack of information. 
19. Feb BAe 146-300 Climb Cockpit The flight crew noticed an unusual smell in the cockpit and shortly 
thereafter began to feel unwell. They immediately donned oxygen 
masks, after which their condition improved significantly. An 
emergency was declared and the aircraft returned, where an 
uneventful landing was completed.  
Oil leak from the No 1 engine, 
which had allowed oil fumes to 
enter the cockpit and cabin air 
supply. 
19. Feb Boeing 747-400 Cruise Cockpit Smoke occurred in the cockpit. Engineers dismantled the left hand 
side of the cockpit to find the cause 
of the smoke. 
  
 
Appendix E: Calculations - Frequency of Possible Fume 
Events 
2007: 14 incidents/365 days  = 0.038 events per day 
2008: 84 incident/365 days = 0.23 events per day 
2009: 95 incident/365 days = 0.26 events per day 
2010: 100 incident/365 days = 0.27 events per day 
2011: 133 incident/365 days = 0.36 events per day 
2012: 89 incident/365 days = 0.24 events per day 
2013: 110 incident/365 days = 0.30 events per day  
The average (2007-2014) = 
                              
       
 = 0.24 events per day 
 
  
  
 
Appendix F: Calculations - Selection Bias 
Knowledge about fume events: 
 
   
          
  
       
    
 
        
 
Considered fume events a problem: 
 
 
   
          
  
       
    
 
       
 
Where: 
2952= No. of pilots and cabin crew who received the survey 
440= No. of respondents who had heard about fume events 
272= No. of respondents who considered fume events a problem 
